Municipal: City of Suffolk immune from suit challenging speed monitoring cameras

Where a vehicle owner challenged the city of Suffolk’s photo speed monitoring system, but maintenance of the system fell under the governmental function of regulating traffic, the City was entitled to sovereign immunity.

Background

On June 23, 2023, a vehicle registered to Curtis Lytle was photographed traveling at 51 miles per hour in a work zone. The posted speed limit was 35 miles per hour. On July 17, 2023, the City of Suffolk issued Lytle a “Notice of Violation/Summons” for speeding, certified by a City law-enforcement officer, with a demand to pay $100.

Lytle failed to pay the penalty and failed to request a trial date to contest the merits. Instead, many months later, Lytle filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in the circuit court alleging the City: (1) failed to issue a proper summons, (2) failed to follow the appropriate procedures for initiating a traffic case, (3) failed to follow procedures for filing an affidavit for non-liability, (4) committed fraud, and (5) was guilty of maladministration of government.

The circuit court sustained the City’s plea in bar and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Reasoning that maintenance of a photo speed monitoring system fell under the governmental function of regulating traffic, the court held: (1) the City was protected by sovereign immunity and (2) Code § 8.01-184, the statute on which Lytle relied, did not waive that immunity.

Sovereign immunity

Municipalities are only entitled to immunity in instances of “liability arising from governmental functions, but not proprietary functions.” “A municipality engages in a governmental function when it exercises powers and duties exclusively for the public welfare, effectively acting ‘as an agency of the state to enable it to better govern that portion of its people residing within its corporate limits.’”

A review of Virginia precedent on roadway-related claims involving sovereign immunity leads to the inevitable conclusion that the City’s use of speed monitoring cameras pursuant to Code § 46.2-882.1 involves a governmental function. The intent of the photo speed monitoring program is to attempt to control the speed and flow of traffic and prevent traffic accidents in areas where pedestrians or road workers are particularly vulnerable; and the imposition of civil fines for violations captured via the photo speed monitoring devices acts as a deterrent for speeding motorists.

The Code of Virginia contains numerous grants of authority to localities that enable them to collect civil fines to act as deterrence mechanisms for the protection of the public. The City, while collecting fines, is doing so as an exercise of its power for the general well-being and benefit of its citizens. By implementing the speed photo system, the City is protecting the general health and safety of pedestrians, workers and other motorists in high-risk areas, a touchstone of a governmental function.

In doing so, the City is also exercising judgment and discretion for the welfare of the public. Thus, the circuit court correctly determined that the City’s implementation of a speed monitoring system designed for the purpose of preventing accidents in high-risk zones qualifies as a governmental function.

Waiver

Lytle argues on appeal that there is an exception to sovereign immunity, under Dillon’s Rule, by which a plaintiff may seek declaratory judgment against a municipality. But Lytle concedes in his opening brief that he “never specifically used the term ‘Dillon Rule’ in the complaint . . . .” Given that Lytle first raises his argument relying on Dillon’s Rule in this appeal, the issue is waived.

Lytle nevertheless suggests that if Dillon’s Rule does not allow review of the speed monitoring cameras, he is without recourse to challenge the process involved in assessing his violation. The court disagrees. Code § 46.2-882.1(G) requires localities to enforce violations under the statute by executing a summons for the violation. In that process, there are instructions outlining the summoned person’s ability to dispute the ticket. Lytle had an opportunity to challenge the validity of the violation which he failed to utilize. Instead, Lytle chose not to pay the fine, nor to seek a court date to challenge the ticket.

Affirmed.

Lytle v. City of Suffolk, Record No. 1655-24-1, Sept. 16, 2025. CAV (Friedman). From the Circuit Court of the City of Suffolk (Bates III). Timothy Anderson (Anderson & Associates, PC, on brief), for appellant. Rebecca J. Powers, Assistant City Attorney, for appellee. VLW 025-7-249. 12 pp.