Landlord and tenant – Tenant’s challenge to eviction is dismissed

Where a tenant asserted a variety of claims against her landlord arising out of her eviction, but each of her claims failed as a matter of law, her suit was dismissed.

Background

Avonte Leshay Smith, appearing pro se, submitted an application to proceed in forma pauperis, or IFP. Concurrent with the submission of her IFP application and complaint, plaintiff sought emergency relief ordering defendants to allow her to retrieve critical medication and other personal property from her apartment following eviction-related lockout. Plaintiff also requested that the Court “restore [plaintiff’s] possession of [the] premises.”
In light of the potential medical emergency presented in plaintiff’s filing, the court conducted an emergency status hearing with the parties the afternoon of May 8, 2026, and at that time, while reserving judgment on plaintiff’s various requests for relief, obtained defendant’s consent to plaintiff retrieving her medication and other personal belongings from her apartment that same afternoon.

IFP

The court is satisfied that plaintiff qualifies for in forma pauperis status. Accordingly, the court will grant plaintiff’s IFP application.

Spoilation

Plaintiff challenges the fact that defendants “altered the status quo, charged unauthorized lease termination/cleaning fees, and removed [plaintiff’s] personal property,” purportedly constituting contempt of the court’s May 8 order and “spoliation of evidence necessary for [her] civil rights claims.” Although plaintiff demands sanctions against defendant for “disobeying a federal order,” all that the court ordered on May 8 was that, as agreed between the parties, plaintiff should be allowed to access her unit to collect her necessary medications and personal property.

The court explicitly reserved ruling on plaintiff’s TRO on May 8. The simple fact that plaintiff had filed for TRO relief did not impose any obligation on defendant to act to preserve the status quo or otherwise refrain from proceeding with its standard eviction processes. Defendant’s act of clearing the apartment in accordance with its noticed eviction procedures is not spoliation.

TRO

Plaintiff’s TRO motion fails because—while the balance of harms and equities certainly favors plaintiff—plaintiff cannot establish a likelihood of success on the merits. Specifically, the Anti-Injunction Act, which provides that “[a] court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of

Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments,” precludes the relief sought, insofar as this court cannot inject itself into plaintiff’s eviction proceedings.

Here, plaintiff is asking this court to enjoin defendant from executing the state court’s judgment (its writ of eviction) with respect to the unlawful detainer proceedings already litigated to conclusion. Plaintiff provides various grounds for seeking this relief, e.g., that defendants engaged in bad faith by blocking plaintiff and/or her third party payor from using the standard “online rent/tenant portal” to bring her balance to zero and thus “exercising [her] legal right of redemption” to avoid eviction, while simultaneously sending her payment reminders via text, which included the online payment portal link.
But these are also arguments that plaintiff raised before the state court in the pendency of her eviction proceedings. That was the appropriate forum for such challenges, as it was the first court with jurisdiction over the property at issue, and the simple fact that plaintiff did not prevail does not open the door to an emergency parallel proceeding in this court.

Screening

When a plaintiff is granted authorization to proceed in forma pauperis, the court is obligated to screen the operative complaint to determine, among other things, whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted. Initially, plaintiff only named TMG Richmond IV, LP as the sole defendant in this case. Thus, plaintiff’s allegations related to Count Two and the acts of “state actors (the court and sheriff)” cannot state a claim against defendant TMG, and so necessarily fail.

Next, there is nothing in Virginia law or the Fair Housing Act that prevents landlords from reasonably restricting the permitted method(s) of payment. And while the complaint appears to allege that defendant was obligated to accommodate plaintiff’s instant, acute medical emergency by delaying the eviction scheduled for May 7, 2026, those statutory schemes protect individuals from discrimination based on their disabled status (or perception thereof). They do not require accommodations in the face of an isolated, emergency medical event.

Finally, plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, cited as a basis for relief, and therefore fails for lack of any supporting facts. Indeed, she never mentions emotional distress again, let alone facts to support a finding of intentional infliction thereof.
So ordered.

Smith v. TMG Richmond IV, LP, Case No. 3:26-cv-399, May 15, 2026. EDVA at Richmond (Young). VLW 026-3-218. 9 pp.

Full-Text Opinion
VLW 026-3-218