Constitutional – Company’s due process claim against county is dismissed

Where a dumpster rental and hauling company alleged its due process rights were violated when it was barred from a county landfill, but it failed to provide a source of the asserted property interest, this claim was dismissed.

Background

After several disputes at the Frederick County landfill, the landfill manager suspended a dumpster rental and hauling company’s disposal privileges to the landfill indefinitely. The company, its owner and his wife together sued the landfill manager, the county’s Board of Supervisors and one of the company’s competitors, alleging due process violations, conspiracy and tortious interference with a contract. This matter is before the court on defendants’ motions to dismiss and plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend.

Due process

Plaintiffs allege that landfill manager Ronnel Kimble Jr. and the County deprived them of their constitutional due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by banning them from the landfill “without any process of law.” As a threshold matter, Mr. and Mrs. Loar do not have Article III standing to bring this claim as individuals.

The suspension letter prohibits Paramount and “any subcontractors or other businesses that [Mr. Loar] or [his] immediate family have interest in” from using the landfill for waste disposal. Mrs. Loar does not allege that she owns an interest in Paramount or any other business. And Mr. Loar’s interest in Paramount, or any other business for that matter, does not give him standing to sue for damages he suffered based on alleged injuries to the business.

Further, the suspension letter does not apply to Mr. or Mrs. Loar as individuals. Mr. Loar alleges he is prohibited entirely from physically accessing the landfill due to a no-trespass notice. But the amended complaint does not challenge the process under which the no-trespass notice was issued to Mr. Loar. Additionally, there is no allegation in the complaint that states Mrs. Loar was prohibited from physically accessing the landfill. Accordingly, Mr. and Mrs. Loar do not have standing as individuals to bring this claim.

While the corporate plaintiff, unlike the individual plaintiffs, has standing to bring this claim, it fails to state a claim for relief. To adequately allege a due process violation, plaintiffs must first show that they have a protected property interest in access to the landfill. Here, plaintiffs fail to provide a source of the asserted property interest. In other words, they do not point to any authority under Virginia law or local ordinances that creates an entitlement or a right for them to access the landfill. This alone calls for dismissal.

Plaintiffs argue that “once a government creates” property like a public landfill, “it must adhere to the constitutional minimum standards in treating citizens equally with sufficient due process.” It is true that when governments grant or deny permits or licenses, they must afford procedural due process to applicants.

But plaintiffs do not allege that the corporate plaintiff ever needed to apply for or ever received a permit or license under state law to access the landfill for waste disposal. Nor do they allege that the County has no discretion to deny their access to the landfill. The court therefore finds that plaintiffs fail to sufficiently allege a protected property interest in access to the landfill.

Declaratory judgment

Plaintiffs ask the court to declare that “§ 142-57 of Frederick County’s Ordinances and its related Ordinances [are] unconstitutional, unenforceable, without any legal effect, and invalid” because they are “inconsistent” with Virginia Law, the Virginia Constitution, and the Constitution of the United States of America. Plaintiffs bring this claim under the Declaratory Judgment Act.

A claim under the Declaratory Judgment Act “does not confer [federal] jurisdiction” where it does not otherwise exist. Given there are no remaining independent claims that would confer federal subject matter jurisdiction, the court cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction over this count.

Remaining claims

When a district court dismisses all federal claims in the early stages of litigation, it should decline to exercise jurisdiction over any remaining pendent state law claims. Accordingly, the court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims and will dismiss those claims without prejudice.

Government defendants’ motion to dismiss granted. Plaintiffs’ motion to amend denied.

Paramount Property Services, LLC v. Kimble Jr., Case No. 5:25-cv-00077, June 18, 2026. WDVA at Harrisonburg (Yoon). VLW 026-3-256. 11 pp.

Full-Text Opinion
VLW 026-3-256