Tort: Alleged sexual-assault victim’s lawsuit was filed too late

Where a woman sued the defendant in 2021, alleging that he began a sexual relationship in 2005 when she was 14 years old and he was 33 years old, but her complaint showed that she knew of her injury and its causal connection to the alleged sexual abuse by the time she reached the age of majority, her suit was barred by the statute of limitations.

Background

On Sept. 17, 2021, Doe filed a complaint against Joseph Robert Green Jr., alleging claims of assault, battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Doe’s claims arise from a sexual relationship between Doe and Green that began in June 2005. At that time, Doe was only 14 years old; Green was 33 years old.

Green filed a plea in bar asserting that Doe’s claim was time barred because the statute of limitations on her claims began to run in December 2008, when Doe turned 18, and expired two years later in December 2010. According to Green, the version of Code § 8.01-249(6) that was in effect in 2005, when the sexual relationship occurred, did not toll the statute of limitations for injuries resulting from sexual abuse when the victim knew of the “fact of injury or its casual connection to the sexual abuse” before reaching the age of majority.

Green acknowledged that the most recent version of Code § 8.01-249(6) did not contain any language indicating that the victim’s knowledge of the injury and its causal connection to sexual abuse would not toll the running of the statute of limitations, but he argued that the 2021 accrual statute did not apply retroactively to reach causes of action that arose before it was enacted. Green further asserted that, even if the 2021 accrual statute applied, Doe’s complaint did not establish that she met the definition of a “complaining witness,” a necessary requirement for a finding of sexual abuse, or that their sexual relationship amounted to “sexual abuse” as defined by Code § 18.2-67.10.

The circuit court granted Green’s plea in bar and dismissed Doe’s complaint with prejudice. It ruled that the statute of limitations period began to run in December 2008, when Doe turned 18 and expired in December 2010. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the circuit court.

Retroactive application

Doe acknowledges that the 2021 accrual statute does not contain language indicating that the General Assembly intended for its retroactive application. She relies instead on Code § 8.01-1,6 which expressly provides for the retroactive application of accrual statutes.

However Doe never mentioned Code § 8.01-1, or any other statutory basis for retroactive application of an accrual statute, in the circuit court. Further, in the Court of Appeals, Doe did not raise Code § 8.01-1 until her reply brief. Doe’s failure to timely raise any argument related to Code § 8.01-1 in either the circuit court or her opening brief in the Court of Appeals renders this argument waived.

Doe’s remaining argument is that the 1995 amendment to Article IV, § 14 of the Constitution of Virginia established that accrual statutes pertaining to sexual abuse were automatically retroactive. Again, the court disagrees. The 1995 amendment does not require that accrual statutes pertaining to sexual abuse be given retroactive application. To the contrary, by its plain language the 1995 amendment merely grants the General Assembly “the power to provide for the retroactive application of a change in the accrual date.” Accordingly, Doe’s reliance on the 1995 amendment is misplaced.

Causation

Doe further argues that, regardless of whether the 2005 accrual statute applies, the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the record established that she knew of her injury and its causal connection to the alleged sexual abuse by the time she reached the age of majority. Again, the court disagrees. Doe’s own complaint includes statements indicating that, while she was still a minor, Doe was consciously aware that her relationship with Green had a deleterious effect on her mental health because she knew it was improper.

Doe, however, contends that the court should look beyond the language of her complaint and consider the fact that it was “written from the perspective of an adult woman who, after psychotherapy, has insight into the root cause of her emotional problems.” In taking this position, Doe essentially argues that it would be error to rely on the plain language of her complaint. Such an approach is simply untenable. Therefore, Doe’s complaint in the present case was properly dismissed as time barred.

Affirmed.

Doe v. Green, Record No. 240794, Nov. 26, 2025 (Powell). From the Court of Appeals. VLW 025-6-028. 13 pp.