Prisons  – Inmate’s lack-of-exercise claim was wrongly dismissed

Where an inmate alleged that he was denied regular exercise that he required for rehabilitation on two separate occasions, each lasting approximately five months, the district court wrongly granted the prison officials’ motion for summary judgment. There were disputed issues of fact over whether the policy resulted in significant health problems and whether in-cell exercise was a reasonable and available alternative.

Background

Theodore Jerry Bolick was incarcerated at the Kirkland Correctional Institution Reception and Evaluation Center on two separate occasions, each lasting approximately five months. During both periods of incarceration, Bolick was not permitted to leave his cell to engage in physical exercise, despite suffering from serious physical disabilities that required exercise for rehabilitation.

Following his transfer from Kirkland, Bolick filed this pro se civil rights action, alleging, among other claims, that the two extended periods of deprivation of out-of-cell exercise violated his Eighth Amendment right to humane conditions of confinement. After the close of discovery, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment which the district court granted.

Standard

To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim of inhumane conditions of confinement based on the deprivation of out-of-cell exercise, an incarcerated individual must satisfy two requirements. First, he must establish that the deprivation was “objectively sufficiently serious[.]” Second, he must establish that the prison official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind, at a minimum that the prison official acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.

Officials’ liability

Bolick was deprived of the ability to exercise for two extended periods of time, each lasting about five months. He attests that this deprivation caused his muscles to atrophy and led to fatigue, chest pains, joint stiffness and aches in his back, hips, legs and feet. While incarcerated at Kirkland, Bolick was unable to rehabilitate his preexisting injuries which led to regression of prior progress in rehabilitative therapy.

Bolick produced evidence to support his allegation that the inability to exercise for extended periods of time caused him increased anxiety, depression and suicidal ideation. The officials point out that a prison doctor who examined Bolick did not note any significant health problems. Such factual disputes do not suggest that summary judgment is appropriate. Rather, they support a conclusion that genuine issues of material fact remain.

The officials argue that five to six months without out-of-cell exercise is too short a period to support a claim of inhumane conditions of confinement. The court disagrees. The officials also contend that safety concerns justified precluding all men undergoing reception and evaluation at Kirkland from leaving their cells to engage in out-of-cell exercise; however generalized safety concerns cannot, without more, justify a complete deprivation of out-of-cell exercise that causes serious or significant physical or emotional harm or a substantial risk thereof.

Finally, the officials argue that the in-cell exercise pamphlet provided Bolick with meaningful alternatives to out-of-cell exercise. To be sure, in-cell exercise may substitute for out-of-cell exercise where out-of-cell exercise is not feasible. It may do so, however, only when the incarcerated individual is in fact able to exercise inside of his cell. Bolick provided evidence that he was unable to do so, pointing to his physical condition and the size of the prison cells in which he was housed. Determining the feasibility and adequacy of proposed alternatives to out-of-cell exercise involves questions of fact susceptible to material disputes that may not be resolved at summary judgment.

Turning to the deliberate indifference prong, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Bolick, genuine issues of material fact remain concerning whether the officials knew that Bolick’s physical ailments in combination with the crowded conditions would make it impossible for him to exercise inside of his cell. Finally the officials are not entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable prison official would have been on notice that the officials’ conduct here would have violated the right of incarcerated individuals to engage in regular exercise, including some out-of-cell exercise, absent particularized penological justifications or other exceptional circumstances, which had been clearly established by the time Bolick was incarcerated at Kirkland.

Supervisor liability

On the record before us, there is insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Director Stirling possessed actual or constructive knowledge that the unreasonable risk of constitutional injury posed by the South Carolina Department of Corrections’ policy prohibiting out-of-cell exercise at Kirkland was widespread. The district court’s grant of summary judgment and dismissal of Bolick’s claims against Stirling is affirmed.

Vacated in part, affirmed in part and remanded.

Bolick v. Anderson, Case No. 23-6867, March 13, 2026. 4th Cir. (Berner), from DSC at Orangeburg (Harwell). Zoe Terner for Appellant. Brian Craig Mauldin for Appellees. VLW 026-2-095. 20 pp.

Full-Text Opinion

VLW 026-2-095
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