<\/p>\n
<\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n HILFIGER v. TRANSAMERICA September 18, 1998 JAMES A. HILFIGER<\/p>\n v. <\/p>\n TRANSAMERICA OCCIDENTAL LIFE OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY Present: All the Justices<\/p>\n Pursuant to our Rule 5:42, the United States Court of Appeals for I.\n<\/p>\n The Court of Appeals first asks: At common law, a policy of insurance taken out on the life of an The statute provides the requisite protection for an insured by II.\n<\/p>\n In the second certified question the Court of Appeals asks: We answer this question in the negative. If Code ? 38.2-319 III.\n<\/p>\n Finally, the Court of Appeals asks: Estoppel is an equitable principle that prevents one "whose would permit the Lamar<\/u>, 393 S.E.2d at 736 (citing Wood<\/u>, 336 <\/u>JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE KOONTZ joins, dissenting. <\/p>\n I would construe Code ? 38.2-302(A) differently from the \n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n FOOTNOTES: <\/font><\/p>\n [1]<\/strong><\/font><\/a> <\/strong><\/font>Because the federal district HILFIGER v. TRANSAMERICA OCCIDENTAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY September 18, 1998 Record No. 980074 JAMES A. HILFIGER v. TRANSAMERICA OCCIDENTAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY UPON QUESTIONS OF LAW CERTIFIED BY THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT Present: All the Justices Pursuant to our Rule 5:42, the United …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":12,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[213],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-9911","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-virginia","always_free"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/valawyersweekly.com\/fulltext-opinions\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9911"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/valawyersweekly.com\/fulltext-opinions\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/valawyersweekly.com\/fulltext-opinions\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/valawyersweekly.com\/fulltext-opinions\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/12"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/valawyersweekly.com\/fulltext-opinions\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=9911"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/valawyersweekly.com\/fulltext-opinions\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9911\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/valawyersweekly.com\/fulltext-opinions\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=9911"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/valawyersweekly.com\/fulltext-opinions\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=9911"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/valawyersweekly.com\/fulltext-opinions\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=9911"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
\n
\nOCCIDENTAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY<\/b><\/font><\/p>\n
\n
\nRecord No. 980074<\/p>\n
\nINSURANCE COMPANY<\/p>\n
\nUPON QUESTIONS OF LAW CERTIFIED BY THE UNITED STATES
\nCOURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT<\/p>\n
\nthe Fourth Circuit certified three questions of Virginia law to
\nthis Court regarding the enforceability of a life insurance
\npolicy. The questions involve the application of Va. Code
\n?? 38.2-302 and -319. We accepted the questions by order
\nentered February 13, 1998.
\nThe facts, as presented in the certification order, <\/b>are as
\nfollows.[1]<\/strong><\/font><\/a>
\nOn January 28, 1995, James A. Hilfiger (Hilfiger) filled out an
\napplication for a life insurance policy with Transamerica
\nOccidental Life Insurance Company (Transamerica) seeking
\ninsurance upon the life of his father, Paul L. Hilfiger. On the
\napplication form, Hilfiger answered all questions on his father’s
\nbehalf, and where the form required the "signature of
\nproposed insured," Hilfiger signed his father’s name.
\nDeborah C. Highsmith, a Licensed Resident Agent of Transamerica,
\nsigned the application as a "witness to all
\nsignatures." Highsmith knew that Hilfiger was signing the
\napplication on behalf of his father.
\nHilfiger’s father did not see the life insurance application, nor
\ndid he give Hilfiger written consent to sign his name. However,
\nHilfiger claims that he spoke to his father about the policy, and
\nthat his father gave him oral authorization to take out the
\npolicy. The application named Hilfiger as the sole beneficiary
\nfor the policy.
\nIn May 1995, Hilfiger’s father underwent a medical examination in
\nconnection with the life insurance application. At the medical
\nexamination, Hilfiger’s father signed a form entitled "PART
\nII of an Application for Insurance to the Transamerica
\nOccidental Life<\/u>." This form did not identify the type of
\ninsurance applied for, who the proposed beneficiary was, or the
\namount of coverage sought. Transamerica issued the insurance
\npolicy on October 9, 1995.
