Search & Seizure – Police didn’t unnecessarily prolong two traffic stops

Where the record showed that police did not unnecessarily prolong two traffic stops involving the defendant, before a canine dog alerted to the presence of drugs, the circuit court did not err by denying her motions to suppress.

Background

Carrie Susanne Davis appeals her convictions for one count of possessing methamphetamine with the intent to distribute and three counts of possessing a Schedule I or II controlled substance.

Suppress

Davis asserts that the canine sniff violated her Fourth Amendment rights by unnecessarily prolonging the stop. This court disagrees.

Corporal Wade lawfully stopped Davis after observing her run a red light in January. By the time Wade returned to his vehicle after obtaining Davis’s information, a deputy (Goodbar) arrived on scene to assist. Wade asked Goodbar to prepare a summons for Davis’s traffic infraction. Wade then returned to Davis’s vehicle, asked her to step out and informed her he would run a dog sniff. Between the time when Goodbar began writing the summons and Wade asking him to stop because the dog sniff returned a positive alert, “[p]robably not even a minute” passed.

Since Wade did not measurably extend the stop beyond the time necessary to complete “tasks tied to the traffic infraction,” he did not unconstitutionally prolong it. This conclusion applies a fortiori to the March stop, where Wade informed the sergeant (Randozzo) of the positive drug sniff before Randozzo had even finished writing the summonses.

Davis also argues that Wade violated her Fifth Amendment rights by subjecting her to custodial interrogation without reading her Miranda rights. However she was neither in “custody” nor subject to “interrogation” in either stop. Accordingly, because the canine sniffs did not unconstitutionally prolong either stop and Davis’s statements were made in non-custodial contexts, the circuit court did not err by denying her motion to suppress.

Safety valve

Davis also argues that the circuit court erred in imposing the five-year mandatory minimum sentence prescribed by Code § 18.2-248(C)(3), rather than invoking the statute’s safety valve provision. In particular, she argues that “the record demonstrated her substantial compliance with the statute.” This court disagrees.

Code § 18.2-248(C)(3)’s safety valve provision places an affirmative obligation on an accused to disclose all related information and evidence within their knowledge and possession to the Commonwealth. They must do so prior to sentencing so that the Commonwealth may test the veracity and completeness of the information and consider her position on the Code § 18.2-248(C)(3)(e) finding. And, regardless of the Commonwealth’s position, an accused must convince the circuit court that they complied with their disclosure obligations. Here, given the noticeable gaps in Davis’s disclosures, the circuit court’s finding that she needed to “provide levels and levels more detail” was not plainly wrong or without evidentiary support.

Sentencing

Davis contends that her combined six-year active prison sentence was “grossly excessive,” thereby constituting cruel and unusual punishment prohibited under both the United States and Virginia Constitutions. This court again disagrees.

Davis was not sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. In fact, her sentences were below the statutorily prescribed maximum punishments for the offenses. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its sentencing discretion.

Affirmed.

Concurring opinion

Causey, J., concurring.

I concur that Davis’s convictions should be affirmed. I also agree with the majority that, under the particular circumstances of this case, the circuit court was not plainly wrong or without evidence to support its conclusion that Davis failed to satisfy the requirements of the Code § 18.2-248(C) “safety valve” for an exemption from mandatory minimum sentencing.

I write separately, however, to emphasize certain holdings regarding the “safety valve” provision that are not rendered in and should not be inferred from the majority’s decision today, as well as to express my views on two aspects of this important provision.

Davis v. Commonwealth, Case No. 0434-25-3, May 26, 2026. CAV (Callins) (Causey, J. concurring). From the Circuit Court of Rockbridge County (Russell). Jonathan B. Tarris (Tarris Law PLC, on brief), for appellant. Sandra M. Workman, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. VLW 026-7-214. 31 pp.

Full-Text Opinion
VLW 026-7-214