SCOTUS: father convicted of child abuse denied confrontation rights

A father charged with sexually abusing his daughter should not have been denied his unfettered constitutional right of confrontation without a state court first making a case-specific finding that the screened testimony of the victim — though authorized by state law — was necessary, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled in a per curiam decision.

In Pitts v. Mississippi, the defendant faced multiple criminal charges after his daughter accused him of sexual abusing her during a weekend visit in 2020. At trial, prosecutors requested that the daughter be able to testify from behind a screen, citing a Mississippi victims’ rights statute which provides that child witnesses “shall” have the right to “a properly constructed screen that would permit the judge and jury in the courtroom … to see the child but would obscure the child’s view of the defendant.”

The defendant objected, arguing that allowing the screened testimony of his daughter would violate his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation in the absence of the state making a showing that such a procedure was necessary under the circumstances.

The trial judge granted the state’s request without making a specific finding of necessity, concluding that the state statute mandated the screening procedure.

After a divided Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions, the U.S. Supreme Court granted his petition for certiorari.

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, concluding the Mississippi courts failed to follow established precedent.

Click here to read the full text of the Nov. 24 decision in Pitts v. Mississippi.

BULLET POINTS: “Ordinarily, the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause ‘guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact.’ Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988). In child-abuse cases, however, that rule sometimes gives way. Consistent with the Sixth Amendment, a court may screen a child witness from the defendant when ‘necessary to protect [the child] from trauma that would be caused by testifying in the physical presence of the defendant, at least where such trauma would impair the child’s ability to communicate.’ Maryland v. Craig, 497 U. S. 836, 857 (1990).

“Still, before invoking this procedure, a court must proceed with care. It must ‘hear evidence’ and make a ‘case-specific’ finding of ‘[t]he requisite … necessity.’ Simply pointing to a state statute that authorizes screening, even one premised on ‘generalized finding[s]’ of necessity, will not suffice. Coy, 487 U. S., at 1021. Because the Mississippi Supreme Court departed from these principles, we reverse. …

“Having resolved that much, we pause to underscore what we leave unresolved. Just because a constitutional error took place at trial does not necessarily mean a new one must be held. Even constitutional errors are sometimes subject to a ‘harmless-error’ rule and do not require a new trial if the prosecution can show ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ This Court has held that the denial of the right to face-to-face confrontation is among those errors ‘subject to that harmless-error analysis.’ Accordingly, on remand the State remains free to argue, and the Mississippi Supreme Court remains free to consider, whether the error in this case warrants a new trial under the harmless-error standard.”

— opinion of the court