\nOn November 13, 1995, Hilfiger’s wife, Donna C. Hilfiger, became
\na broker for Transamerica. Shortly thereafter, she executed an
\namendment to the insurance policy as a Transamerica resident
\nagent. As with the original application, Hilfiger signed his
\nfather’s name to the form. Hilfiger’s father did not see the
\ndocument, but Hilfiger asserts that he discussed the amendment
\nwith his father. Nine days after the amendment was executed,
\nHilfiger’s father became ill. He died four days later on December
\n3, 1995.
\nTransamerica refused to pay the proceeds of the life insurance
\npolicy. Hilfiger filed a motion for judgment against Transamerica
\nin the Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach seeking the
\nproceeds of the policy, additional damages, and costs.
\nTransamerica removed the case to the United States District Court
\nfor the Eastern District of Virginia and later filed a motion for
\nsummary judgment. The federal district court granted
\nTransamerica’s summary judgment motion, concluding that the
\nexecution of the policy did not comply with Code ? 38.2-302
\nand, therefore, was void. Hilfiger appealed to the Court of
\nAppeals.
\nIn certifying the questions to this Court, the Court of Appeals
\nstated that the answers would be determinative of the proceeding
\npending before it. We address the three questions in order.\n<\/p>\n
\nWhether the son’s signing his father’s name as "proposed
\ninsured" violates Va. Code ? 38.2-302, where the son
\ndiscussed the policy with his father, had verbal authorization to
\napply for the policy, and his father later submitted to a medical
\nexamination and signed a form entitled "PART II of an
\nApplication for Insurance to the Transamerica Occidental Life<\/u>?"<\/p>\n
\ninsured without the insured’s knowledge or consent by someone
\nother than the insured was usually held void as against public
\npolicy. 1 Bertram Harnett & Irving I. Lesnick, The Law of
\nLife and Health Insurance<\/u> ? 3.04[1][a] (1997). The
\nreason for this rule was the risk to the insured that a
\nbeneficiary would be tempted to "hasten by improper means
\nthe time when he will receive the benefits of the policy." Wood
\nv. New York Life Ins. Co.<\/u>, 336 S.E.2d 806, 809 (Ga. 1985); Hopkins
\nv. Hopkins<\/u>, 614 A.2d 96, 100 (Md. 1992).
\nCode ? 38.2-302(A) codifies this common law principle,
\nstating in pertinent part that:
\nNo contract of insurance upon a person shall be made or
\neffectuated unless at the time of the making of the contract the
\nindividual insured, being of lawful age and competent to contract
\nfor the insurance contract (i) applies for insurance, or (ii)
\nconsents in writing to the insurance contract.<\/p>\n
\nidentifying two alternative conditions for creating a valid
\ncontract of life insurance. The specific conditions identified by
\nthe General Assembly reflect an intent to require unequivocal
\nevidence that an insured approved the creation of a contract of
\ninsurance on his or her life. With this purpose in mind, we
\nconclude that the facts in this case, as recited in the
\ncertification order, do not establish proof of either condition.
\nFirst, the evidence in this case, that Hilfiger’s father knew
\nabout the policy and orally authorized Hilfiger to apply for the
\npolicy, does not constitute an application for the policy by the
\ninsured as required by the statute.
\nAt one time, the insured’s knowledge of the policy alone was
\nsufficient to establish compliance with the requirements of the
\nCode. Former Code ? 38.1-330, the predecessor to Code
\n? 38.2-302, provided in relevant part that "[n]o
\ncontract of insurance upon the person . . . shall be
\nmade or effectuated unless . . . the individual insured
\n. . . applies therefor, has knowledge thereof, or
\nconsents thereto . . . ." In 1986, however,
\nthe General Assembly eliminated the phrase "has knowledge
\nthereof," leaving the two current alternative conditions as
\nthe only means of creating a valid contract of life insurance.
\nActs 1986, ch. 562.
