Hearing officer may have violated detainee’s rights

Where a disciplinary hearing officer refused to allow a detainee charged with “conspir[ing] or making plans to commit/possession of unauthorized drugs,” to call a witness in his defense, and where the detainee was found guilty and lost good-conduct time as a result, there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the detainee’s due process rights were violated.

Background

David Crawley, a former Virginia detainee, filed this civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging 35 different claims against 19 defendants. After the court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss, 15 claims remained pending against 13 defendants. The matter is currently before the court on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Exhaustion

The defendants argue that Crawley failed to exhaust available administrative remedies as to 12 of his remaining 15 claims before filing this action, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The court concludes that Crawley failed to exhaust available administrative remedies as to claims 2, 6, 10, 12, 13, 27, 28, 29, 30 and 35.

However, while the defendants argue that Crawley failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to the excessive force and assault claims against officer Crotts in claim one, the court finds a dispute as to whether administrative remedies were available to Crawley and, therefore, will deny the motion for summary judgment as to these claims. Similarly, while defendants argue that Crawley failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to the retaliation claim against lieutenant Colna in claim eight, the court finds a dispute as to whether administrative remedies were available to Crawley and, therefore, will deny the motion for summary judgment as to this claim.

Due process

Crawley alleges that disciplinary hearing officers Wolfe and MacVean denied him due process at his disciplinary hearings by refusing to allow him to present evidence in his defense. Crawley alleges that Wolfe “arbitrarily” refused to allow Crawley to submit declaration statements of witnesses to the alleged May 3 assault and that Wolfe “demonstrated his prejudice when he refused to accept the plaintiff affidavits of witness … or review the video footage” when Crawley contended that he was being falsely accused in retaliation.

Because the disciplinary hearing penalty did not cause Crawley’s sentence to be enhanced and he does not demonstrate (or even allege) that his 30 days of cell restriction imposed atypical and significant hardship on him, the court concludes that his due process right were not affected. Moreover, the undisputed evidence shows that Crawley did not submit any request for documentary evidence or witnesses prior to the hearing.

Wolfe attests that Crawley indicated that he had an affidavit from another inmate but that he decided not to submit it because “he did not want the [other inmate] to get a charge. Still further, to the extent that Wolfe did not review the relevant video footage, the court notes that the video had been reviewed by the reporting officer prior to the disciplinary hearing and that the warden personally reviewed the video footage when Crawley appealed his disciplinary conviction. Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to these claims.

Regarding the disciplinary hearing conducted by MacVean on Crawley’s charge of “conspir[ing] or making plans to commit/possession of unauthorized drugs,” there is no dispute that Crawley submitted two requests for documentary evidence: one for the two pages of drug codes, and the other for his workbook. MacVean denied both of Crawley’s requests for documentary evidence. MacVean also denied Crawley’s witness request and, ultimately, found Crawley guilty of the offense.

Because Crawley lost good-conduct time as a result of the disciplinary conviction, his due process rights were implicated. Due process requires, among other things, that the inmate be provided an opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence in his defense, so long as it is “consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals.” The court finds a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether MacVean denied Crawley due process when he refused to allow Crawley to call Ms. Whitaker as a witness. Accordingly, the court will deny the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to this claim.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment granted in part, denied in part.

Crawley v. Kanode, Case No. 7:19-cv-00474, Aug. 11, 2022. WDVA at Harrisonburg (Cullen). VLW 022-3-340. 23 pp.