Negligence – Coach defeats student’s claim of gross negligence

Where a parent alleged a coach was grossly negligent during a student-on-student altercation, the coach was granted summary judgment. Although she owed the student a duty, the assault was not foreseeable and her actions did not amount to “an utter disregard of prudence,” as required for a gross negligence claim.

Background

Samantha St. Clair—a student support coach at Skyline Middle School—observed a middle-school student, R.S., push a classmate, A.S.C., during a physical education class. Seconds later, St. Clair was called to a meeting and walked towards the gymnasium exit.

While St. Clair’s back was turned, R.S. punched A.S.C. in the face, causing serious injury. A.S.C. argues St. Clair was grossly negligent for walking away after R.S. pushed him. This matter is before the court on St. Clair’s motion for summary judgment on the remaining gross negligence claim.

Duty

The court begins by ascertaining whether St. Clair owed a duty to supervise A.S.C. with reasonable care. Two cases from the Supreme Court of Virginia hold that when an adult “agrees to supervise and care for [a] child” whom a parent has relinquished to their care, such an adult has a common-law duty to do so “with reasonable care.”

The court finds that St. Clair owed a duty to supervise A.S.C. with reasonable care. To be sure, as St. Clair notes, St. Clair had no students assigned to her in the gym. But, as A.S.C. notes, St. Clair’s job description included responsibilities to “[e]nsure[] the adequate and safe supervision of students” and “provide . . . learning environment support.” This includes when St. Clair encountered students throughout the school. Thus, St. Clair had a duty to supervise and care for A.S.C. with “reasonable care” when she encountered him in the gymnasium.

Foreseeability

For the violent acts of third persons to be foreseeable, a defendant must have knowledge of past violence that is sufficiently proximate to indicate that similar violence against the plaintiff might recur. Here, the record shows that St. Clair had no knowledge of any prior violent or disruptive acts of R.S. A.S.C. fails to demonstrate otherwise.

A.S.C. asserts that several facts create a triable issue that R.S.’s conduct was foreseeable. Specifically, A.S.C. points to (1) R.S.’s push of A.S.C. a few seconds before the punch; (2) that St. Clair may have noticed that R.S. was much larger than A.S.C; (3) a “commotion” among students who were reacting to the altercation and (4) that St. Clair took a half-step towards “what is assumed to be the closest gym exit but changes direction to maybe avoid getting any closer to . . . R.S. and the Plaintiff.”

But none of this evidence creates a factual dispute that St. Clair knew who R.S. was or should have foreseen R.S.’s violent act. R.S.’s punch “was not foreseeable based on [his push] because it differed in degree and kind from his earlier violence.” Nor is it a reasonable inference from the video that the “commotion” among the children was in reaction to R.S. and A.S.C.’s interaction (or that, if it was, this commotion made R.S.’s violence more foreseeable). And finally, it would be mere “speculation and the piling of inferences” to infer that St. Clair was heading towards the best exit but changed course to avoid R.S. and A.S.C.

Breach

In Virginia, “[g]ross negligence is ‘a degree of negligence showing indifference to another and an utter disregard of prudence that amounts to a complete neglect of the safety of such other person.’” Here, St. Clair has pointed to evidence that her actions did not amount to “an utter disregard of prudence.” Specifically, St. Clair shows that after R.S. pushed A.S.C., she evaluated the situation and decided that her involvement was not needed. This is enough for St. Clair to prevail, as “a claim for gross negligence must fail when the evidence shows that the defendant[] exercised some degree of care.”

The burden shifts to A.S.C. to present evidence that St. Clair’s reaction was an “egregious” breach of her duty. She has failed to do so. Additionally, A.S.C. cannot show that St. Clair engaged in the “deliberate conduct” of ignoring a known danger—the hallmark of gross negligence.

As previously discussed, A.S.C. cannot point to evidence that R.S.’s violence was reasonably foreseeable. Thus, “there is no evidence that [St. Clair] made a deliberate decision to ignore the [risk that A.S.C. would be assaulted by R.S.], nor is there any evidence that [St. Clair] consciously disregarded” that risk.

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment granted.

A.S.C. v. St. Clair, Case No. 5:24-cv-00072, Jan. 8, 2026. WDVA at Harrisonburg (Yoon). VLW 026-3-013. 15 pp.

Full-Text Opinion

VLW 026-3-013
Virginia Lawyers Weekly