Charges dismissed due to Speedy Trial Act violation

Where neither the district court nor the parties ever mentioned the Speedy Trial Act or the ends-of-justice exclusion when setting a date for trial beyond the time allowed under the Speedy Trial Act, the act was violated and the charges must accordingly be dismissed.

Background

The Speedy Trial Act requires that a criminal defendant’s trial “commence within seventy days from the filing date … of the … indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.” Congress recognized, however, “that criminal cases vary widely and that there are valid reasons for greater delay in particular cases.”

“To provide the necessary flexibility, the Act includes a long and detailed list of periods of delay that are excluded in computing the time within which trial must start,” including the “ends-of-justice” exclusion. Under this provision, if the district court finds “that the ends of justice served by the granting of [a] continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial,” it can exclude that period from the Speedy Trial computation. The Act requires the district court to “set[] forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding” that an ends-of-justice continuance is proper.

Enil Ramon Montoya Velasquez appeals his convictions for two drug-related offenses, asserting that his jury trial on those charges did not occur within the timeframe established by the Act.

Analysis

At a hearing on May 20, 2020, the district explained that it granted the Speedy Trial continuance on July 22, 2019, under the ends-of-justice exception “for trial preparation.” The record shows that, on July 22, 2019, the district court asked the parties if they had “talked about trial dates.” The government’s response — that it was “looking like probably December is the earliest” — was vague and ambiguous as to why they were looking at that month. The government offered, and the district court requested, no clarification as to whether December was “the earliest” point for trial because Velasquez or his counsel needed more time to prepare for trial, because that was the most convenient time for counsels’ respective schedules or for some other reason.

In fact, neither the district court nor the parties ever mentioned the Speedy Trial Act or the ends-of-justice exclusion. This court therefore cannot find, from the hearing transcript alone, that the district court had the ends-of-justice factors on its mind when it entered its July 22 minute order.

The district court had the opportunity to offer more clarity at the May 20, 2020, motion-to-dismiss hearing, but it gave none. The court stated in a conclusory manner that it granted the July 22 ends-of-justice continuance “to provide defense counsel sufficient time to prepare for trial.” But the record does not support that the district court had that concern on its mind contemporaneous with its July 22 minute order because Velasquez’ counsel never requested more time for trial preparation during that proceeding.

Nor can the court, as the government suggests, infer that Velasquez’ counsel needed more trial preparation time solely from the fact that his counsel requested two prior ends-of-justice continuances in May and June 2019. The record shows that counsel requested those continuances to recover from a recent broken foot that precluded her from driving so that she would have time to confer with Velasquez about his upcoming arraignment. To accept the government’s argument would require this court to simply speculate as to a post hoc justification for the district court’s July 22 minute order. But the Act expressly precludes it from doing so.

Estoppel

The government asserts that since Velasquez’ counsel consented to the government’s representations during the July 22 arraignment that December was “the earliest” time trial could be held, he is now estopped from raising such a challenge. The court disagrees. There is no evidence that the parties envisioned that the district court would, after the arraignment’s conclusion, consider granting an ends-of-justice continuance under the Act. Velasquez could not have taken a position on a continuance for which he had no notice.

For similar reasons, Velasquez did not “succeed[] in persuading [the district] court” to find that an ends-of-justice continuance was warranted on July 22. Again, the parties did not ask for a Speedy Trial continuance at the end of Velasquez’ arraignment, let alone cite the Speedy Trial Act. The district court took it upon itself to grant an ends-of-justice continuance. Lastly, there is a diminished risk here that Velasquez will “derive an unfair advantage” from enforcing his Speedy Trial Act rights because the Act permits the district court to “dismiss the charges without prejudice.”

Reversed, vacated in part and remanded.

United States v. Velasquez, Case No. 20-4514, Oct. 25, 2022. 4th Cir. (Agee), from EDNC at Wilmington (Dever). Anne Margaret Hayes for Appellant. William Connor Winn for Appellee. VLW 022-2-225. 17 pp.