Employment – Two defendants dismissed from wage suit

Where an employee failed to plead facts making it plausible that two defendants were liable for her wage, fraud, and related claims, these claims were dismissed.

Background

Plaintiff Rosa Coca sued multiple defendants, asserting claims under federal and Virginia law. Defendants Kavan Shaban and r80, LLC have filed motions to dismiss.

FLSA/VMWA

Shaban and r80 argue that the court should dismiss Counts One and Two under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Virginia Minimum Wage Act because plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to establish joint liability against these defendants. The court agrees.

The only non-conclusory facts alleged in the complaint connecting plaintiff’s plausibly alleged employer, Persona Doctors, LLC, with r80 are that (1) “[o]n or around September 8, 2020, [plaintiff] was provided an Employment Handbook by Defendant r80”; and (2) Defendant Shaban “[u]sed his personal address . . . as the principal place of business for both r80 and Persona.”

Plaintiff does not allege that the employment handbook governed any of the essential terms and conditions of her employment. Indeed, she does not allege any of the handbook’s content or that she was required to follow any potential requirements contained therein. To the contrary, plaintiff’s allegations indicate that the handbook did not modify the essential terms and conditions of plaintiff’s employment.

Although plaintiff’s allegations about the mutual connection to Shaban can be read to assert common ownership and a common principal place of business, when considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, including the employment agreement with Persona, the court cannot find that plaintiff’s sparse allegations about a connection between Persona and r80 plausibly show that the two “share[d], agree[d] to allocate responsibility for, or otherwise codetermine[d]—formally or informally, directly or indirectly—the essential terms and conditions” of plaintiff’s employment.

In her opposition, plaintiff asserts for the first time that “R80 exercised direct and indirect control over Plaintiff’s pay and payroll processing” and “issued employment-related documents.” But “it is axiomatic that a plaintiff may not amend her complaint through an opposition brief.” However, to the extent that plaintiff can allege specific facts about the circumstances giving rise to these new assertions that would render her joint employment theory plausible, the court will permit Plaintiff leave to amend.

As to Shaban, plaintiff alleges only the following: (1) “Upon information and belief, the corporate structure of r80, WBV, and Persona Doctors, LLC, was used by [Shaban] to shield himself from personal responsibility and to avoid financial obligations”; (2) Shaban “exercised complete control over r80, WBV, and Persona Doctors, LLC, such that the companies operated as his alter egos rather than separate entities”; (3) Shaban “used his personal address . . . as the principal place of business for both r80 and Persona Doctors, LLC”; (4) Shaban “[f]ailed to observe corporate formalities, including maintaining separate finances for each entity, and commingled corporate and personal assets”; (5) Shaban “[g]rossly undercapitalized the entities” and (6) “[p]erpetuated fraud or injustice by avoiding contractual obligations, including [Plaintiff’s] severance and final wages.”

As a preliminary matter, allegations based on information and belief “veer away from supporting plausible inferences, and turn instead toward unsupportable conclusory talismanic statements.” Moreover, aside from the specific allegations regarding the use of his personal address and the alleged fraud that forms the basis of this complaint, the allegations as to Shaban are a mere recital of factors often considered by courts in a veil piercing analysis—without any particular facts to render them plausible.

Nonetheless, plaintiff now asserts additional allegations in opposition. To the extent that plaintiff can allege specific facts about the circumstances giving rise to these new assertions that would render her joint employment theory plausible, the court will permit plaintiff leave to amend.

VWPA

Both r80 and Shaban also move to dismiss the VWPA claims. As to r80, for the same reasons, plaintiff again fails to state a claim for joint employer liability. As for Shaban, it is well-settled that the VWPA does not provide for joint liability of corporate officers. Accordingly, the VWPA claims will also be dismissed—again with leave to amend with specific facts.

Fraud/breach of contract

Both defendants also move to dismiss plaintiff’s remaining claims for violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7473, breach of contract and common law fraud. For all of these claims, plaintiff merely relies on group pleading and has failed to plausibly connect r80 or Shaban to the specific actions alleged that would support these theories or to otherwise plausibly allege that the corporate veil should be pierced in this case. These too will be dismissed.

Defendants r80 and Shaban’s motion to dismiss granted.

Coca v. r80, LLC, Case No. 1:25-cv-939, July 21, 2026. EDVA at Alexandria (Alston). VLW 026-3-308. 13 pp.

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