Civil Rights – Jury to decide if Lynchburg police officer used excessive force

Where a man alleged the officer violated his constitutional rights by kicking down his front door, punching him in the head multiple times and allowing a canine to attack him, and a reasonable juror could conclude an officer used disproportionate and excessive force, the officer’s motion for summary judgment was denied.

Background

Herman Evans claims Lynchburg Police Officer Seth Reed violated his constitutional rights by kicking down his front door, punching him in the head multiple times and allowing a canine (Knox) to attack him. He also asserts the City of Lynchburg violated his constitutional rights by having a custom of tolerating the use of excessive force by its police officers and by failing to train its officers about appropriate levels of force. Defendants have moved for summary judgment.

City’s MSJ

Evans first relies on a Monell theory called “custom by condonation.” Under this theory, a municipality violates § 1983 if it fails “to put a stop to or correct a widespread pattern of unconstitutional conduct.”

In his amended complaint, Evans alleged 15 past incidents where Lynchburg police department, or LPD, officers used excessive force against citizens. However, in its summary judgment motion, the city asserts that Evans conducted no discovery to substantiate those allegations and argues no admissible evidence exists in the summary judgment record about those 15 incidents.

In response, Evans cites the city’s denials that there were past excessive force incidents with LPD officers. These citations are insufficient to create a triable issue as to whether there were past instances of LPD officers using excessive force, and if so, whether the city knew or should have known about those instances. Therefore, the city is entitled to summary judgment on that claim.

Evans also argues the city was deliberately indifferent to his Fourth Amendment rights by failing to train its police officers about acceptable levels of force. Evans seeks an inference that the city’s training is deficient based on Reed’s conduct. Because this type of inference is not permitted, the city is entitled to summary judgment on that claim.

Reed’s MSJ

Reed argues that no reasonable juror could find that he used excessive force against Evans. Excessive force cases are decided using the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard, guided by three factors: (1) the “severity of the crime” that is the subject of the stop or arrest, (2) “whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others” and (3) “whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”

Under the first factor, the fact that Reed thought Evans had committed a misdemeanor weighs in favor of Evans. Under the second factor, Evans was undoubtedly foul-mouthed and unpleasant when interacting with Reed. But nothing in the well-
documented video of the incident would lead any well-trained officer to believe Evans posed any danger to Reed or Williams.

Under the third factor, Reed argues that Evans resisted by hitting Knox; but Reed’s bodycam video does not unequivocally show Evans hitting Knox. Moreover, a reasonable juror could find that it shows Evans “naturally responding” to Knox’s bite by trying to pry his jaws open. In fact, Evans quickly fell to the floor after being struck in the head by Reed and remained compliant the rest of the time. Reed has presented no credible evidence that Evans attempted to escape Reed’s control beyond slamming his front door closed.

Having reviewed the entire bodycam video, the court concludes that reasonable jurors could find that Reed used disproportionate and excessive force against Evans given all the circumstances.

Qualified immunity

The defense shield officials when “(1) there is no constitutional violation, or (2) the constitutional right “was [not] ‘clearly established’ at the time of” its alleged violation.” Here, the court has already found there is sufficient, admissible evidence to “make out a violation of a constitutional right”—namely, the rights to be free from unlawful seizure and from excessive force.

Reed argues it is not clearly established that officers must give a verbal warning before ordering a leashed dog to attack. The court agrees. However it is clearly established that an officer violates the Fourth Amendment when they arrest someone without probable cause. It naturally follows that an officer cannot use significant force when effectuating an unlawful arrest.

Even if Reed had probable cause to arrest Evans, it was also clearly established by April 3, 2022, that an officer cannot use intermediate or deadly physical force to seize someone suspected of committing a minor crime who has no weapon, has made no threats and who is not actively resisting.

State claims

Because the court has already concluded that Evans’ excessive force claim should be resolved by a jury, the result is no different for his assault and battery and gross negligence claims.

City’s motion for summary judgment granted. Reed’s motion for summary judgment denied.

Evans v. The City of Lynchburg, Case No. 6:24-cv-00019, Feb. 24, 2026. WDVA at Lynchburg (Moon). VLW 026-3-083. 20 pp.

Full-Text Opinion

VLW 026-3-083
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