Tort – Statute of limitations bars sexual abuse suit

Where the parties disputed when a man asserting a claim for sexual abuse had knowledge of the claim for purposes of triggering the statute of limitations, and the circuit court, replying on the deposition testimony and documentary evidence, determined he was aware of the causal connection between the sexual abuse and his injuries before he reached the age of majority, the suit was dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations.

Background

In 2017, Steve Thomas Jurnigan II, filed a complaint asserting claims against Michael H. Stevens, James M. Bowes and the Southampton Bowmen Club, or SBC. The complaint asserted claims based on sexual abuse that occurred from 1993-2000, when Jurnigan was between 8 and 15 years old. The complaint asserted that Jurnigan was unaware of the causal connection between the sexual abuse and his injuries until he received psychotherapy.

Appellants filed pleas in bar, asserting that Jurnigan’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations in effect when Jurnigan reached the age of majority in 2002. Applying the version of Code § 8.01-243 in effect in 2002, the appellants maintained that Jurnigan’s claims were subject to a two-year statute of limitations period.

Jurnigan asserted that his claims did not accrue until 2014, at the time when he first learned of the causal connection between the sexual abuse and his injuries after he received psychotherapy. Relying on the 2014 version of Code § 8.01-243, Jurnigan asserted that his claims were not time-barred.

The circuit court acknowledged that the parties disputed when Jurnigan became aware of the causal connection between the sexual abuse and his injuries. It concluded that the evidence established that Jurnigan knew that the abuse caused him to suffer some injuries before he reached adulthood. Consequently the circuit court concluded that Jurnigan’s claims accrued when he reached the age of majority in 2002. Therefore, the circuit court held that Jurnigan’s claims became time-barred two years later in 2004.

The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s judgment. Noting the conflicting evidence before the circuit court, the Court of Appeals determined that a genuine dispute of material fact existed concerning the accrual of Jurnigan’s claims. In light of this factual dispute, the Court of Appeals held that the circuit court erred by granting the appellants’ pleas in bar.

Analysis

The Court of Appeals committed a significant error when it treated the appellants’ pleas in bar as motions for summary judgment. When the parties present evidence addressing a factual dispute underlying a plea in bar and submit the matter to the circuit court rather than a jury, the circuit court is required to resolve the underlying factual dispute after considering the evidence before it. In this context, a plea in bar is not akin to a motion for summary judgment.

The Court of Appeals committed another significant error when it failed to give any deference to the circuit court’s factual findings. At the risk of stating the obvious, the deposition testimony and accompanying exhibits presented by the appellants constituted substantive evidence in this case. Any form of admissible evidence may be presented to resolve the contested factual issue underlying a plea in bar. The circuit court’s factual findings were based on its consideration of the evidence presented by the parties, and they were entitled to substantial deference on appeal.

Applying the proper deferential legal standard, the circuit court’s factual findings regarding the accrual of Jurnigan’s claims were not plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence. Based on the deposition testimony and documentary evidence presented by the appellants, the circuit court could have reasonably determined that Jurnigan was aware of the causal connection between the sexual abuse and his injuries before he reached the age of majority.

Accordingly, the circuit court did not err when it determined that Jurnigan’s claims accrued when he reached the age of majority in 2002. Likewise, the circuit court did not err when it determined that Jurnigan’s claims became time-barred by the pertinent statute of limitations two years later in 2004.

Reversed and final judgment.

Stevens v. Jurnigan II, Record No. 250142, April 9, 2026 (Chafin). From the Court of Appeals of Virginia. VLW 026-6-017. 9 pp.

Full-Text Opinion

VLW 026-6-017
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