Criminal – Murderer denied new trial

Where a man allegedly told the defendant’s investigator, after the defendant was convicted at trial, that he committed the murder alone and that the defendant was not present or involved in the killing, but the man then recanted this confession and it was contradicted by ample evidence demonstrating the defendant’s presence at the scene of the murder, the circuit court did not err in denying the motion for a new trial.

Background

Cornelius Lamont Carrington appeals his convictions for first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony.

Conspiracy

Carrington first argues that the Commonwealth’s evidence is insufficient to prove that he and Jerome “communicated and made an agreement to commit” murder. This court disagrees. The jury’s finding that Carrington formed a conspiracy with his cousin, Jerome Carrington, to murder Ronnie Sneed is not plainly wrong or without evidentiary support.

The day before Sneed’s murder, a neighbor (Ward) heard Carrington tell Sneed that he was “going to kill [him].” Surveillance footage captured Jerome picking Carrington up in the early morning hours on the day of the murder, and the two promptly driving to the All Day Inn to park next to Sneed’s vehicle. Although the two roamed around the area in the hours that followed, they remained close to Sneed’s motel.

Footage showed Jerome and Carrington return to the motel parking lot on foot and hide in a back stairwell—where Sneed’s body was later found—moments before Sneed arrived. And one minute after Sneed arrived and entered the back stairwell, surveillance footage recorded gunshots. Combining Carrington’s expressed intent to kill Sneed with Carrington and Jerome’s coordinated conduct resulting in the death of Sneed, a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Carrington and Jerome formed an agreement to commit an unlawful act.

Murder

Carrington next argues that the evidence is insufficient to establish that he is the individual who shot Sneed. This court again disagrees. The jury’s finding that Carrington is criminally liable for Sneed’s murder is not plainly wrong or without evidentiary support.

Assuming Carrington was not the actual perpetrator of the murder, he (1) expressed an intention to kill Sneed less than 12 hours before the murder, (2) was at the scene of the crime in the moments before and after Sneed’s murder and (3) he and Jerome appeared to wait around for Sneed to arrive and tried to burn their clothing after the fact—conduct consistent with the commission of the crime.

Carrington even concedes that he and Jerome “were present at the time of the murder,” only challenging whether he or Jerome pulled the trigger on Sneed. By so arguing, Carrington fails to account for his liability as a principal in the second degree. Taking his presence at the scene of the crime with the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Carrington “assented” to the murder, “lent to it his countenance and approval, and was thereby aiding and abetting the same.”

After-acquired evidence

Carrington concludes his appeal by arguing the court should have granted a new trial based on the after-discovered evidence of Jerome’s confession. Again, this court disagrees.

A post-trial third-party confession may justify a new trial, depending on the audience to whom the confession is made, whether the confession has been consistent or has evolved and whether the confession can be corroborated. Here, post-trial, Jerome reportedly told Carrington’s private investigator that he shot Sneed following a drug deal gone wrong and that Carrington was not present or involved in the killing.

But, at a hearing on Carrington’s motion for a new trial, Jerome recanted this confession, claiming he lied. Jerome’s after-discovered confession was inconsistent, uncorroborated and contradicted the record, including ample evidence demonstrating Carrington’s presence at the scene of the murder. That Jerome conveniently only confessed to a private investigator employed by Carrington—rather than the police—also detracts from the confession’s credibility.

Affirmed.

Carrington v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0018-25-2, May 26, 2026. CAV (unpublished opinion) (Callins). From the Circuit Court of Henrico County (Harris Jr.). John W. Parsons (John W. Parsons, Attorney at Law, on brief), for appellant. Liam A. Curry, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. VLW 026-7-216. 10 pp.

Full-Text Opinion
VLW 026-7-216