\nWe also conclude, as Hilfiger acknowledges, that orally
\nauthorizing another to take out a policy does not alone
\nconstitute "applying" for the policy. If oral
\nauthorization alone were enough to satisfy the application
\nrequirement, the written consent alternative would be rendered
\nsuperfluous. Wren v. New York Life Ins. Co.<\/u>, 493 F.2d 839,
\n841 (5th<\/sup> Cir. 1974)(interpreting a similar statute).
\nNevertheless, Hilfiger asserts that the application prong of the
\nsection was satisfied in this case because his father
\n"materially participated" in the application process by
\nproviding a medical history and submitting to a medical
\nexamination. We disagree. "Material participation" in
\nthe application process is not synonymous with applying<\/u>
\nfor the policy. As we have said, the purpose of the conditions
\nrequired for a valid contract of life insurance is to eliminate
\nany doubt that the insured knew about and agreed to the issuance
\nof the insurance contract. Here, providing medical information in
\nconjunction with the issuance of an insurance policy did not
\nreflect consent to the contract of insurance.
\nFor the same reason, we reject Hilfiger’s contention that his
\nfather’s signature on the medical examination form qualified as a
\nconsent in writing to the insurance contract. The insured’s
\nsignature on the medical form affirmed only that the information
\nprovided on the form was correct. Although the form itself stated
\nthat it was a part of an application for insurance, it contained
\nnone of the terms of the contract. It was not, and could not have
\nbeen, a written consent "to the insurance contract" as
\nrequired by Code ? 38.2-302.
\nFor these reasons, we conclude that the facts of this case do not
\nsatisfy either alternative required by Code ? 38.2-302 for
\nthe creation of a valid contract of life insurance. Accordingly,
\nwe answer the first question in the affirmative.\n<\/p>\n
\nWhether the insurance policy should be enforced on behalf of the
\nbeneficiary despite the violation of ? 38.2-302, in light
\nof Virginia Code ? 38.2-319’s provision that "[a]ny
\ninsurance contract made in violation of the laws of this
\nCommonwealth may be enforced against the insurer?"<\/p>\n
\nrequired enforcement of a policy issued in violation of Code
\n? 38.2-302, the protection for an insured intended by Code
\n? 38.2-302 could never be realized, and Code
\n? 38.2-302 would be meaningless. Code ? 38.2-319 does
\nnot compel such a result.
\nBy its own terms, Code ? 38.2-319 applies to a contract of
\ninsurance which is "made" in violation of a law of the
\nCommonwealth. Code ? 38.2-302 declares that if the
\nstatutory requirements are not met, no life insurance policy can
\nbe "made or effectuated." Thus, in the absence of
\ncompliance with the provisions of Code ? 38.2-302(A), no
\ncontract of insurance is created, and any policy issued under
\nthose circumstances must be void ab<\/u> initio<\/u>. Wood<\/u>,
\n336 S.E.2d at 809, 811-12 (interpreting a similar statute). Contra<\/u>
\nJackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Receconi<\/u>, 827 P.2d 118, 131
\n(N.M. 1992).
\nHere, no contract of life insurance was "made or
\neffectuated" because there was no compliance with Code
\n? 38.2-302(A). Therefore, Code ? 38.2-319 does not
\nrequire enforcement of the insurance policy issued by
\nTransamerica in this case.\n<\/p>\n
\nWhether an insurance company can be estopped to rely on
\n? 38.2-302 because its agent knew about the incorrectness
\nof the signature on the application?<\/p>\n
\naction or inaction has induced reliance by another from
\nbenefiting from a change in his position at the expense of the
\nother." Employers Commercial Union Ins. Co. of America v.
\nGreat American Ins. Co.<\/u>, 214 Va. 410, 412, 200 S.E.2d 560,
\n562 (1973). Hilfiger argues that Transamerica should be estopped
\nfrom relying on Code ? 38.2-302 to avoid payment on the
\nlife insurance policy because it is charged with the knowledge of
\nits agents, both of its agents knew that the insured did not sign
\nthe application form, and both agents failed to inform Hilfiger
\nof the consequences of that omission. This failure, Hilfiger
\nasserts, prevented him from taking the appropriate corrective
\nmeasures to secure a valid life insurance policy for his father.
