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Criminal – Court denies defendant’s third motion to continue trial

Virginia Lawyers Weekly//January 27, 2026//

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Criminal – Court denies defendant’s third motion to continue trial

Virginia Lawyers Weekly//January 27, 2026//

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Where the defendant moved to continue his trial because he had recently retained new counsel, his motion was denied. The court previously granted two continuances, the defendant had a history of seeking to change counsel around key deadlines and he had been warned that further requests for new counsel and continuances on that basis would be disfavored.

Background

On Oct. 9, 2025, a grand jury sitting returned a nine-count indictment charging Warith Deen Muhammad with seven counts of wire fraud and two counts of Travel Act violations. Muhammad has filed a motion for bond, to continue the trial and extend the pretrial deadlines and to substitute attorney.

Bond

When it revoked defendant’s bond, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that defendant had violated the terms of his supervised release by not actively seeking employment and by contacting a person who is or may be a victim or witness in the investigation or prosecution outside the presence of counsel or Pretrial Services. The court further found that the government had shown by clear and convincing evidence that defendant poses a danger to his community and that no conditions of release can reasonably cure this risk.

Defendant now proposes that either his brother or his great-aunt serve as his third-party custodian and that he satisfy his previously imposed work requirement by working as a preparation cook for his brother. The court finds that neither defendant’s brother nor his great aunt is a suitable third-party custodian. As such, his motion for bond is denied.

Continuance

Defendant seeks a continuance of more than three months. But this court has already granted two prior trial continuances—first setting the trial approximately 2.5 weeks after the standard speedy trial deadline and then continuing the trial a further two weeks—both intended to allow defense counsel adequate time to prepare a defense in the case.

Moreover, defendant has a history of seeking to change counsel around key deadlines that raises significant concerns about defendant hiring and firing attorneys as a delay tactic. Indeed, this court previously warned defendant that further requests for new counsel and continuances on that basis would be disfavored. Now, defendant has retained Ms. Collins despite knowing of her personal conflict with the jury trial date.

In her attempt to assuage the court’s concerns about delay tactics at the hearing, Ms. Collins represented that defendant was actually “very apprehensive” about her schedule and that she would have to ask to continue the trial and that he “pushed back” and only agreed to the request for a continuance “after taking a day or two to mull it over.” These representations, if true, alternatively raise concerns about defendant’s willingness to waive his speedy trial rights to continue the trial which the court takes very seriously. Indeed, no speedy trial waiver was included with the motion to continue.

Moreover, a defendant seeking a continuance must show that the public’s interest in a speedy trial is outweighed by concerns related to his ability to prepare his case. Here, more than 2.5 years have now passed since the conclusion of the alleged offense in which defendant is accused of using fraudulent representations to defraud seven investors of approximately $422,500. The government has represented that more than 30 trial subpoenas have been issued and travel has been arranged for witnesses from West Virginia, Maryland, Nevada, Florida, New York and Texas—witnesses that include defendant’s alleged victims, as well as defendant’s former business associates and representatives from financial and banking institutions.

Additionally, defendant has not established that failure to grant this continuance would be likely to make a continuation of the case “impossible” or result in a “miscarriage of justice.” Mr. Hunter, who remains a member of the defense team, indicated that he was preparing to go to trial on Jan. 26, 2026, and that he anticipated being ready to proceed on that date, when Ms. Collins contacted him.

To the extent defendant argues that a failure to grant the continuance would deny counsel for the defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, the government’s evidence raises concerns that Ms. Collins has not exercised due diligence in proceeding with this case. Thus, the motion to continue is denied.

Substitute

Ms. Collins is currently unavailable during the week of trial, which will not be continued. Accordingly, the motion to substitute counsel is denied, although Ms. Collins and Mr. Stewart are added to the defense team and may participate in the preparation of defendant’s defense and in his defense at trial to the extent they are or become available.

Defendant’s motion for bond denied. Defendant’s motion to continue trial and extend pretrial deadlines denied. Defendant’s motion to substitute attorney denied.

United States v. Muhammad, Case No. 1:25-cr-284, Jan. 9, 2026. EDVA at Alexandria (Alston). VLW 026-3-022. 23 pp.

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