Court erred in using hearsay to value marital residence

Where the circuit court admitted a tax assessment document and used it to determine the value of the marital residence, it erred. The document was inadmissible hearsay.

Background                                        

Ann M. Isbell appeals the circuit court’s final decree awarding her a divorce from Curtis W. Isbell.

Residence

Wife argues that the circuit court erred in admitting the tax assessment document and using it to determine the value of the marital residence because it was inadmissible hearsay opinion evidence. The court agrees.

Husband offered, and the circuit court admitted into evidence, the tax assessor’s valuation of the marital residence in 2023 as $582,000; the court then accepted the truth of the matter asserted in the tax assessment when it found precisely that value for the residence. This is exactly the type of hearsay evidence prohibited when, as here, the assessor’s qualifications have not been established to the satisfaction of the court, their demeanor cannot be observed during testimony by the trier of fact and their pronouncements are immune from cross-examination.

Although husband asserts that wife identified the tax assessment on her exhibit list, and thus invited the error she now complains of, that contention is not persuasive.

An intended exhibit does not become evidence until it is introduced and accepted by the circuit court. Wife maintains, as she did in the circuit court, that the document was included in her exhibit list because she had been paying the property taxes. She also steadfastly objected to admission of the tax assessment as proof of valuation.

Accordingly, the circuit court’s valuation of the marital residence is reversed and remanded for the circuit court to reconsider the residence’s value.

Interest

Wife argues that even if husband had a separate interest in the marital residence, the circuit court erred in determining the amount of his separate interest. Specifically, she contends that the court found that the parties realized $437,200 from the sale of the Bradco stock but erroneously decided that the entire proceeds of the sale attributable as husband’s separate contribution, rather than a mix of separate and marital contributions.

Because husband’s 1993 purchase of Bradco stock occurred before the marriage, the sale proceeds of those shares constituted husband’s separate property. Husband testified that when the tranches of stock were sold, $300,000 of the sale proceeds were used to pay off the parties’ mortgage on the marital residence. The circuit court’s finding that husband had at least some separate interest in the marital residence is not plainly wrong or without evidentiary support.

But the circuit court also concluded that the Bradco stock purchased in 2005 was husband’s separate property. The evidence does not support this classification. Purchased during the marriage, the 2005 Bradco stock was presumptively marital property unless husband proved it was separate property. Husband failed to do so. The circuit court’s classification of the Bradco stock husband purchased in 2005 was thus without supporting evidence, and resulted in a misapplication of the equitable distribution statute.

Wife next contends that the circuit court erred by failing to award her a separate interest in the marital residence based on her downpayment on the home. The court agrees. The parties both testified that wife made the $25,000 downpayment on the marital residence using pre-marital money. Further, there was no evidence that wife ever withdrew her interest in the residence.

Accordingly, the circuit court plainly erred in finding that husband contributed to the downpayment on the marital residence and in failing to credit wife with a separate interest in the marital residence.

Personal property

Wife contends that the value of the marital personal property split between the parties in the final decree was vastly different and, therefore, the circuit court abused its discretion by failing to grant her a monetary award for her interest in that property. The court disagrees. The record shows the circuit court considered the factors listed in Code § 20-107.3(E) before reaching its decision.

Annuity

Wife argues that the circuit court erred in classifying husband’s annuity as part marital and part separate because husband failed to provide sufficient evidence to trace his separate interest. The court again disagrees. Crediting husband’s testimony, the money from the ESOP and IRA accounts constitutes a traceable separate interest for husband within the annuity. Husband’s testimony itself was evidence the court as the trier of fact chose to credit.

Support

“[B]ecause we reverse the equitable distribution award and remand for reconsideration,” the circuit court must reexamine spousal support in light of its additional equitable distribution proceedings; therefore, we must also reverse the spousal support ruling and “direct the trial court, on remand, to reconsider the issue of spousal support.”

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Isbell v. Isbell, Record No. 1542-24-2, Oct. 14, 2025. CAV (unpublished opinion) (Malveaux). From the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond (Jenkins Jr.). Robert L. Isaacs (Robert L. Isaacs & Associates, on briefs), for appellant. Richard L. Locke (Shannon S. Otto; Locke Family Law; Shannon Otto Law, PLLC, on brief), for appellee. VLW 025-7-292. 14 pp.