Fulltext Opinions
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Coleman, Elder and Fitzpatrick
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
SCOTTIE TYRONE BOOKER
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 0061-96-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
MARCH 18, 1997
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY
Kenneth M. Covington, Judge Designate
Joseph A. Sanzone (Joseph A. Sanzone
Associates, P.C., on brief), for appellant.
Richard B. Smith, Assistant Attorney General
(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Scottie Tyrone Booker (appellant) appeals his convictions of
second degree murder and of using a firearm in the commission of
murder. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion
when it granted the Commonwealth’s motion for a jury view of the
nighttime lighting at the crime scene. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
The facts relevant to the jury view are as follows. The
victim suffered a fatal gunshot wound to the head between 2:00
and 2:30 a.m. on July 17, 1994 in a parking lot outside of a
Farmville nightclub. During the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief,
four witnesses testified about the lighting conditions at the
parking lot. Shawn Collins, Lynwood Batts, and Russell Harris,
*Pursuant to Code ? 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
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Jr. testified that they were present in the parking lot at the
time the murder occurred. Mr. Collins testified that the
lighting in the parking lot was “real clear” and that the fog
lights on Mr. Batts’ car were operating from behind him. He also
testified that the club had recently closed for the evening and
that the parking lot was filled with cars waiting to exit. Mr.
Batts testified that the lighting in the parking lot was “fair.”
Mr. Harris testified that the lighting in the parking lot was
sufficient to enable him to see the bullet hole in the victim’s
head from his position in a nearby car. He also testified that
he observed the traffic in the parking lot. William Harding, the
owner of the club, testified about the lighting equipment
installed to illuminate the parking lot. Mr. Harding testified
that a “high pressure sodium light” was mounted on the gate at
the entrance of the parking lot. He also testified that eight
poles in the parking lot were equipped with either 200 watt high
pressure sodium lights or “dusk to dawn” lights. In addition,
“quartz lights” were mounted in a row on the side of the club
building and aimed toward the parking lot. Mr. Harding testified
that all of these lights were on at the time of the murder. He
also testified that the only change in the lighting equipment
since the night of the murder was the addition of one new light
on a ninth pole in the parking lot.
During a recess near the conclusion of its case-in-chief,
the Commonwealth moved for a jury view of the lighting in the
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parking lot at night. The record contains no transcript of
either the parties’ argument regarding the Commonwealth’s motion
or the trial court’s ruling. At the end of the recess, the trial
court informed the jury of the Commonwealth’s motion and that it
had granted the motion for the purpose of allowing the jury to
observe the lighting conditions in the parking lot “after dark”
at the location of the body.
At the conclusion of the trial while the jury was
deliberating, appellant’s counsel stated for the record the
grounds for his objection to the jury view. Appellant’s counsel
argued that the jury view of the parking lot misrepresented the
lighting conditions on the night of the murder because the
headlights of the line of cars waiting to exit the parking lot
that night were absent during the viewing. Appellant’s counsel
argued that the jury view distorted the jury’s understanding of
the actual lighting available to the witnesses who observed the
murder and prevented the jurors from properly scrutinizing the
eyewitnesses’ testimony. The Commonwealth responded by arguing
that the jury view did not misrepresent the conditions in the
parking lot on the night of the murder. The Commonwealth’s
attorney asserted that the lighting of the parking lot during the
jury view was the same as “the minimal lighting conditions that
were present [on the night of the murder] without the addition of
other vehicles who may have headlights on.”
Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it granted
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the Commonwealth’s motion for a jury view of the crime scene. We
disagree.
“A jury may view a crime scene upon the request of the
Commonwealth or defendant ‘when it shall appear to the court that
such view is necessary to a just decision.’ Code ? 19.2-264.1.
Whether such request should be granted lies within the discretion
of the trial court.” Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364,
378, 402 S.E.2d 218, 227 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 834, 112
S. Ct. 113, 116 L.Ed.2d 82 (1991) (citation omitted).
We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it permitted the jury to view the lighting conditions in the
parking lot at night. The trial court was permitted to allow the
jurors to view the lighting at the parking lot after dark to
enable them to better understand and apply the testimony given
during the trial. See Culpepper v. Neff, 204 Va. 800, 806, 134
S.E.2d 315, 319-20 (1964) (citation omitted) (stating that the
purpose of a jury view is to enable the jury to better understand
and apply the evidence given in court). Prior to the
Commonwealth’s motion for the jury view, the eyewitnesses had
described the lighting in the parking lot on the night of the
murder in subjective terms such as “real clear” and “fair.” The
jury view of the lighting in the parking lot was proper to enable
the jurors to better understand the eyewitnesses’ description of
the lighting on the night of the murder.
We disagree with appellant’s argument that the evidence did
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not establish that the lighting in the parking lot on the night
of the jury view was substantially the same as the lighting on
the night of the murder. See Quesinberry, 241 Va. at 379, 402
S.E.2d at 227. Mr. Harding testified that on the night of the
murder the parking lot was illuminated by eight lights mounted on
poles at various locations in the parking lot and by lights
mounted on the club building and on a gate at the club’s
entrance. He testified that the only change in the lighting
since the murder was the installation of one new light on a ninth
pole in the parking lot. Although the parking lot contained a
line of cars waiting to exit at the time of the murder, and the
jury observed the parking lot while it was empty, the record
indicates that any light from these cars was irrelevant to the
witnesses’ view of the crime. None of the witnesses, including
appellant himself, testified that light from the line of cars
either helped or hindered his or her view of the crime.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the convictions of
second degree murder and using a firearm in the commission of
murder.
Affirmed.
