Roanoke police officer immune in Walmart arrest

Where the officer had a reasonable basis to believe a man had committed or was committing a battery upon Walmart employees, qualified immunity operated to bar  false arrest, malicious prosecution and excessive force claims.

Background

Jeremiah Henderson filed this civil rights action against Austin McClain of the Roanoke City Police Department alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Henderson contends that, during an encounter at a local Walmart, McClain falsely arrested him while using excessive force and later deceived a magistrate in order to procure a warrant for his arrest. McClain now moves for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

False arrest, malicious prosecution

Henderson cannot sustain the claimed violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from false arrest and malicious prosecution because McClain had a reasonable belief that Henderson had committed or was committing a battery.

McClain arrived on scene having already heard that Henderson was “about to . . . hit” a Walmart greeter, Jeannette Wheeler. After he arrived, Wheeler told McClain that Henderson had made multiple violent threats against her. Seconds later, as Thomas Shelton, a Walmart assistant manager, attempted to leave his conversation with Henderson, McClain observed the agitated Henderson physically accost Shelton. Shelton’s reaction to this physical contact, combined with the reported threats and already-threatening atmosphere, made it reasonable to believe that the contact did injury to Shelton’s “mind or feelings.”

These facts, taken together, form the basis for a reasonable belief that Henderson had committed or was committing a battery. Because McClain had probable cause to suspect a battery, he is entitled to qualified immunity on Henderson’s false arrest and malicious prosecution claims.

Excessive force

Like Henderson’s other two claims, the constitutional provision at issue in his excessive force claim is the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable seizures. The Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), instructs that the relevant inquiry is whether a given use of force was objectively reasonable, something that depends on “the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”

The three Graham factors weigh in McClain’s favor. The first factor, the nature of the offense, supports the use of handcuffs because the underlying offense—assault and battery—is a violent one. The second factor, whether the suspect poses a threat to the officer or others, also weighs strongly in McClain’s favor. By the time Officer McClain handcuffed Henderson, he had already heard that Henderson had threatened to inflict bodily harm on one Walmart employee and had witnessed Henderson grab another employee. A reasonable officer in McClain’s position would suspect that a more serious disturbance was on the horizon.

The third and final factor—whether Henderson was resisting or evading arrest—also cuts in McClain’s favor, albeit not as strongly as the other two. Henderson resisted McClain’s attempt to detain him, but McClain had already begun the process of handcuffing Henderson before any serious attempts at resistance. Because each of these factors—and the other facts and circumstances of the case—weigh in McClain’s favor, his use of handcuffs was objectively reasonable. The reasonableness of his actions entitles him to qualified immunity from suit for use of excessive force.

Remaining arguments

There are two additional issues before the court. First, Henderson argues that his complaint presents a retaliatory prosecution claim. Having carefully examined the pleadings and subsequent filings, the court can identify no such claim.

Finally, McClain has moved to enjoin related state-court proceedings that he contends were initiated in an attempt to thwart this removal action and undermine the court’s authority. Henderson’s state-court suit is composed entirely of state-law claims not present in this case and over which this court has never exercised jurisdiction. Without any overlap in the claims at issue, this court discerns no threat to its jurisdiction from the ongoing state-court litigation or an attempt by Henderson to undermine its jurisdiction over the federal claims. Absent these concerns, the court will not take the extraordinary step of enjoining a state-court proceeding.

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment granted. Defendant’s motion to enjoin state court proceedings denied.

Henderson v. McClain, Case No. 19-cv-00685, Oct. 19, 2020. WDVA at Roanoke (Cullen). VLW 020-3-521. 14 pp.