Virginia Lawyers Weekly

In this suit by plaintiff tenants alleging a pattern of racial harassment and intimidation during the six-year period the tenants rented a house owned by defendant, including discriminatory statements, forcible eviction and burning of the tenants’ possessions, a Charlottesville U.S. District Court grants defendant landlord summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claims under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a) and 3605(c), but denies summary judgment to the landlord on plaintiffs’ other Housing Act claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 3605(b) and 3617.

In sum, applying the ordinary listener standard to the evidence introduced in support of plaintiffs’ factual assertions indicates that defendant did not make a statement with respect to the rental of the dwelling indicating a preference, limitation, or discrimination against plaintiffs on the basis of race or color in violation of 3604(c), or that defendant made a statement that indicated an intention to make any such preference, limitation or discrimination. While the evidence of these factual assertions may convince a reasonable juror that, “because of race,” defendant violated § 3604(b), the evidence indicates no affirmative conduct on defendant’s part that could support a claim under § 3604(c). Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted on plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 3605(c).

However, there are sufficient issues of fact to deny defendant’s motion as to plaintiffs’ claims under § 3617. In the first instance, it is not disputed that, when Michael Johns attempted to assist his mother in removing her property from the lawn, defendant owner warned him, “Boy, you better get back in your van and off my land.” A reasonable juror could conclude that such conduct indicates coercion, intimidation, communication of a threat or interference on account of Michael Jones having aided or encouraged Mrs. Johns in the exercise or enjoyment of her rights under § 3604(b). Also, a reasonable juror could determine that the owner’s entry upon and taking possession of the property in mid-June, and then discarding and burning plaintiffs’ property, indicates coercion, intimidation, threat or interference prohibited by § 3617. Defendant’s motion will be denied as to plaintiffs’ claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3617.

Given that I am not dismissing all of the claims over which the court has original jurisdiction, and that defendant has not addressed plaintiffs’ state law claims, defendant’s motion will be denied as to plaintiffs’ state law claims.

Johns v. Stillwell (Moon, J.) No. 3:07cv00063, May 20, 2009; USDC at Charlottesville, Va. VLW 009-3-287, 26 pp.

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