COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Willis, Fitzpatrick and Annunziata
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
LINDA ANN BAUCKMAN
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 0160-96-4 JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK
OCTOBER 29, 1996
VERNON A. BAUCKMAN
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY
LeRoy F. Millette, Jr., Judge
E. E. Sanders, Jr., for appellant.
Raymond J. Morley, Jr. (Pfitzner, Morley,
Brickley, Borksy & Arden, on brief), for
Linda Ann Bauckman (wife) appeals the equitable distribution
decision of the circuit court. Wife contends that the trial
court erred in classifying as marital property certain notes
payable to wife from Vernon A. Bauckman (husband) and awarding
her their value. Finding no error, we affirm.
“Fashioning an equitable distribution award lies within the
sound discretion of the trial judge and that award will not be
set aside unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to
support it.” Srinivasan v. Srinivasan, 10 Va. App. 728, 732, 396
S.E.2d 675, 678 (1990). “Unless it appears from the record that
the trial judge has not considered or has misapplied one of the
statutory mandates, this Court will not reverse on appeal.”
Ellington v. Ellington, 8 Va. App. 48, 56, 378 S.E.2d 626, 630
*Pursuant to Code ? 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
Wife asserts that the evidence establishes that three notes
payable to her and purportedly signed by husband were traceable
to funds she inherited from her family.1 Husband denied signing
two of the notes and testified that wife incurred no loss on the
third note. Wife testified that she used her own funds and money
belonging to her mother and her children to purchase certificates
of deposit which husband used as collateral for the operation of
his business. She lent him money to pay the business’ rent and
to purchase mirrors and other items for the restaurant. These
items, as well as the business and the marital home, were lost
through bankruptcy. She testified she came into the marriage
with approximately $200,000 but that all her cash was gone. She
admitted that husband had separate property in the form of
furnishings and collectibles prior to the marriage and that, at
the time of the hearings, he had no cash.
The trial court found that wife came into the marriage with
assets, but that those assets were applied to the marital home
and business which were lost in bankruptcy. The court noted that
the parties did not agree whether the notes were executed.
If these notes were, in fact, executed, and I
know they’re in dispute, it’s clear to me
that that money was basically put into the
1Wife also argues that the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over wife’s separate property. This argument
confuses the court’s underlying jurisdiction to decide issues of
equitable distribution with the statutory limit on the court’s
authority to order a transfer or division of separate property.
Compare Code ? 20-107.3(A) with Code ? 20-107.3(C).
marital, the marital pot, the idea being that
the money was borrowed to keep Charlie
Brown’s going, that the money was borrowed so
that they could continue the lifestyle they
wanted to go on. So, I think that that
should be considered, if any thought at all
about it, some sort of a credit against the
marital assets. And I’m going to consider it
The trial court then ruled that all existing marital assets would
be awarded to wife.
Under Code ? 20-107.3(A), the trial court is required, upon
the request of a party, to determine the title and value of “all
property . . . of the parties.” Property which no longer is part
of the marital estate cannot be distributed by the court. No
cash or certificates of deposit remained to be distributed. The
court’s ruling demonstrates that it considered the separate
property wife brought into the marriage when it awarded her the
maximum amount of marital assets available for distribution. We
cannot say the court’s equitable distribution decision was either
plainly wrong or an abuse of its discretion.
Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is affirmed.