Criminal – Sex offense defendant ineligible for sentence reduction

Where the Sentencing Guidelines provide that an individual is not entitled to a two-point decrease if they were convicted of a “sex offense,” that doomed the inmate’s claim. Although he argued the exception did not apply because his offense was not perpetrated against a real, actual minor, but rather an undercover law enforcement officer impersonating a minor, this argument was rejected.

Background

On May 27, 2020, a grand jury returned a one-count indictment against Joseph Marvin Bryant, charging him with aggravated sexual abuse. On Oct. 9, 2020, pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Bryant pled guilty to a one-count criminal information charging him with coercion and enticement in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). On Feb. 25, 2021, the court sentenced Mr. Bryant to 135 months’ imprisonment, the lowest end of the Guideline range.

Mr. Bryant has now filed a motion to modify his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) and U.S.S.G. Amendment 821. He argues that he is eligible for a two-level decrease to his total offense level which would reduce his advisory Guideline range from 135-168 months to 120-135 months. The United States argues that, although Mr. Bryant is a zero-point offender, he is not eligible for a sentence reduction under Amendment 821 because his offense of conviction is a sex offense as defined in U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1(b)(2).

Attempt

Mr. Bryant acknowledges that defendants convicted of a sex offense, as defined under § 4C1.1(b)(2), are ineligible for the two-point reduction, but he contends that his conviction does not fall within that exception because his offense was not perpetrated against a real, actual minor, but rather an undercover law enforcement officer impersonating a minor. The court disagrees.

As the United States correctly argues, § 4C1.1’s definition of sex offense includes an offense perpetrated against a minor or an attempt to commit an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). Courts have routinely held that § 2422(b)’s attempt provision applies in circumstances where the defendant’s conduct is perpetrated against an adult that the defendant believed was a minor, including a law enforcement officer impersonating a minor. Thus, that Mr. Bryant’s offense was perpetrated against a fictitious minor does not mean that it falls beyond §4C1.1(b)(2)’s definition of sex offense.

Definition

Mr. Bryant next argues that even if § 2422(b) contemplates minor to include a fictitious minor, the Guideline does not. He contends that other provisions of the Guidelines define minor to expressly include fictitious minors, while § 4C1.1 does not.

Mr. Bryant’s argument misses the mark. The text of § 4C1.1 does not define minor at all, nor does its application require a court to consider the definition of minor. Instead, § 4C1.1 requires a court to determine what constitutes a sex offense, and § 4C1.1(b)(2) makes clear that a sex offense includes an offense, or an attempted offense, under any one of the statutes identified by § 4C1.1(b)(2).

That several provisions of the Guidelines expressly define minor to include a fictitious minor is of no consequence, because the relevant provision here — § 4C1.1(b)(2) — does not use the word minor. At bottom, Mr. Bryant committed a sex offense within the meaning of § 4C1.1(a)(S). He is therefore ineligible for the two-point reduction to his total offense level.

Defendant’s motion for sentence reduction denied.

United States v. Bryant, Case No. 3:20-cr-49, June 2, 2026. EDVA at Richmond (Lauck). VLW 026-3-246. 12 pp.

Full-Text Opinion
VLW 026-3-246