Habeas Corpus – Petition attacking military court martial is dismissed

Where the plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his court martial conviction for sexual assault, but two of his arguments were already rejected by another court, and the remaining arguments were procedurally defaulted, his petition was dismissed.

Background

Sergio A. Reyes-Lesmes filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petition challenges petitioner’s conviction for sexual assault by military court martial. Respondents argue that the court must dismiss petitioner’s claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to put forward a mistake of fact defense and failing to object to the way in which the military panel selected the specification under Charge Two as these issues have been fully and fairly decided by the United States Army Court of Appeals. Respondents further argue the remainder of petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted.

Full and fair consideration

A military court’s fair consideration of a petitioner’s claim is dispositive and precludes reconsideration by a district court. Accordingly, before assessing the merits of a habeas petition challenging a conviction by military court-martial, the court must consider whether petitioner’s claims received full and fair consideration by a military court.

With respect to petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the record is clear that the Army Court of Appeals was presented with two-party briefing on the issue, considered the claim on its merits and discarded it. Regarding his ineffective counsel claim, his issue implicates factual questions that the Army Court of Appeals conclusively resolved. These claims are dismissed.

Default

Petitioner does not dispute that he failed to exhaust the remainder of his claims. But he argues that there was cause for his failure to exhaust his remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claims and his unanimous jury claim. Beginning with petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim, he contends that he “could not have possibly raised these claims on direct appeal because there was not a sufficient record made at the trial.”

He further argues that he could not have developed a record as to ineffective assistance on habeas review within the military system because the Uniform Code of Military Justice “has no provisions allowing post-conviction review of Court Martial convictions.” Petitioner’s second point is incorrect. Courts martial “are subject to collateral review within the military justice system” and military courts conducting collateral review may engage in fact-finding hearings.

As for petitioner’s first argument, he fails to explain why he could not preserve his ineffective assistance claims related to expert testimony, spoliation, prior inconsistent statements and jury unanimity on the present trial record—the same record presently before the court on habeas review—particularly when he did raise on direct appeal his ineffective assistance claim based on his counsel’s failure to raise a consent defense.

Turning to petitioner’s unanimous jury claim, petitioner argues that cause exists for his failure to raise the claim because his direct appeal predated the Supreme Court’s decision in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83 (2020), which overruled Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), and held that the Sixth Amendment’s unanimous jury requirement applies to state courts. Petitioner argues that Ramos should equally apply to military courts martial, that its novelty creates cause to raise his unanimity argument now and that petitioner was prejudiced by the failure to require a unanimous jury because it is likely that the jury did not reach a unanimous verdict.

Assuming that Ramos creates cause for petitioner’s procedural default, petitioner has not clearly shown that he was prejudiced by the failure to require unanimity. His trial counsel did not poll the panel and there is no indication that the failure to require unanimity worked to petitioner’s “actual and substantial disadvantage.”

Moreover, the Supreme Court has long held that “[t]he right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment is not applicable to trials by courts-martial or military commissions.” Ramos does not change this conclusion; federal courts and the U.S. Navy-Marine Court of Criminal Appeals have held that the decision is “not applicable to courts-martial.”

Respondents’ request to dismiss the petition granted.

Reyes-Lesmes v. McDonnell, Case No. 1:25-cv-1416, May 22, 2026. EDVA at Alexandria (Nachmanoff). VLW 026-3-228. 11 pp.

Full-Text Opinion
VLW 026-3-228