Constitutional – Search of probationer’s house was unlawful

Although a defendant’s conditions of probation allowed law enforcement to conduct warrantless searches, his mere ownership interest in a house did not permit officers to search the tenant-occupied residence.

Background

Federal probation officers conducted warrantless searches of two residences based on their supervision of Augustine Perez, a federal supervisee subject to warrantless search conditions. Officers first searched Perez’s reported residence and then searched a separate home, owned by Perez and occupied by Deanna Coleman, based on the officers’ belief that Perez resided there as well. At Coleman’s home, the officers entered over her objection and initiated a probationary search that ultimately led to the seizure of $25,325 and other items later alleged to be connected to drug trafficking.

The government brought this civil forfeiture action against the seized currency, alleging that the currency was related to drug trafficking. Coleman and Perez moved to suppress the evidence found during the residential searches by arguing that the searches violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the motion to suppress and granted summary judgment for the government.

Landlord and tenant

The government first argues that the officers were justified in searching Teal Drive because Perez owned Teal Drive and his release conditions required him to submit to warrantless searches of his “property.” To the government, it’s simple: Perez’s property can be subject to warrantless searches, and Teal Drive is Perez’s property.

The court disagrees. A landlord cannot give police consent to conduct a warrantless search of a tenant’s home. Although the warrantless search of Teal Drive was not conducted by consent, the landlord limitation to the consent exception applies with equal force here. To hold otherwise would allow probation conditions to override settled Fourth Amendment limits and permit warrantless searches of third parties’ homes based solely on the landlord’s legal status.

Therefore, just as a landlord’s property interest does not confer authority to consent to the search of a tenant’s residence, a probationer’s ownership interest does not permit officers to rely on probation conditions to search a tenant-occupied residence. Accordingly  the officers were not permitted to search Teal Drive merely based on Perez’ ownership of that property because Coleman resided there as a tenant.

Probable cause

The government alternatively argues that the officers could search Coleman’s house, pursuant to Perez’s supervised release conditions, because the officers reasonably believed that Perez also resided in Coleman’s home. The Fourth Circuit has not addressed third-party rights for probationary searches, but the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have. They have held that “[a]n officer must have probable cause to believe a dwelling is the residence of a parolee in order to initiate a warrantless search of a residence not known to be the home of a parolee.”

The court adopts the Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ reasoning, which balances the potential for violations of the constitutional rights of third parties and the government’s important interest in supervising parolees and probationers. An officer must have probable cause to believe a dwelling is the residence of the court-supervised individual to initiate a warrantless search of a residence not known to be the court-supervised individual’s home.

If the Fourth Amendment requires probable cause to execute an arrest warrant at a third party’s home, then it should likewise require probable cause for executing a probationary search at a third party’s home. In fact, the government’s interest is likely higher and more urgent in executing arrest warrants than in conducting probationary searches, where probation officers have routine contact with their supervisees.

Therefore, if probable cause is necessary when the government has a greater interest, it should also be required when that interest is less compelling. Requiring less than probable cause would render “all private homes susceptible to search by dint of mere suspicion or uncorroborated information” that a probationer lives there.

Here, without any corroborating information, the informant’s tip, the fact that some investigation was conducted and the prescription pill bottles were not sufficient for a person of reasonable prudence to believe that Perez lived at Teal Drive at the time of the search. Because the officers did not meet this probable cause standard, the Teal Drive search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Any evidence discovered there should be excluded from this civil forfeiture proceeding.

Reversed, vacated and remanded with instructions.

United States v. Perez, Case No. 23-7280, Feb. 23, 2026. 4th Cir. (Benjamin), from MDNC at Winston-Salem (Biggs). Ryan Menter for Appellants. Nathan Lee Strup for Appellee. VLW 026-2-058. 23 pp.

Full-Text Opinion

VLW 026-2-058
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