Habeas Corpus – District court must analyze BOP regulation under Loper Bright

Where the district court deferred to a Bureau of Prisons’ regulation, it erred. While the case was on appeal, the Supreme Court overturned Chevron and held that federal courts “may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.”

Background

Rahshjeem Benson was sentenced in December 2020. But he was not transferred to his designated Bureau of Prisons, or BOP, facility—FCI Edgefield—until March 2022. Prior to his arrival at FCI Edgefield, Benson alleges that he participated in First Step Act, or FSA, programs and earned FSA credits which could expedite his pre-release custody or supervised release.

Once Benson arrived at FCI Edgefield, the BOP administered a risk and needs assessment to determine the FSA programs best suited for a prisoner based on his risk of recidivism. But because Benson did not receive the assessment until he arrived at FCI Edgefield, the BOP refused to give him any credits he alleges that he previously earned.

Benson filed a pro se habeas petition, requesting that the BOP award him the approximately 150 FSA credits he claims that he earned before arriving at FCI Edgefield. After a magistrate judge recommended dismissing his petition, the district court rejected Benson’s objections and dismissed his petition.

Standing

Upon his arrival at FCI Edgefield, Benson received a “low” recidivism risk. But the BOP subsequently re-administered the risk and needs assessment and found that he was a “medium” recidivism risk, placing him outside the reach of certain provisions of the FSA. As a result, the government contends that the higher risk status stands as a statutory bar to Benson having his FSA credits applied, rendering this case moot. This court disagrees.

The FSA does not squarely foreclose a prisoner’s eligibility for prerelease custody or supervised release based on a single determination that he has a “medium” risk of recidivism. It leaves two paths to eligibility: (1) two subsequent reassessments of “low” risk or (2) the warden’s approval of the prisoner’s petition. Under this court’s precedent, Benson’s statutorily-prescribed paths to FSA eligibility for prerelease custody or supervised release are sufficient to establish Article III jurisdiction.

Merits

The district court, applying Chevron deference, concluded that the BOP’s implementation of its “successful participation” regulation was a valid exercise of delegated authority. The trouble, of course, is that Chevron was overturned in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024). In the wake of Loper Bright, federal courts “may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.”

While the district court did not have the benefit of Loper Bright at the time of its decision, it must be applied now. Accordingly, this court remands for the district court to address the Loper Bright issue in the first instance. It briefly discusses some guiding principles for purposes of remand.

Congress decided that a prisoner is eligible to earn credits when his sentence commences. Despite that clear commend, it appears that the BOP’s interpretation of “successful participation” permits it to ignore FSA time credits earned after a prisoner’s sentence commences but before the BOP’s own administration of an assessment. Insomuch as that interpretation is not due the now-discarded Chevron deference, this court leaves it to the district court to flesh out in the first instance whether it is the “single, best meaning” of the FSA.

Vacated and remanded.

Benson v. Warden FCI Edgefield, Case No. 24-6713, April 22, 2026. 4th Cir. (Agee), from DSC at Round Hill (Herlong Jr.). Claire Victoria Madill for Appellant. Todd Stuart Timmons for Appellee. VLW 026-2-144. 17 pp.

Full-Text Opinion

VLW 026-2-144
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