\nWe have addressed the application of equitable estoppel in the
\ncontext of enforcing insurance policies against an insurer. Id.<\/u>;
\nReserve Life Ins. Co. v. Ferebee<\/u>, 202 Va. 556, 118 S.E.2d
\n675 (1961); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Eicher<\/u>, 198 Va. 255,
\n93 S.E.2d 269 (1956); Gilley v. Union Life Ins. Co.<\/u>, 194
\nVa. 966, 76 S.E.2d 165 (1953). And, as Hilfiger points out, we
\nhave applied the doctrine to enforce an insurance policy based on
\nimputing to the insurer its agent’s knowledge of false statements
\non the application. See<\/u> Gilley<\/u>, 194 Va. at 974, 76
\nS.E.2d at 170. These cases all involved the level of knowledge
\nand complicity of both the agent and applicant in supplying such
\nfalse information. None of these cases, however, involved
\nconsideration of whether the equitable doctrine of estoppel
\nshould be applied in a manner which negates a significant public
\npolicy codified by the General Assembly.
\nJurisdictions addressing that situation have not been unanimous
\nin their conclusions or rationales. One court applied equitable
\nestoppel based on the theory that the statutory requirements for
\na valid life insurance contract reflect a public policy to
\nprotect the insured and the beneficiary, rather than to preserve
\nthe public order and morals and, therefore, the statutory
\nrequirements can be waived by the beneficiary. Adam Miguez
\nFuneral Home, Inc. v. First Nat’l Life Ins. Co.<\/u>, 234 So.2d
\n496, 499 (La. Ct. App. 1970). Another court concluded that the
\nfailure to apply equitable estoppel under these circumstances
\nwould allow insurers to perpetrate a fraud upon policyholders by
\naccepting premiums on a policy, knowing that the policy was void
\nfrom the beginning. Holmes v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.<\/u>,
\n244 N.Y.S.2d 148, 153 (1963).
\nIn contrast, equitable estoppel has not been applied in these
\ncircumstances on the theory that its application would invite
\nbeneficiaries and insurers’ agents to create a binding contract
\nof insurance on the life of another in direct contravention of
\nthe policy addressed by the common law and statutes in imposing
\nrequirements for a valid policy. Hunt v. Pyramid Life Ins. Co.<\/u>,
\n732 S.W.2d 167, 169 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987); Time Ins. Co. v.
\nLamar<\/u>, 393 S.E.2d 734, 735-36 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
\nWe are persuaded that the better rationale is not to apply
\nequitable estoppel to enforce a life insurance policy issued in
\ncontravention of Code ? 38.2-302. That statute was not
\nenacted for the protection of the beneficiary but to protect the
\ninsured against potentially improper motives of the beneficiary.
\nThus, contrary to the conclusion reached elsewhere, we conclude
\nthat a beneficiary is not entitled to waive the statutory
\nrequirements. As we have already stated, applying Code
\n? 38.2-319 to enforce a contract which Code
\n? 38.2-302 renders void ab<\/u> initio<\/u> eliminates
\nthe very purpose of the statute. To apply equitable estoppel in
\nthese circumstances also: \n<\/p>\n
\nunreasonable result that [the conduct of an insurance company or
\nits agent] would breathe life into an insurance contract which
\nthe General Assembly [for reasons of individual and public
\nprotection] intended to have no life, and would frustrate the
\nstrong public policy that no contract for life insurance should
\nbe made unless the insured applies for or consents in writing to
\nthe contract.
\n<\/tt><\/font><\/p>\n
\nS.E.2d at 812).
\nAccordingly, we answer the third certified question in the
\nnegative.
\nFirst certified question answered in the affirmative.
\nSecond certified question answered in the negative.
