Criminal – Woman held in contempt for repeatedly interrupting court proceeding

 Where a woman repeatedly interrupted a hearing despite multiple court warnings from the court that her refusal to follow instructions would result in contempt proceedings, the court did not abuse its discretion when it summarily found her in direct contempt.

Background                              

The circuit court summarily held Amy Lynn Childress in direct contempt for “[m]isbehavior in the presence of the court” and sentenced her to 10 days’ incarceration. The contempt conviction was based on Childress’s repeated interruptions during a hearing on her attorney’s motion to withdraw as counsel.

Contempt

Childress claims that her “abrupt” contempt conviction was retaliatory and meant to punish “her for engaging in constitutionally protected advocacy.” She contends that the court violated her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and her First Amendment freedom of speech rights when it held her in contempt for attempting to object on the record. This court disagrees.

Childress’s contempt conviction was not “abrupt.” The court warned Childress on multiple occasions to stop interrupting and respect the court’s rulings. It repeatedly cautioned her that her failure to follow these instructions would result in contempt proceedings. Although Childress stated she understood, she nevertheless interrupted and ignored numerous court rulings.

The record reflects that the court gave Childress considerable leeway to examine Weber on his motion to withdraw. But during this extensive examination, Childress asked questions on irrelevant topics after being directed not to, ignored the court’s instructions to move on and editorialized about the proceeding. Considering Childress’s behavior, which reflected “defiance of, and disdain for, the judiciary,” the court did not abuse its discretion when it summarily found her in direct contempt.

The contempt finding did not violate Childress’s First Amendment rights.  Restrictions on courtroom speech that ensure the fair and orderly administration of justice extend not only to licensed lawyers but also to self-represented litigants. The “right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom. Neither is it a license not to comply with the relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.”

Although Childress characterizes her frequent interruptions as “objections” and “vigorous advocacy” protected by the First Amendment, neither the record nor case law supports that claim. The court repeatedly ordered Childress to focus her questions on relevant matters and respect its rulings. Nevertheless, Childress relentlessly pursued topics irrelevant to Weber’s motion to withdraw and defied all orders not to interrupt. Childress’s interjections were not designed to “preserve a claim for appeal” but rather to “resist a ruling of the trial court.” Thus, her interjections were not protected speech, and the court did not violate her First Amendment rights when it held her in direct contempt.

Nor did the summary adjudication of direct contempt violate Childress’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Her contemptuous conduct occurred entirely “in the presence of the court.” The court convicted her of petty contempt, relying on statutes permitting a maximum of 10 days’ imprisonment and a fine of $250. Because the court observed the offense, it was authorized to hold her in direct, petty contempt without further proof or evidence.

Attorneys

Childress challenges the appointment of John Alexander as a special prosecutor in her underlying criminal case. She asserts that his participation at the hearing “affect[ed] the legitimacy of the proceeding” and was a structural error that violated her due process rights. Childress also challenges the court’s order allowing Weber to withdraw as counsel. She contends that the court violated her Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when it granted Weber’s motion without appointing substitute counsel.

But this appeal is limited to Childress’s conviction for direct contempt. Any issues concerning Alexander’s appointment and Weber’s withdrawal relate to the prosecution of Childress in the underlying cases, rather than the court’s summary contempt conviction, and therefore are not ripe for consideration in this appeal.

Americans with Disabilities Act

Childress argues that the court erred when it denied her “explicit requests for reasonable Americans with Disabilities Act, or ADA, accommodations”—specifically, requests for recesses. However, nothing in the record shows that Childress requested an accommodation under the ADA or that the court ruled on any such request.

Childress did not give the court an opportunity to rule on any ADA claim below, and Rule 5A:18 precludes this court from considering the issue for the first time on appeal. Although Childress asks this court to apply the “ends of justice” exception to Rule 5A:18, she has not affirmatively argued that the “exception is necessary to avoid a grave injustice or the denial of essential rights.” Because Childress’s assignment of error is procedurally defaulted under Rule 5A:18, this court cannot address it.

Affirmed.

Childress v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1802-24-3, April 7, 2026. CAV (unpublished opinion) (per curiam). From the Circuit Court of the City of Lynchburg (Peatross). Amy Lynn Childress, pro se. (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Ryan Beehler, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. VLW 026-7-134. 11 pp.

Full-Text Opinion

VLW 026-7-134
Virginia Lawyers Weekly