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CONRAD v. COMMONWEALTH




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CONRAD

v.

COMMONWEALTH


COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Bumgardner and Frank

Argued at Salem, Virginia

Record No. 3076-02-3

LYNN SPENCER CONRAD

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION[1]
BY CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK

NOVEMBER 25, 2003

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WYTHE COUNTY

J. Colin Campbell, Judge

Thomas M. Jackson, Jr., for appellant.

Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W.
Kilgore,

Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

The trial court found Lynn Spencer Conrad (appellant) guilty of
driving under the

influence of alcohol in violation of Code ? 18.2-266, and
sentenced her to 30 days in jail

suspended for 12 months, and fined her $850. On appeal she
contends that the Commonwealth

failed to substantially comply with Code ? 18.2-268.6. Because
appellant entered a guilty plea to

the charge, we affirm the trial court.

Appellant was convicted of driving under the influence of
alcohol in general district court

on October 13, 2000, and appealed that conviction to the circuit
court. She filed two motions to

dismiss in the circuit court. One challenged the roadblock at
which she had been stopped, and

the other contended that she had been erroneously denied a
breath test. The trial court denied

both motions. On August 13, 2002 appellant moved to suppress the
blood alcohol analysis

because the Commonwealth failed to comply with Code ?
18.2-268.6 when it sent the second

blood sample to the Medical College of Virginia without first
consulting her. The trial court

found that the Commonwealth had substantially complied with Code
? 18.2-268.6, and denied

appellant’s motion to suppress by letter opinion on September
17, 2002. The record reflects that

she pled guilty to the charge on October 22, 2002.

Appellant waived her right to appeal when she pled guilty at
trial.

A voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty by an accused is, in

reality, a self-supplied conviction authorizing imposition of
the

punishment fixed by law. It is a waiver of all defenses other
than

those jurisdictional, effective as such not only in the
lower court

but as well in this court. Where a conviction is rendered upon
such

a plea and the punishment fixed by law is in fact imposed in a

proceeding free of jurisdictional defect, there is nothing to
appeal.

To take any other view would give recognition to an empty right

and permit frivolous appeals for the mere sake of delay.

Peyton v. King, 210 Va. 194, 196-97, 169 S.E.2d 569, 571 (1969)
(emphasis added); see also

Walton v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 85, 91, 501 S.E.2d 134, 138
(1998); Savino v.

Commonwealth, 239 Va. 534, 538, 391 S.E.2d 276, 278 (1990).

Because appellant’s guilty plea waived her right to appeal in
this instance, we affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

Affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES:

[1]Pursuant to
Code ? 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.


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