\nThird certified question answered in the negative. <\/p>\n
\nmajority and would, therefore, answer the first certified
\nquestion in the negative. I agree that the statute identifies
\n"two alternative conditions" for making a valid life
\ninsurance contract, allowing a proposed insured either to apply
\nfor life insurance or to consent to such a contract. However, as
\nI understand the majority’s position, a proposed insured’s oral
\nauthorization combined with "material participation" in
\nthe application process does not constitute "applying"
\nfor the insurance contract. I disagree.[2]<\/strong><\/font><\/a>
\nThe part of Code ? 38.2-302(A) at issue provides that no
\nlife insurance contract is made or effectuated unless "the
\nindividual insured . . . (i) applies for insurance, or
\n(ii) consents in writing to the insurance contract." The
\nstatute fails to define "applies;" therefore, the term
\nmust be "given its ordinary meaning, given the context in
\nwhich it is used." Dep’t of Taxation v. Orange-Madison
\nCoop. Farm Serv.<\/u>, 220 Va. 655, 658, 261 S.E.2d 532, 533-34
\n(1980). "The context may be examined by considering the
\nother language used in the statute." City of Virginia
\nBeach v. Bd. of Supervisors of Mecklenberg County<\/u>, 246 Va.
\n233, 236-37, 435 S.E.2d 382, 384 (1993).
\nExamining the language chosen by the legislature, I find it
\nsignificant that the phrase "in writing" appears after
\nthe disjunctive "or" and immediately following
\n"consents" and that the two phrases, "applies for
\ninsurance" and "consents in writing," are
\nseparately identified by the designations "(i)" and
\n"(ii)." As a general rule, "proper grammatical
\neffect will be given to the arrangement of words in a sentence of
\na statute," Harris v. Commonwealth<\/u>, 142 Va. 620, 624,
\n128 S.E. 578, 579 (1925), and a presumption exists that the
\nGeneral Assembly understood basic rules of grammar when drafting
\nthe statute. Frere v. Commonwealth<\/u>, 19 Va. App. 460, 464,
\n452 S.E.2d 682, 685 (1995). Fundamental rules of grammar require
\nthe placement of a phrase so as to indicate clearly what the
\nphrase modifies. John C. Hodges et al., Harbrace College Handbook
\n249 (12th<\/sup> ed. 1994).
\nApplying this rule to Code ? 38.2-302(A), the phrase
\n"in writing" modifies "consents," the word
\nimmediately preceding the phrase, and does not modify
\n"applies." But see<\/u> Alleman v. Lincoln Nat’l
\nLife Ins. Co.<\/u>, 636 F.2d 1195, 1196 (10th<\/sup> Cir.
\n1981) (holding that writing provision in Utah statute, which
\nstates that "[n]o life . . . insurance contract
\n. . . shall be made . . . unless
\n. . . the individual insured . . . in writing
\napplies therefore [sic] or consents thereto," modifies not
\nonly "applies" but also "consents"). By
\nchoosing not to modify "applies" with the phrase
\n"in writing," the General Assembly intended not to
\nrestrict the method by which an individual can apply for
\ninsurance. See<\/u> Forst v. Rockingham Poultry Mktg. Coop.,
\nInc.<\/u>, 222 Va. 270, 278, 279 S.E.2d 400, 404 (1981)
\n("When the General Assembly uses two different terms in the
\nsame act, it is presumed to mean two different things.").
\nMoreover, when the General Assembly has intended for a proposed
\ninsured to apply for insurance in writing, it has so stated. See<\/u>
\nCode ? 38.2-3737(A) ("No contract of insurance upon a
\ndebtor shall be made or effectuated unless . . . the
\ndebtor . . . applies for the insurance in writing
\n. . . ."). Thus, the General Assembly knows
\nwhat language to use when it wants to condition the making of an
\ninsurance contract upon submission of a written application.
