Criminal – Woman dodges disorderly conduct conviction

Where a woman was convicted of disorderly conduct, but her conduct could have resulted in convictions for assault and for fighting words, the other-crimes proviso in the statute prevents her from being convicted of disorderly conduct.

Background

Virginia punishes disorderly conduct in public places as a Class One misdemeanor. But the statute excludes from criminal liability “the utterance or display of any words or . . . conduct otherwise made punishable under” another provision of Title 18.2 of the Code of Virginia. Teona Seqouya Rose appeals her disorderly conduct conviction, arguing that her threatening and verbally abusing the victim could have resulted in convictions for assault and for fighting words.

Analysis

A person is “guilty of disorderly conduct if, with the intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof,” she “engages in conduct having a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person . . . at whom, individually, such conduct is directed” while “in a public place.” But under “the other-crimes proviso,” “[t]he conduct prohibited under subsection A shall not be deemed to include the utterance or display of any words or to include conduct otherwise made punishable under this title.”

In this case, Rose says that the cursing qualified as “violent abusive language . . . under circumstances reasonably calculated to provoke a breach of the peace.” Code § 18.2-416. And she argues that her menacing conduct at Jones’s window could have been punished as assault under Code § 18.2-57.

The other-crimes proviso applies only when the disorderly conduct at issue “was comprised solely of conduct ‘otherwise made punishable under this title.’” In this case, Rose could have been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of simple assault under Code § 18.2-57(A) based solely on the same conduct for which Rose was convicted of disorderly conduct.

An assault “occurs when an assailant,” among other things, “engages in an overt act intended to place the victim in fear or apprehension of bodily harm and creates such reasonable fear or apprehension in the victim.” Rose’s conduct fit that definition. She kicked Jones’s car and angrily harassed her outside the window. Jones testified that she felt threatened and bullied. Rose was so menacing that Jones’s 12-year-old son cowered and cried in the back seat, “scared to death.”

The threatening words used by Rose were integral to the assaultive conduct. As Rose kicked the door with her boots, she shouted, “I’m gonna beat yo ass, get the fuck out the car, bitch. I’m gonna beat yo ass. I want my ones. Get the fuck out the car.” Jones understood the slang expression, “I want my ones,” to mean that Rose wanted to fight her in the street. Those verbal threats were on par with the menacing words that the Supreme Court found sufficient to support an assault conviction in Clark v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 636 (2010).

Conclusion

Because Rose could have been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of assault under Code § 18.2-57, the other-crimes proviso in Code § 18.2-415(B) prevents her from being convicted of disorderly conduct.

Reversed and warrant dismissed.

Rose v. Commonwealth, Case No. 1533-25-3, June 30, 2026. CAV (unpublished opinion) (Raphael). From the Circuit Court of the City of Lynchburg (Watson). Dennis Englerth (Beacon Law, PLLC, on brief), for appellant. J. Brady Hess, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. VLW 026-7-274. 7 pp.

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