Easement to lake does not include docking rights

Where the express terms of an easement grants only ingress and egress to a lake, the easement does not convey riparian rights to plaintiff, and he has no right to dock a boat at a seawall on defendants’ lot.

Overview

In 1966, the owners of three lots in a subdivision recorded an easement. Lot 612 in the Barcroft Lake Shores subdivision abutts the lake. Lots 613 and 615 do not. The easement granted the owners of Lot 613 and Lot 615 an easement for ingress and egress to the lake.

This litigation is between the current owners of Lot 612 and Lot 613. The easement was granted by the Fidels, who owned Lot 612 in 1966. Lot 613 was owned by the Robinsons at the time. The Robinsons owned Lot 613 for almost 50 years.

During their ownership, the Robinsons built a retaining wall on Lot 612, installed an electrical outlet outside of the easement area, dredged the lake near the edge of the easement and docked a pontoon boat at the retaining wall.

Rustgi, the plaintiff in this case, bought Lot 613 from the Robinsons in 2013 and continued to use the retaining wall to dock a pontoon boat, recharging its batteries from the electrical outlet. In 2017, the Webbs bought Lot 612 and spent the next 18 months constructing a new home on the lot.

In January 2019, the Webbs, the defendants in this case, sent plaintiff  and the owner of Lot 615 a letter advising them to make “‘arrangements in order to conform with the original obligations of the easement,’ which Defendants asserted did not permit boat docking, electrical wiring, or personal property storage.”

Plaintiff responded with a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the original easement allowed his use, or, alternatively, he and his predecessors in title had established a prescriptive easement. Defendants demurred and filed counterclaims alleging trespass and nuisance.

Following a hearing, the court took the matter under advisement and now issues its rulings.

Findings

The express easement is unambiguous on its face, so parol evidence to determine the drafters’ intent cannot be introduced “particularly as the evidence would serve to contradict the narrowly tailored written terms of the agreement[.]”

The easement agreement “grants only ‘ingress and egress to Lake Barcroft,’ within a twenty-foot wide corridor extending to the lake through Defendants’ Lot 612 property, and therefore does not covey riparian rights to Plaintiff[.] …

“Although the agreement states the sea wall was constructed for ‘use’ of the parties in the ‘whereas’ preamble, that language did not further expand ‘use’ to include storage of objects, like a boat lashed to such wall, but rather at most qualified that the sea wall may be used to effect ingress and egress to the lake from the easement area[.]”

The easement does not permit defendants to block reasonable access to the lake.

Holdings

Plaintiff must remove his boat because docking it along defendant’s seawall “is incongruous with the expressed terms of the easement agreement[.] …

“Plaintiff’s claim of easement by prescription is denied as he has failed to demonstrate the requisite adversity to establish an easement by prescription for docking his boat, but instead has proven a long history of permissive use granted by previous owners of the servient Lot 612[.] …

“Plaintiff’s docking of his boat, and electrification and use of the electrical outlet are both trespassory and a nuisance, and in violation of the riparian and easement agreement rights of the Defendants.”

The court permanently enjoins plaintiff from docking a boat alongside defendants’ property and must disconnect the electrical line running from his property to the sea wall. Plaintiff says he has not stored any other property on defendants’ property, so they may dispose of the property as they see fit.

Defendants may not permanently block any portion of the easement area to interfere with plaintiff’s reasonable “ingress and egress to Lake Bancroft.”

Rustgi v. Webb, Case No. CL-2019-10190. June 7, 2020; Fairfax Cir. Ct. (Bernhard). John C. Altmiller, J. Chapman Petersen for the parties. VLW 020-8-055, 18 pp.