Tort – Lawsuit by ‘sting’ victim against conservative organization is dismissed

Where a consultant alleged he was fraudulently induced into making embarrassing statements by a woman pretending to be his date, but actually working for a conservative organization that frequently engages in “sting” operations, his lawsuit was dismissed. His claims were barred by the First Amendment or otherwise failed as a matter of law.

Background

Amjad Fseisi, a consultant for various federal agencies, brings claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, conspiracy to commit the same and violation of the Federal Wiretapping Act against a political activist group and its agents for publishing his statements that they recorded in an undercover “political journalism” operation. Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss.

First Amendment

Defendants contend that plaintiff is a limited purpose public figure who cannot recover any publication-related damages without a showing that O’Keefe Media Group, or OMG‘s publications were false and were made with “actual malice.” Plaintiff contends that defendants’ liability is not based on the tort of defamation but rather misrepresentation, and on that basis, OMG’s publications for the purposes of his claims “did not constitute a form of expression by the defendants; rather, the statements were the product of misrepresentations.” The court agrees with defendants.

All of plaintiff’s claimed damages arise out of OMG’s publications, however characterized. OMG’s publications, whether defamatory or “a product of misrepresentation,” were clearly a form of expression (viz., what plaintiff said and what OMG claimed he said). Plaintiff’s claims to recover damages, all of which arise out of OMG’s publications, are therefore foreclosed by the First Amendment.

Misrepresentation

To plead fraudulent misrepresentation under Virginia law, a plaintiff must allege “(1) a false representation, (2) of a present, material fact, (3) made intentionally and knowingly, (4) with intent to mislead, (5) reliance by the party misled that is both reasonable and detrimental, and (6) resulting damage to the party misled.”

While there are alleged misrepresentations, ranging from Jane Doe’s true identity to her motives in seeking out the plaintiff, the publication of plaintiff’s statements constituted an intervening cause from which the alleged damages resulted. Therefore, plaintiff has not and cannot plead facts plausibly satisfying the causation element of his fraud claim. And plaintiff’s conspiracy to commit misrepresentation fares no better for similar reasons.

Wiretap Act

Plaintiff’s final claim is that defendants’ recording of his statements without his consent violated the Federal Wiretap Act’s general prohibition on intentionally recording an oral communication. Recognizing that Virginia is a “one-party consent” state, meaning that only one party must consent to the recording, plaintiff nevertheless contends that defendants’ activity falls under the exception for a “communication  intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State.”

Plaintiff alleges that the recordings were made for the tortious purpose of defaming him; but while he concedes that he does not allege a defamation claim or rely on any defamatory aspect of defendants’ public statements, he argues that his misrepresentation and conspiracy allegations provide the tortious purpose for the recordings. This provision requires an intent to commit a future tortious act.

Here, the relied-upon misrepresentations all occurred before the publication of the recordings (viz: chiefly during the Bumble dating app messaging between plaintiff and Jane Doe) and were part and parcel of defendants’ scheme to obtain the recordings, not the purpose for which the recordings were intended to be used. Because plaintiff has not otherwise plausibly alleged that defendants intercepted his oral communications with the purpose of committing a subsequent tort or criminal offense, his wiretapping claim must be dismissed.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss granted.

Fseisi v. O’Keefe Media Group, Case No. 1:25-cv-02368, May 14, 2026. EDVA at Alexandria (Trenga). VLW 026-3-216. 9 pp.

Full-Text Opinion
VLW 026-3-216