Negligence: Jury’s $2.5 verdict against anesthesiologist is reversed

Where a woman alleged an anesthesiologist caused her physical pain and emotional distress by, among other things, “fail[ing] to timely and properly administer anesthesia services,” during her C-section, the jury’s $2.5 million verdict was reversed. The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on superseding cause – the other doctor’s decision to perform a caesarian delivery without anesthesia.

Background

After a six-day medical malpractice trial, a jury awarded Elizabeth Bandy $2,500,000 in damages against Reston Anesthesia Associates PC and Mirza Baig MD.

Jury instruction

Dr. Baig argues that the trial court erred when it denied the jury instruction on superseding cause because the instruction was supported by more than a scintilla of evidence and it was a correct statement of the law. The court agrees.

Dr. Baig’s proffered jury instruction correctly stated the law. This court’s inquiry, accordingly, is whether more than a scintilla of evidence supported the instruction. Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the proponent of the refused instruction, there was ample evidence that performing a caesarian delivery without anesthesia was not reasonably foreseeable.

Dr. Hodgson, himself, testified that he had never begun a caesarian delivery without anesthesia present. Neither of the expert anesthesiologists who testified at trial had ever known an obstetrician to begin the operation before anesthesia was present. The events in the delivery room were so unsettling that staff were called in to give emotional support to nurses involved in the delivery because “they were upset.”

The decision to begin the surgical procedure was Dr. Hodgson’s alone, and the evidence—viewing it in the light most favorable to Dr. Baig—was that the anesthesiologist had been caring for another patient but was now headed to Ms. Bandy and was only seconds away when Dr. Hodgson decided to proceed with a C-section. Similarly, competent evidence also suggested that no genuine emergency existed to require such a drastic course.

Under these circumstances, the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on superseding cause, so that the jury—as the factfinder—could assess the factual questions related to causation and whether Dr. Hodgson’s actions were reasonably foreseeable.

Counterarguments

The trial court denied the superseding cause instruction tendered by Dr. Baig, finding that “the instruction [was] confusing, because it . . . would imply that . . . Dr. Hodgson’s decision to proceed with the C-section . . . is a not reasonably foreseeable incident in this case.” The trial court continued, the C-section was “going to happen,” “was going to be necessary,” and determined that the “instruction does [not] do anything other than create[] confusion for the jury.”

Ms. Bandy argues, in addition to claims that the C-section was entirely foreseeable, that Dr. Baig’s instruction was an improper means of asserting negligence against other non-defendant doctors. This court disagrees with the trial court and Ms. Bandy.

First, Ms. Bandy is free to present her foreseeability argument to the jury on remand—but on these facts the actions leading up to the delivery of Ms. Bandy’s child could not be deemed foreseeable as a matter of law. Moreover, Ms. Bandy’s suggestion that Dr. Baig was attempting to assert negligence against Dr. Hodgson is misplaced. The defense did not allege negligence against any other doctor. It is well-settled that an intervening act can be a superseding cause even in the absence of negligence.

Bias

The trial court recognized Dr. Hodgson as an expert in obstetrics and gynecology. On cross-examination, Dr. Baig’s counsel asked about Dr. Hodgson’s “two other medical malpractice cases in 2014 and 2019.” The trial court ultimately ruled that asking Dr. Hodgson the medical malpractice question “invite[d] unfair prejudice in the circumstances.”

Because the issue of cross-examining Dr. Hodgson for bias is almost certain to recur in a retrial, the court addresses it. It finds that the trial court erred in ruling that evidence of Dr. Hodgson’s possible bias and possible self-protection was inappropriate and lacked probative value.

First, there was a classic battle of the experts in this case. Virgina law protects the ability to draw out evidence of an expert’s bias. Moreover, Dr. Hodgson also testified to material facts, and his rendition of events was, again, at odds with defense witnesses on various issues.

The issue of whether Dr. Hodgson’s version and analysis of events was skewed by his own self-interest was a probative line of inquiry. On remand, questioning related to Dr. Hodgson’s bias should be treated as probative evidence and cross-examination on this topic presents an appropriate line of questioning, subject to the constraints of Rule 2:403.

Reversed and remanded.

Reston Anesthesia Associates, P.C. v. Bandy, Record No. 1792-23-4, Oct. 7, 2025. CAV (Friedman). From the Circuit Court of Fairfax County (Leary). Paul T. Walkinshaw (Kathleen S. Ryland; Byron J. Mitchell; Kristina L. Fattoum; Wharton Levin; Mitchell & Simopoulous, PLLC, on briefs), for appellants. Lauren M. Byrne (Robert E. Byrne, Jr.; John Simpson; MartinWren PC, on brief), for appellee. VLW 025-7-277. 21 pp.