Criminal – Court rejects murder defendant’s bias argument

Where a man who was convicted of murdering a transgender woman argued a juror’s post-trial comments and actions showed bias towards him, but the district court observed the juror’s demeanor, posed probing questions and found the juror both credible and impartial during an evidentiary hearing, this argument failed.

Background

A jury convicted Daqua Ritter of three charges related to Ritter’s murder of a transgender woman.

Juror

During jury selection, Juror 71 voluntarily disclosed to the court: “I am trans. And I just didn’t want that to become an issue. I personally don’t think it would affect my decision one way or the other, but I’ll leave that up to you.” Neither party asked any follow-up questions, and the juror was eventually selected to serve as the jury’s foreperson.

Shortly after returning the verdict, one newspaper quoted the juror as saying, “In my personal experience, it can be dangerous for transgender women to date,” and that transgender people “are everywhere. If one of us goes down, there’ll be another one of us on the jury.” Juror 71 told another newspaper, “I wish I had this great angle to give you as a reporter, that my gender identity weighed on this heavily and I saw myself in the victim, but honestly, it didn’t. I followed the evidence and law and followed the judge’s instructions and did what was asked of me and came to that conclusion.”

At a subsequent evidentiary hearing, the court asked many questions of the juror, who affirmed that no past experience affected the juror’s ability to fairly consider the evidence. The court found the juror credible in the jury “questionnaire, during jury selection, at sidebar, and on numerous occasions at the post-trial hearing.” The court found the statements to the press did not contradict the juror’s oath of impartiality.

Ritter argues that the juror’s post-trial actions suffice to show actual bias. Actual bias exists only when a juror cannot or will not decide the case solely on the evidence. The district court observed the juror’s demeanor, posed probing questions and found the juror both credible and impartial. This court will reverse such credibility findings only for “manifest error.” None exists here.

Jury instruction

Ritter next argues that the district court should have granted a mistrial because a curative instruction could not alleviate the prejudice caused by an inadmissible hearsay statement made at trial. The court disagrees.

After the brief testimony was accidentally elicited, both parties impeached Kerria
Mallory. Before Mallory left the stand, she seemed to acknowledge that she had made a mistake in her trial testimony — or, at the very least, that her trial testimony conflicted with her sworn grand jury testimony. So the hearsay testimony was already undermined before the district court issued its clear, direct and comprehensive instruction.

Ritter argues that the hearsay testimony amounted to an incurable confession. But the testimony didn’t amount to a confession at all. The district court acted well within its discretion in deciding that any prejudice from that testimony could be cured by a strong, specific instruction telling the jury to disregard it.

Sufficiency

Ritter challenges his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2). The court needs to ensure that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that Ritter killed Doe because of some characteristic related to gender.

The evidence here suggests that Ritter was motivated in large part by Doe’s desire to publicize their relationship. In other words, one but-for cause of Ritter’s decision to murder Doe was Doe’s indiscretion. But the evidence also supports a jury finding that Ritter would not have killed a biological female who was similarly public about their relationship.

Ritter also argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) for lying to investigators about Doe’s murder. The court again disagrees. The court finds that there was enough evidence to permit a reasonable juror to conclude that had Ritter been truthful with state agents, his statements would likely have reached federal officers.

Affirmed.

United States v. Ritter, Case No. 24-4576, Feb. 18, 2026. 4th Cir. (Richardson), from DSC at Aiken (Lydon). Lindsey S. Vann for Appellant. David N. Goldman for Appellee. VLW 026-2-052. 16 pp.

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