Criminal – Evidence supported joint possession of firearm jury instruction

Where a man convicted of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon argued the circuit court wrongly instructed the jury on joint possession, this argument was rejected. There was more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the theory that there could be multiple people in possession of the firearm within the vehicle.

Background

After a jury trial, the circuit court convicted Harry Meredith Williams of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon.

Sufficiency

Williams contends that the evidence failed to show that he possessed either the Glock 21 handgun or the Draco because his “mere presence in the vehicle [was] insufficient by itself” to establish possession. In support, he relies on the testimony of his girlfriend, Shaquanda Hill, and the testimony of the passenger, Wiltor Fritz, as well as the lack of any fingerprint or DNA evidence or eyewitness testimony proving that he possessed either firearm. This court disagrees.

Williams’s text messages show he sought a firearm, procured it and placed it in Hill’s vehicle. Officer Black testified that the Draco depicted in the text messages was “identical” to the Draco ultimately recovered during the traffic stop.

After officers pulled Williams over, he—twice—reached into the area where officers subsequently found the Draco, evincing his ability to exert dominion over that area of the vehicle. His proximity to the Draco “is a circumstance probative of possession and may be considered as a factor in determining whether [Williams] possessed the firearm.” It is also notable that Williams first reached into that area when Officer Robinette was walking toward the vehicle. A rational trier of fact could have inferred this action as an attempt by Williams to conceal the Draco from view.

Williams, however, contends that the Commonwealth still failed to exclude his hypothesis of innocence that “[he] was [un]aware of the presence of the Draco firearm lodged in the rear passenger seat of the [Dodge sedan].” He is mistaken. The jury “reasonably reject[ed] [William’s] proffered hypothesis of innocence.”

As delineated above, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that Williams was aware that the Draco was in the back of the sedan. Moreover, the jury was not required to credit Fritz’s testimony. In this case, the evidence at trial illustrated that Fritz made inconsistent statements to police officers about the Draco.

Plainly put, the jury considered Williams’s hypothesis of innocence, with respect to the Draco, and did not “arbitrarily adopt” an interpretation of the evidence “which incriminate[d] [Williams].” Hence, based on the record, the jury’s rejection of Williams’s hypothesis of innocence was not “plainly wrong.”

Jury instruction

Williams further contends that the trial court erred in permitting Jury Instruction 9 to be given to the jury because there was no evidence that he had the “intent to jointly possess a firearm.” This court again disagrees. “[J]ury instructions are proper only if supported by the evidence, and more than a scintilla of evidence is required.” Here, there was more than a scintilla of evidence supporting Jury Instruction 9.

As outlined above, the evidence showed that the Draco was within Williams’s reach in the open passenger area of the vehicle, and Williams reached into that same area when Officer Robinette approached the vehicle. Williams also reached into that area when searching for his identification, and he had previously texted Hill to keep a Draco in her car.

Williams was not alone when officers pulled him over—Fritz was in the front-passenger seat and claimed to own the Draco. Beyond Fritz’s presence and statements, Williams also made ownership an issue throughout the trial to try and vitiate his possession of the Draco with the fact that someone else may have owned, or had control over, the Draco.

Under these circumstances, there could be multiple people in possession of the Draco. This amounts to more than a scintilla of evidence to justify Jury Instruction 9. However the case is remanded for the purpose of correcting the clerical error in the sentencing order.

Affirmed and remanded.

Williams v. Commonwealth, Case No. 0215-25-2, June 9, 2026. CAV (unpublished opinion) (Athey Jr.). From the Circuit Court of Henrico County (Herman). (Charles E. Haden, on brief), for appellant. (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Liam A. Curry, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. VLW 026-7-237. 12 pp.

Full-Text Opinion
VLW 026-7-237