LATUCHE v. LATUCHE


LATUCHE v. LATUCHE

(unpublished)


AUGUST 26, 1997
Record No. 3145-96-2

SUSAN C. LATUCHE

v.

RANDALL A. LATUCHE, SR.

MEMORANDUM OPINION[1]
PER CURIAM
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY

Herbert C. Gill, Jr., Judge
Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton

(Thomas O. Bondurant, Jr.; Bondurant & Benson, on brief), for
appellant.

(James M. Goff II, on brief), for appellee.


Susan C. Latuche (wife) appeals the decision of the circuit
court. Wife contends the trial court erred by (1) failing to
award her the marital residence or allowing her to occupy the
marital residence until the parties’ youngest child reaches
majority; and (2) failing to award sufficient spousal support for
wife to retain the financial position she occupied during the
marriage. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we
conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we
summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27.

Marital Residence

Wife sought an award of the marital residence in lieu of
spousal support. The trial court ordered that the marital
residence be sold. The uncontroverted evidence established that
the marital residence was jointly owned marital property and was
subject to joint marital debts in the form of tax liens. The
evidence also established that the sale of the marital residence
would eliminate the majority of the parties’ joint debts.

"Fashioning an equitable distribution award lies within
the sound discretion of the trial judge and that award will not
be set aside unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to
support it." Srinivasan v. Srinivasan, 10 Va. App.
728, 732, 396 S.E.2d 675, 678 (1990). Under Code ? 20-107.3(C), the
trial court was authorized to order the parties to sell the
jointly owned marital residence in order to reduce their marital
debt. While wife sought to remain in the marital residence for
the next eight years, she admitted that the home was in danger of
foreclosure at least one time; that she earned $85 a week but
that she worked sporadically and only approximately twenty hours
a month; that she did not want to work full time while her
children were in school; and that her oldest child was fifteen
and was the first one home from school. We cannot say that the
trial court abused its discretion in ordering the sale of the
parties’ only significant asset to eliminate their joint debts.

Spousal Support

Wife framed her challenge to the award of spousal support as
based upon its inadequacy compared to her financial status during
the marriage. Wife’s argument, however, asserts without
specificity that the trial court failed to consider the statutory
factors when determining the amount of spousal support.[2]

Although the appellant argues that the trial court did not
consider all of the statutory factors, [her] brief fails to
identify which factors were not considered and how they would
have affected the trial court’s determination. Since this
argument was not fully developed in the appellant’s brief, we
need not address this question. Statements unsupported by
argument, authority, or citations to the record do not merit
appellate consideration. We will not search the record for errors
in order to interpret the appellant’s contention and correct
deficiencies in a brief.

Buchanan v. Buchanan, 14 Va. App. 53, 56, 415 S.E.2d
237, 239 (1992) (citation omitted).

Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily
affirmed.

Affirmed.

 

 

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Pursuant to Code ? 17-116.010 this
opinion is not designated for publication.

[2]
While wife cites Code ? 20-107,
which was repealed in 1982, we assume she refers to Code ? 20-107.1, which
contains the statutory factors relevant to an award of spousal
support.

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