Workers’ compensation: Woman denied benefits for off-premises injury

Where a woman sought workers compensation benefits, after she was injured while traversing a crosswalk on a public street that separated her employer’s building from a public parking lot, the Workers’ Compensation Commission’s decision denying her benefits was affirmed.

Background

Audra Poole appeals the Workers’ Compensation Commission’s decision denying her benefits for an injury sustained while traversing a crosswalk on a public street that separated her employer’s building from a public parking lot. Poole challenges the Commission’s decision that no exception from the coming and going rule applied and that the extended premises doctrine was inapplicable to the parking lot and crosswalk.

Extended premises

Poole contends that the “parking garage was the ‘extended premises’ of [her] place of employment” because that is where Quest “instructed its employees on where to park.” When a parking lot is not owned, maintained or controlled by the employer, application of the extended premises doctrine “rests on a combination of criteria, including but not limited to proximity, authority, and responsibility for maintenance.”

The evidence does not show that Quest had authority over the parking garage or was responsible for its maintenance. Further, there was scant evidence regarding proximity at the hearing. The Commission stated, “we received little describing the crosswalk’s physical proximity to the hospital housing Quest’s office. We gather it separated the parking deck she used and the hospital entrance.”

If the Commission lacked evidence to evaluate the proximity of the crosswalk to the hospital, it follows that the Commission lacked evidence to evaluate the proximity of the parking garage to the hospital. Further, Poole’s appellate brief fails to address the issue of proximity. The burden was on Poole to prove her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment, including any associated criteria (e.g., proximity, authority, responsibility).

The Commission’s decision reflects that all testimony was taken into consideration. After considering that testimony, the Commission made a factual determination that Poole was not required to park in a specific garage or area. That factual determination is binding. Accordingly, Poole’s argument that the Commission erred in failing to find the parking garage was part of Quest’s extended premises is unconvincing.

Independently—and of greater importance—Poole did not fall in the parking garage. After parking, she entered a “walkway from the parking garage” and then “walked on the crosswalk” where she fell “halfway through.” This court has recognized a sharp distinction between parking lots and other areas. Poole did not fall in the parking garage. Accordingly, the “parking lot” cases do not conflict with the Commission’s decision.

Passageways/walkways

In worker compensation cases, the analysis for passageways and walkways differs from the analysis for parking lots. However, the initial question here is whether a crosswalk in a public street is the equivalent of a walkway or passageway. As there is no Virginia authority to the contrary, this court cannot say that the Commission’s determination that the crosswalk was not part of the extended premises was plainly wrong or that the Commission erred in its application of the law.

Affirmed.

Poole v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., Record No. 0701-24-3, Sept. 9, 2025. CAV (Chaney). From the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Commission. James B. Feinman (Law Office of James B. Feinman, on brief), for appellant. (Lisa Reed Petersen; Schoenberg & Associates, on brief), for appellee. VLW 025-7-241. 13 pp.