Sovereign immunity protects city from suit over speed camera ticket

A Circuit Court judge correctly found that city of Suffolk was protected by sovereign immunity in a suit by a vehicle owner challenging a traffic ticket issued by the city’s speed camera system, the Court of Appeals of Virginia has decided.

After plaintiff Curtis D. Lytle received a camera-generated speeding ticket in the mail, he sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in Suffolk’s Circuit Court. Lytle alleged the city failed to issue a proper summons, failed to follow appropriate procedures for initiating a traffic case, and failed to follow procedures for filing an affidavit for non-liability. He further alleged the city committed fraud and was guilty of maladministration of government.

But the Circuit Court judge found that the city was engaged in a governmental function and therefore protected by sovereign immunity.

Lytle appealed, arguing that the judge erred in granting the city’s plea in bar. He further contended that the judge erred in ruling the city’s use of the speed monitoring system qualified as a governmental function because Suffolk’s use of a third-party private vendor and its collection of civil fines indicated the implementation of the photo speed monitoring system was a proprietary function solely for the city’s benefit.

Lytle also argued that even if the city was engaging in a governmental function, “Dillon’s Rule” provided an exception to sovereign immunity. The rule allows a plaintiff to challenge a municipal policy.

Writing for the three-judge appellate panel, Judge Frank K. Friedman said the Circuit Court correctly found that the city was entitled to sovereign immunity; that case law supported that traffic regulation is a government function; and that the involvement of a third-party entity in the operation of the camera system did not eliminate the city’s sovereign immunity defense.

Friedman also cited Virginia Code § 46.2-882.1, which allows state and local law enforcement agencies to operate speed cameras.

“While the City contracted with a third-party private vendor to mail a ‘Notice of Violation/Summons’ following alleged violations, each Notice is certified by a City law-enforcement officer who reviews the images recorded by the cameras,” Friedman wrote. “Thus, the operation remains discretionary because a law-enforcement officer reviews the photos and determines whether to issue a summons based on the photo and information gathered by the camera.”

Judges Mary B. Malveaux and William G. Petty joined Friedman in the court’s 12-page opinion in Lytle v. City of Suffolk (VLW 025-7-249).

Appeal initiated

Attorney Timothy Anderson represented Lytle.

Anderson said his client has filed a petition for appeal with the Supreme Court of Virginia.

“Our position is straightforward: While traffic enforcement is generally a governmental function, municipalities must still comply with the limits and procedures the General Assembly has set,” Anderson said. “In Suffolk’s case, the speed camera program was administered in ways that exceeded the authority granted by state law — such as treating violations as pay-by-mail invoices instead of following the same procedures required for traffic infractions.”

When a locality steps outside the authority the Legislature has given it, citizens should be able to ask a court to declare those actions unlawful.

— Timothy Anderson, Virginia Beach

Anderson said the appeal asks the Supreme Court to recognize a narrow carve out from sovereign immunity for ultra vires acts.

“That means when a locality steps outside the authority the Legislature has given it, citizens should be able to ask a court to declare those actions unlawful. This exception would not involve damages; it would apply only to prospective declaratory relief, ensuring municipalities operate within their legal boundaries,” he said.

If the Court of Appeals’ decision is upheld, Anderson said, “localities could disregard statutory safeguards without meaningful oversight, leaving drivers with no way to challenge systemic violations other than fighting individual $100 tickets one at a time. We believe the Supreme Court should clarify that sovereign immunity is not a license for local governments to act outside of the law.”

Suffolk City Attorney William E. Hutchings Jr. did not respond to requests for comment.

Work zone ticket

On June 23, 2023, a vehicle registered to Lytle was photographed traveling 51 mph in a work zone with a posted 35 mph speed limit.

Suffolk issued a notice of violation and summons on July 17, 2023. A city law enforcement officer reviewed the evidence of the alleged violation.

However, according to the court record, Lytle did not pay the ticket. He also failed to request a trial date to contest the citation. Instead, Lytle filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in the Circuit Court on April 5, 2024.

The Circuit Court sustained the city’s plea in bar and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.

The Circuit Court judge held that sovereign immunity protects the city and Code § 8.01-184, the statute on which Lytle relied, did not waive that immunity.

Governmental function

The Court of Appeals agreed with the city’s assertion that operating a speed camera system constitutes a governmental function.

“The Code of Virginia contains numerous grants of authority to localities that enable them to collect civil fines to act as deterrence mechanisms for the protection of the public. The City, while collecting fines, is doing so as an exercise of its power for the general well-being and benefit of its citizens. By implementing the speed photo system, the City is protecting the general health and safety of pedestrians, workers and other motorists in high-risk areas, a touchstone of a governmental function,” Friedman wrote.

The judge also cited the state Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Gray v. Virginia Secretary of Transportation in holding that, “as a general rule, the sovereign is immune not only from actions at law for damages but also from suits in equity to restrain the government from acting or to compel it to act.”

Regarding Lytle’s assertion that the city was engaged in a proprietary rather than a governmental function, the Court of Appeals held that the camera system’s operation was discretionary, allowing a law enforcement officer to determine when to issue a summons based on a review of the evidence gathered by the camera.

Additionally, use of the speed camera system — and imposition of fines — protects the safety of pedestrians, workers and other motorists in high-risk areas, the panel noted.

“Thus, we hold that the circuit court correctly determined that the City’s implementation of a speed monitoring system designed for the purpose of preventing accidents in high-risk zones qualifies as a governmental function. Consequently, the circuit court properly granted the City’s plea in bar of sovereign immunity,” Friedman wrote.

“Furthermore, the fact that a third-party entity plays a role in the process does not prohibit application of sovereign immunity — our courts have applied governmental immunity in matters involving contracts with third parties,” Friedman said, citing the 1989 state Supreme Court case of Edwards v. City of Portsmouth, which involved the city’s use of a private ambulance service.

Finally, the panel rejected Lytle’s suggestion that the city’s use of a third-party private vendor automatically rendered the operation of the system proprietary.

Dillon Rule

Lytle had also argued on appeal that an exception to sovereign immunity existed under Dillon’s Rule, by which a plaintiff may seek declaratory judgment against a municipality.

Friedman pointed to Rule 5A:18 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, which bar consideration of appeals not properly preserved at the Circuit Court.

Rule 5A:18 is relevant because “Lytle did not raise his argument relying on Dillon’s Rule in the circuit court,” Friedman wrote. “Indeed, Lytle concedes in his opening brief that he ‘never specifically used the term ‘Dillon Rule’ in the complaint … .’ Given that Lytle first raises his argument relying on Dillon’s Rule in this appeal, the issue is waived.”

The Court of Appeals concluded by addressing the suggestion that if Dillon’s Rule did not allow review of the speed monitoring cameras, Lytle was without recourse to challenge the process involved in assessing his violation.

“Notably, Code § 46.2-882.1(G) requires localities to enforce violations under the statute by executing a summons for the violation,” Friedman wrote.

“In that process,” he continued, “there are instructions outlining the summoned person’s ability to dispute the ticket. Lytle had an opportunity to challenge the validity of the violation which he failed to utilize. Instead, Lytle chose not to pay the fine, nor to seek a court date to challenge the ticket. Lytle’s claim that he was denied recourse for disputing the ticket is wholly without merit.”