Search & Seizure – Warrantless search of hotel room safe upheld

Where the defendant argued the government improperly searched the safe of a hotel room he was sharing with another person, his motion to suppress was denied. The other resident had authority to consent to search.

Background

Defendant Stephen Anthony Graham moves to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop from a vehicle driven by codefendant Kourtney Allyson Arnold and in which Graham was a passenger. He also seeks to suppress evidence found in the safe of a hotel room of the Arcadia Inn which he shared with Arnold.

Graham argues that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop. Graham also argues that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room safe, and no exception to the warrant requirement justified the warrantless search.

Stop

The government asserts that during the four-minute, 1.3-mile drive from the Arcadia Inn to 1952 Lee Highway, Dye and Loyd “observed Arnold’s vehicle cross the white lane lines multiple times.” Because Dye and Loyd were in an unmarked vehicle, they communicated the lane violations to Sparks and directed him to initiate a traffic stop.

Virginia law requires that “[a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as is practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from that lane until the driver has ascertained that such movement can be made safely.” The government argues that Arnold’s failure to maintain her lane constituted a traffic violation, and therefore the stop was reasonable.

Graham argues that the stop was wholly pretextual, and Dye and Loyd are lying about witnessing lane violations. In the alternative, Graham argues that lane violations are not traffic violations under Virginia law and therefore cannot provide the basis for reasonable suspicion.

There is evidence that the stop was pretextual in this case. The day before the stop, Dye received a tip indicating that Arnold was engaged in drug activity at the Arcadia Inn, and that she intended to check out and take any belongings, including drugs, the following day. Even assuming Dye and Loyd directed initiation of the traffic stop with the subjective intent of investigating Arnold and Graham for narcotics offenses, however, that alone does not render the stop unlawful.

Because the officers’ subjective motivation is not dispositive, the issue is (1) whether the record supports a finding that Arnold committed a traffic violation and (2) whether that traffic violation justifies the traffic stop. A preponderance of the evidence supports the finding that Arnold failed to maintain her lane during the incident. In several unpublished decisions, the Fourth Circuit has held that failure to drive within a lane is a traffic violation that can justify a traffic stop.

Even if a lane violation is not a traffic violation under Virginia law, reasonable suspicion may rest on an objectively reasonable mistake of law. The Eastern District of Virginia held that an officer’s belief that touching a fog line constitutes a traffic violation was reasonable. Therefore, even if Dye and Loyd were mistaken in concluding that a lane violation is a traffic offense, the multiple lane violations created a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Because the officers had several reasonable, objective bases for the stop, the motion to suppress the evidence obtained in vehicle search is denied.

Hotel room

Graham argues that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room safe as an occupant of the room. Generally, an individual staying the night in a hotel room, even if he is not the renter, has a reasonable expectation of privacy in that room. The government responds that Graham waived his Fourth Amendment rights pursuant to a state plea agreement and as a condition of federal supervised release, which significantly diminished or otherwise eliminated Graham’s reasonable expectation of privacy.

The Supreme Court has avoided deciding whether a probation waiver completely eliminates a defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Accordingly, I find that Graham had a reasonable expectation of privacy, although potentially diminished, that provides him standing to challenge the search of the hotel room safe.

The government nevertheless argues that Arnold had actual and apparent authority to consent to search of the safe. The court agrees. Although Arnold’s authority to consent to search of the room does not automatically extend to the safe, she had actual authority to consent to the search of the safe because she had general access to and used the safe. And even assuming the fact that Arnold did not have a key to the safe deprived her of actual authority to permit the search, Arnold had apparent authority to consent.

Defendant’s motion to suppress denied.

United States v. Graham, Case No. 1:26-cr-00007, June 15, 2026. WDVA at Abingdon (Ballou). VLW 026-3-255. 22 pp.

Full-Text Opinion
VLW 026-3-255