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COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Bumgardner and Frank
Argued at Salem, Virginia
Record No. 3076-02-3
LYNN SPENCER CONRAD
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
BY CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK
NOVEMBER 25, 2003
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WYTHE COUNTY
J. Colin Campbell, Judge
Thomas M. Jackson, Jr., for appellant.
Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W.
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
The trial court found Lynn Spencer Conrad (appellant) guilty of
driving under the
influence of alcohol in violation of Code ? 18.2-266, and
sentenced her to 30 days in jail
suspended for 12 months, and fined her $850. On appeal she
contends that the Commonwealth
failed to substantially comply with Code ? 18.2-268.6. Because
appellant entered a guilty plea to
the charge, we affirm the trial court.
Appellant was convicted of driving under the influence of
alcohol in general district court
on October 13, 2000, and appealed that conviction to the circuit
court. She filed two motions to
dismiss in the circuit court. One challenged the roadblock at
which she had been stopped, and
the other contended that she had been erroneously denied a
breath test. The trial court denied
both motions. On August 13, 2002 appellant moved to suppress the
blood alcohol analysis
because the Commonwealth failed to comply with Code ?
18.2-268.6 when it sent the second
blood sample to the Medical College of Virginia without first
consulting her. The trial court
found that the Commonwealth had substantially complied with Code
? 18.2-268.6, and denied
appellant’s motion to suppress by letter opinion on September
17, 2002. The record reflects that
she pled guilty to the charge on October 22, 2002.
Appellant waived her right to appeal when she pled guilty at
A voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty by an accused is, in
reality, a self-supplied conviction authorizing imposition of
punishment fixed by law. It is a waiver of all defenses other
those jurisdictional, effective as such not only in the
but as well in this court. Where a conviction is rendered upon
a plea and the punishment fixed by law is in fact imposed in a
proceeding free of jurisdictional defect, there is nothing to
To take any other view would give recognition to an empty right
and permit frivolous appeals for the mere sake of delay.
Peyton v. King, 210 Va. 194, 196-97, 169 S.E.2d 569, 571 (1969)
(emphasis added); see also
Walton v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 85, 91, 501 S.E.2d 134, 138
(1998); Savino v.
Commonwealth, 239 Va. 534, 538, 391 S.E.2d 276, 278 (1990).
Because appellant’s guilty plea waived her right to appeal in
this instance, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
Code ? 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.