<\/p>\n
<\/a> \n PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY SCHOOL v. <\/b><\/font><\/p>\n FOGARTY<\/b><\/font><\/p>\n AUGUST 31, 1999<\/font><\/p>\n Record No. 1866-98-4<\/font><\/p>\n PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD<\/font><\/p>\n v. <\/font><\/p>\n SHARON E. FOGARTY<\/font><\/p>\n FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Lemons Argued at Alexandria, Virginia<\/font><\/p>\n MEMORANDUM OPINION*<\/sup> BY JUDGE CHARLES Thomas C. Palmer, Jr. (Brault, Palmer, Grove, Sharon E. Fogarty, pro<\/u> se<\/u>.<\/font><\/p>\n Prince William County School Board (employer) We review the evidence in the light most On September 27, 1995, claimant worked for Spencer’s daughter drove into the parking lot Claimant testified that Spencer’s daughter The commission, in affirming the deputy "The commission’s decision that an In Arrington v. Murray<\/u>, 182 Va. 1, 28 As one authority has noted, activity that is Employer’s reliance on Lipsey v. Case<\/u>, The record supports the commission’s finding Accordingly, the commission’s opinion is Affirmed.<\/u><\/font><\/p>\n *<\/sup> Pursuant to Code ? 17.1-413, <\/font> <\/p>\n FOOTNOTES:<\/b><\/font><\/p>\n
\n<\/a><\/p>\n
\nNOTICE<\/b>: The opinions posted here are
\nsubject to formal revision. If you find a typographical error or
\nother formal error, please notify the Virginia Court of Appeals. <\/font><\/p>\n
\n
\nBOARD <\/b><\/font><\/p>\n
\n
\nCOMMISSION<\/font><\/p>\n
\nand Senior Judge Duff<\/font><\/p>\n
\nH. DUFF<\/font><\/p>\n
\nZimmerman, White & Mims, on briefs), for appellant.<\/font><\/p>\n
\n
\nappeals a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission
\n(commission) awarding benefits to Sharon E. Fogarty (claimant).
\nEmployer contends the commission erred in finding that claimant
\nproved she sustained an injury by accident arising out of her
\nemployment on September 27, 1995. <\/font>[1]<\/strong><\/font><\/a> Finding
\nno reversible error, we affirm the commission’s decision.<\/font><\/p>\n
\nfavorable to claimant as the prevailing party. When so viewed,
\nthe record establishes the following:<\/font><\/p>\n\n
\n employer as an assistant principal at Bennett Elementary
\n School. On that date, she and Graham Spencer, the school’s
\n principal and her supervisor, were standing outside the
\n school in the parking lot supervising the children as they
\n boarded the school buses to go home. Claimant described part
\n of her assistant principal duties as doing whatever the
\n principal directed her to do.<\/font><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
\nand parked her car. She had Barney, a Norwegian Elkhound and the
\nSpencers’ family pet, in the car with her. She planned to take
\nBarney to the veterinarian and had stopped at the school to pick
\nup a check from her father.<\/font><\/p>\n
\nwalked over to where she and Spencer were located. Claimant saw
\nSpencer and his daughter talking. At that point, Spencer directed
\nclaimant to go over to the car and "meet the dog."
\nClaimant testified that she declined twice but Spencer continued
\nto insist that she go and see the dog. Claimant then followed
\nSpencer’s daughter to the car, where she began petting the dog
\nand talking to Spencer’s daughter. At that point, the dog, who
\nhad his head out of the car window, bit claimant’s nose. On the
\nway to the hospital, Spencer lamented to claimant, "Why did
\nI make you go over there?"<\/font><\/p>\n
\ncommissioner, accepted claimant’s testimony and found that she
\n"twice declined Spencer’s request that she meet Barney, but
\nfinally acquiesced to the request of her supervisor when he
\ndirected her to do so a third time." The commission found
\nthat "[h]er contact with the dog, although not a part of her
\nregular work duties, was in direct response to a demand of her
\nsupervisor." Thus, the commission concluded that claimant’s
\nevidence proved that her "injury resulted from an actual
\nrisk of her employment."<\/font><\/p>\n
\naccident arises out of the employment involves a mixed question
\nof law and fact and is thus reviewable on appeal." Southside
\nVirginia Training Ctr. v. Shell<\/u>, 20 Va. App. 199, 202, 455
\nS.E.2d 761, 763 (1995).<\/font><\/p>\n
\nS.E.2d 19 (1943), the Supreme Court held that an injury arises
\nout of the employment when the employee is performing work
\ndirected by one of the business partners, even if the work was
\nnot in the trade, business, or occupation of the employer but was
\npersonal to the partner and performed at his residence. See<\/u>
\nid.<\/u> at 5, 28 S.E.2d at 20-21. The Supreme Court agreed
\nwith the commission that it would be inequitable to allow an
\nemployer to direct an employee to perform work and then deny that
\nthe employee was protected by the Virginia Workers’ Compensation
\nAct. See<\/u> id.<\/u> at 5, 28 S.E.2d at 21. Where the
\nemployee is injured while performing an activity that the
\nemployer has instructed him or her to do, that work constitutes
\npart of an employee’s employment responsibilities and required
\nwork, even though different from his or her usual and regular
\ntasks performed in the employer’s business. See<\/u> Honaker
\n& Feeney v. Hartley<\/u>, 140 Va. 1, 13, 124 S.E. 220, 223
\n(1924).<\/font><\/p>\n
\nnot an integral or normal part of the job becomes such where the
\nemployer’s request clearly conveys the understanding that the
\nemployee was to take part in the activity. See<\/u> 2 Arthur
\nLarson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law<\/u>
\n? 22.04(2) (1999). Claimant’s unrebutted testimony was that
\namong her job duties was to do whatever Spencer directed her to
\ndo. This testimony, coupled with the three "directions"
\nby Spencer that she meet the dog, provides credible evidence in
\nsupport of the commission’s decision that the accident arose out
\nof claimant’s employment.<\/font><\/p>\n
\n248 Va. 59, 445 S.E.2d 105 (1994), is misplaced. In that case,
\nLipsey was a "working student." In exchange for
\nperforming duties on the farm, she received instruction on farm
\noperation, riding lessons, and room and board. She shared living
\nfacilities with two other working students. A dog belonging to
\none of these students bit Lipsey on her face during a lunch break
\nat the house. The Court held that while the injury occurred in
\nthe course of the employment it did not arise out of the
\nemployment. The Court found no causal connection between Lipsey’s
\nrequired work and her injury. See<\/u> id.<\/u> at 61-62, 445
\nS.E.2d at 107. Further, Lipsey did not allege that the employer
\nrequired her to have physical contact with the dog. Although the
\ndog lived in the house and freely roamed the farm, the employer
\ndid not direct Lipsey to "meet" the dog as claimant was
\nrepeatedly instructed to do by Spencer.<\/font><\/p>\n
\nthat claimant was instructed by her supervisor to go see his dog,
\nBarney, and that her contact with the dog, while not a part of
\nher regular work duties, was in direct response to this
\ninstruction by the supervisor. With her duties being what the
\nprincipal directed her to do, she clearly felt obligated to
\ncomply.<\/font>[2]<\/b><\/font><\/a> Thus, claimant’s injury resulted from an actual risk of
\nher employment.<\/font><\/p>\n
\naffirmed.<\/font><\/p>\n
\nrecodifying Code ? 17-116.010, this opinion is not
\ndesignated for publication.<\/font><\/p>\n