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Civil Rights – Court reinstates excessive force claims against police officer

Virginia Lawyers Weekly//April 27, 2026//

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Depositphotos

Civil Rights – Court reinstates excessive force claims against police officer

Virginia Lawyers Weekly//April 27, 2026//

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Where a police officer rammed a man’s vehicle and sent it into a tailspin, and then shot the occupant, the erred when it dismissed his claims.

Background

Acting on a tip from an informant that was illegally dealing drugs, and other detectives arranged for a controlled drug buy in the parking lot of a commercial shopping complex. Once he arrived at the complex, however, Payne became suspicious that something was amiss and began to drive out of the parking lot.

One detective rammed his vehicle into Payne’s car, causing it to spin until it came to a stop near an embankment. The detectives then positioned their vehicles around Payne’s car, blocking Payne inside. Seconds later, fearing that Payne was reaching for a gun, Moser shot Payne through the back window of his car. The detectives later determined that Payne had been unarmed at the time of the incident.

Payne alleges that Moser violated his constitutional rights under the by using excessive force in arresting him. The district court granted to Moser.

Standard

The Supreme Court has articulated three factors to guide this court’s  inquiry into whether an officer’s actions were objectively reasonable or may have constituted excessive force: (1) “the severity of the crime at issue”; (2) if the individual “pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others” and (3) “whether the [individual was] actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”

Arrest

Payne was seized from the moment the detectives carried out the tactical vehicle intervention, or TVI, rammed into Payne’s car and sent it into a tailspin. This court must therefore consider the “proportionality of the force in light of all the circumstances” at the moment Moser authorized the maneuvers to effect Payne’s arrest.

The first factor “intended as a proxy for determining whether ‘an officer [had] any reason to believe that [the subject of a seizure] was a potentially dangerous individual.’” The record evidence supports the detectives’ belief that they had probable cause to arrest Payne for possession of drugs with intent to sell—a felony offense—when he arrived at the location of the planned drug buy. The detectives also had reason to believe that Payne would be armed, having been told repeatedly that Payne often carried a gun. This factor favors Moser.

The second factor, which is considered the most important, weighs in favor of Payne. At the time that Moser directed the detectives to use their vehicles to effect Payne’s arrest, Payne was, by all accounts, driving slowly out of a shopping complex. He was driving neither quickly nor recklessly, nor was there any other apparent danger to pedestrians. A reasonable jury could conclude that Payne posed no immediate threat to the detectives or to any other individual.

The third factor also favors Payne, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to him. All of the detectives’ vehicles were unmarked, black and had tinted windows. The detectives did not activate their lights or sirens, nor did they attempt to pull Payne over, before they used the TVI and PIT maneuvers to stop him. Payne stated both in his interviews with detectives immediately following the incident and in his deposition that he feared someone was trying to rob or kill him. A reasonable jury could conclude that Payne was not aware that law enforcement was in the vicinity. Therefore, Moser is not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

Shooting

Next, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Payne, the court considers whether it was objectively reasonable for Moser to shoot Payne. Importantly, the record contains undisputed evidence that Moser was repeatedly told that Payne was likely armed.

However there is a genuine factual dispute over whether Payne moved furtively. Payne contends that he kept his left hand on the steering wheel at all times as his car spun to a stop, had his left arm by his side on the armrest at the moment that Moser shot him and that he never reached toward the center console. Moser contends, on the other hand, that he saw Payne reach toward the center console. Summary judgment is, therefore, not appropriate.

The district court did not reach the issue of qualified immunity because it concluded that no constitutional violation occurred. Upon remand, therefore, the district court will need to consider—in the first instance—whether Moser is entitled to qualified immunity for either of Payne’s asserted claims of excessive force.

Vacated and remanded.

, Case No. 24-2237, April 13, 2026. 4th Cir. (Berner), from at Alexandria (Nachmanoff). Andrew O. Clarke for Appellant. Kimberly Pace Baucom for Appellee. VLW 026-2-128. 19 pp.

Full-Text Opinion

VLW 026-2-128
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