Constitutional – Police’s retention of motorcycles didn’t violate company’s due process rights

Where a financing company argued its due process rights were violated when the police kept two motorcycles as part of a murder prosecution and subsequent prosecution, its suit was dismissed. Because the motorcycles were lawfully seized under the Fourth Amendment and retained as evidence in an active criminal investigation, no further process was due.

Background

American Acceptance Corporation of SC, or AAC, brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the Lexington County Sheriff’s Department, or LCSD. The LCSD confiscated two motorcycles in connection with a murder investigation and subsequent prosecution. AAC held a security interest in the motorcycles and claimed LCSD violated its procedural due process rights by retaining its property during the pending criminal investigation without providing AAC notice and an opportunity to be heard. The district court granted LCSD’s motion to dismiss.

Standard

The parties disagree as to whether the Fourth or the Fourteenth Amendment defines the scope of the process owed to AAC. AAC contends that LCSD violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by failing to provide AAC with notice and an opportunity to be heard with respect to the retention of the motorcycles. LCSD, however, characterizes this matter as a Fourth Amendment case and avers that its compliance with the Fourth Amendment satisfied due process.

In Rodgers v. Knight, 781 F.3d 932 (8th Cir. 2015), the Eighth Circuit addressed an analogous challenge to law enforcement’s retention of seized property for a criminal investigation. Ultimately, the court concluded that “‘[w]hen seizing property for criminal investigatory purposes, compliance with the Fourth Amendment satisfies pre-deprivation procedural due process’ . . . [and w]here retention of evidence is justified by pending charges or an arrest warrant, no further process is required.”

In accordance with this court’s well-established precedent that the Fourth Amendment has been “thought to define the ‘process that is due’ for seizures of person or property in criminal cases,” and the reasoning in Rodgers, it finds that the Fourth Amendment applies in this case as well. This court finds no reason to change the analysis simply because the property interest belongs to a third party.

Analysis

Having established that the Fourth Amendment guides the analysis, this court finds no due process violation exists here. The parties agree that the motorcycles were properly seized under the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement with respect to Andrzejewski and pursuant to a warrant exception with respect to Brock.

Given the connection of the motorcycles, LCSD had a reasonable basis to retain them as evidence for Andrzejewski’s pending charges and Brock’s murder investigation. LCSD’s actions were also in accordance with South Carolina law providing that “[a] custodian of evidence must preserve all physical evidence . . . related to the conviction or adjudication of a person,” including for murder.

The court does not dispute that AAC has a legitimate property interest in the two motorcycles here. However, to require further due process in this instance would impede South Carolina’s ability to carry out its public interest duties to investigate crimes in a prompt manner.

It would further permit future third-party lienholders to intervene in and delay criminal investigations by attempting to take possession of critical physical evidence. Accordingly, because the motorcycles were lawfully seized under the Fourth Amendment and retained as evidence in an active criminal investigation, no further process was due. AAC makes two counterarguments, but this court finds both unpersuasive.

Motion

AAC argues the district court erred by stating that it considered “the motion, the response, the reply, the record, and the applicable law” on a motion to dismiss. This court finds no impropriety here. It is undoubtedly the province of the district court to consider the parties’ briefings and applicable law when reviewing a motion to dismiss. Courts need not rely on a complaint for legal conclusions.

AAC also argues that the district court erroneously referred to the fact that Brock was riding his motorcycle at the time of his murder because it was not stated in the complaint. However, one exhibit attached to the amended complaint expressly included a statement from LCSD to AAC stating, “[i]t is believed that the rider of one bike shot and killed a person riding the other,” with a citation to a news article directly referencing the fact. Accordingly, the district court properly considered the pleadings in rendering its decision.

Affirmed.

Appellant American Acceptance Corporation of SC v. Gietz, Case No. 25-1448, May 12, 2026. 4th Cir. (Giles), from DSC at Columbia (Lewis). Joseph Studemeyer for Appellant. Daniel C. Plyler for Appellees. VLW 026-2-170. 15 pp.

Full-Text Opinion
VLW 026-2-170