\nTherefore, in my view, under the provisions of Code
\n? 38.2-302(A), consent to an insurance contract must be in
\nwriting, but the act of applying for insurance is not confined to
\nany particular form. In other words, the mode of applying for a
\nlife insurance contract is not limited to a written application
\npersonally signed by the proposed insured. Accord<\/u> Walker
\nv. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co.<\/u>, 20 F.3d 923, 924-25 (8th<\/sup>
\nCir. 1994) (holding that insured can apply for insurance without
\nsigning application). <\/strong><\/font>[3]<\/strong><\/font><\/a> <\/strong><\/font>
\nWhile rules of grammar are not permitted to defeat the purpose of
\na statute, Harris<\/u>, 142 Va. at 624, 128 S.E. at 579,
\nconstruing "applies" to denote more than the narrow
\nmeaning of an application signed by the proposed insured does not
\nthwart the common law principle that Code ? 38.2-302(A)
\nembodies. A proposed insured’s signature on an application form
\nis not critical to proving that the individual applied for
\ninsurance if other facts evidence the proposed insured’s intent
\nto apply. See<\/u> Walker<\/u>, 20 F.3d at 925 (finding that
\nsignature of insured on insurance application was not crucial to
\nproving his knowledge of policy and identity of beneficiary); Crump
\nv. Northwestern Nat’l Life Ins. Co.<\/u>, 236 Cal. App.2d 149, 155
\n(1965) (holding insured’s signature not essential where insured’s
\nagent prepared application and insured later ratified insurance
\ncontract). In other words, if the facts show that the proposed
\ninsured acted with the purpose of obtaining life insurance, then
\nno risk exists of "allowing one person to have insurance on
\nthe life of another without the knowledge of the latter." Walker<\/u>,
\n20 F.3d at 925.
\nIn the instant case, the actions of Hilfiger’s father show that
\nhe applied for insurance as contemplated by the provisions of
\nCode ? 38.2-302(A). Because the district court granted
\nsummary judgment to Transamerica, the facts and inferences must
\nbe construed in the light most favorable to Hilfiger. United
\nStates v. Leak<\/u>, 123 F.3d 787, 794 (4th<\/sup> Cir. 1997).
\nSee<\/u> also<\/u> Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc<\/u>.,
\n477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986) ("at the summary <\/u>judgment
\nstage the judge’s function is not . . . to weigh the
\nevidence and determine the truth of the matter"). The facts
\nshow that Hilfiger orally discussed the policy with his father
\nand that the father verbally authorized his son to obtain the
\npolicy. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
\nCircuit stated in its certification order, "we can infer
\nthat the insured father ‘authorized’ Hilfiger to sign for him and
\nprovided the answers which Hilfiger filled in on the application
\nforms." Moreover, the father underwent a medical exam during
\nwhich he signed a form titled "Part II of an Application for
\nInsurance to the Transamerica Occidental Life." Thus, the
\nevidence shows not only oral authorization, but also undisputed
\novert actions on the part of the father that not only corroborate
\nhis oral authorization but also establish his participation in
\nthe application process. This is not a case of mere oral
\nauthorization, which, as the majority observed, would render the
\nwritten consent alternative superfluous.
\nGiven these facts, I conclude that Hilfiger’s signing his
\nfather’s name as the "proposed insured" does not
\nviolate Code ? 38.2-302. As the majority stated,
\n"[T]he purpose of the conditions required for a valid
\ncontract of life insurance is to eliminate any doubt that the
\ninsured knew about and agreed to the issuance of the insurance
\ncontract." That purpose is fulfilled in this case.
\nAccordingly, for these reasons, I dissent.[4]<\/strong><\/font><\/a> <\/strong><\/font>\n<\/p>\n
\ncourt granted summary judgment in favor of Transamerica
\nOccidental Life Insurance Company, the facts are presented in the
\nlight most favorable to Hilfiger. United States v. Leak<\/u>,
\n123 F.3d 787, 794 (4th<\/sup> Cir. 1997).
\n[2]<\/strong><\/font><\/a>
\nNotably, the majority states only what action is insufficient to
\napply for a life insurance contract and fails to delineate or
\ndefine specifically the requirements necessary to apply for
\ninsurance under Code ? 38.2-302(A).
\n[3]<\/strong><\/font><\/a>An
\nexample of a statute that plainly requires a written application
\nsigned by the insured is Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 175, ? 123
\n(1998). This section states that "[n]o life company shall
\nissue any policy of life or endowment insurance . . .
\nexcept upon a written application therefor signed or assented to
\nin writing by the person to be insured . . . ."
\n[4]<\/strong><\/font><\/a> <\/strong><\/font>Because I would answer the
\nfirst certified question in the negative, I need not address the
\nremaining two questions.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"