Fraud – Court vacates fraud judgment against home sellers

Where the purchasers of a home alleged the sellers concealed the plumbing conditions to throw them off their guard, the trial court erred by failing to set aside a jury verdict on this claim. A buyer cannot prevail on a fraud-in-the-inducement claim based on an allegedly hidden defect if a reasonably prudent person in the buyer’s position would have taken steps to investigate, and if such an investigation would have uncovered the defect.

Background

Leslie and Tyler Painter purchased a residential property from Curtis and Venessa Wright. The house had plumbing problems, and the Painters sued the Wrights for breach of contract and fraud in the inducement. At a bench trial, the court dismissed the Painters’ breach-of-contract claim but found in their favor on the fraud claim. On appeal, the Wrights argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion to vacate the judgment for the Painters on the fraud claim

Jurisdiction

The Painters argued below that under Rule 1:1(a), the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case after entering the Feb. 7, 2025, order. The Painters insisted that the February 7 order was the final order because it entered a money judgment in their favor, and the trial court did not suspend, modify or vacate it within 21 days.

The trial court disagreed with their jurisdictional claim, treating the August 5 order as the final order. But if the Painters were correct, then this court would lack appellate jurisdiction here because the notice of appeal, filed August 28, was not filed within 30 days of the February 7 order.

The February 7 order recited that the trial court had granted the Wright’s motion to strike the breach-of-contract claim in Count One. The order also entered a money judgment for the Painters on Count Two. It used final-order-sounding language—“ADJUDGED, ORDERED and DECREED.”

Although the order recited that the Wrights had “requested that this matter remain on the docket for post-trial motions,” that is not enough to negate the finality of an otherwise final order. Indeed “only an order within the twenty-one day time period that clearly and expressly modifies, vacates, or suspends the final judgment will interrupt or extend the running of that time period so as to permit the trial court to retain jurisdiction in the case.”

Still, the trial court was right when it cited Rule 1:1(e) to conclude that the February 7 order was not the final order because that order did not dismiss or enter judgment on Count One. Rule 1:1(e) makes clear that an order granting a motion to strike in a civil case is not final unless it also enters judgment on the claim or dismisses it.

The February 7 order here said that the trial court had granted the motion to strike the breach-of-contract claim in Count One, but the order did not go further to dismiss that claim. Only the August 5 order did that. So the August 5 order was the final order under Rule 1:1(e), and the Wrights’ August 28 notice of appeal was timely filed within the 30 days allowed by Rule 5A:6(a).

Fraud

The record in this case is devoid of any evidence that the Wrights affirmatively misrepresented any facts about the plumbing to the Painters. Indeed, the Wrights and the Painters were never in direct contact. The Painters’ theory of the case thus depended on circumstantial evidence that the Wrights had concealed the plumbing conditions to throw them off their guard. This court disagrees.

The known plumbing repairs, the home inspection report noting that the inspector did not examine the washing machine or drain and the disconnected washing machine should have put the Painters on notice that further inquiry was warranted. Notably, the Painters obtained the Wrights’ consent for a complete home inspection that would have examined the washing machine and drain pipes.

But the inspector ended up conducting only a partial inspection because his contract with the Painters did not require him to examine the appliances or drains. The partial inspection that resulted cannot be blamed on the Wrights. Had the Painters simply connected the washing machine and turned it on, they would have discovered the plumbing problems that gave rise to this suit.

A buyer cannot prevail on a fraud-in-the-inducement claim based on an allegedly hidden defect if a reasonably prudent person in the buyer’s position would have taken steps to investigate, and if such an investigation would have uncovered the defect. Likewise, a buyer cannot prevail if he undertakes only a partial investigation when a full investigation would have revealed the defect. The trial court erred in failing to grant the Wrights’ motion to strike the fraud-in-the-inducement claim and in failing to set aside the judgment.

Reversed and final judgment.

Wright v. Painter, Case No. 1525-25-3, June 30, 2026. CAV (unpublished opinion) (Raphael). From the Circuit Court of Botetourt County (Branscom). Charquia Fegins for appellants. No brief or argument for appellees. VLW 026-7-273. 14 pp.

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