Tort – Chesterfield County dismissed from wrongful death suit

Where the co-administrators of the estate of a man who was fatally shot by a Chesterfield County police officer sued the county, but their amended complaint failed to state a Monell claim against the county, and the county was entitled to sovereign immunity on their negligence claim, the county was dismissed from the lawsuit.

Background

This action stems from the fatal shooting of Charles M. Byers by Chesterfield County Police Officer Gordon J. Painter. The co-administrators of the Byers’s estate advance two counts against Chesterfield County in connection with their son’s death: excessive force and deprivation of civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count Three) and wrongful death, negligence, gross negligence and/or willful and wanton negligence pursuant to Virginia law (Count Five). Chesterfield County has filed a motion to dismiss.

Count Three

“To hold a municipality liable for a constitutional violation pursuant to Monell, a plaintiff must establish ‘the existence of an official policy or custom that is fairly attributable to the municipality and that proximately caused the deprivation of their rights.’” Plaintiffs argue that their amended complaint states a Monell claim against Chesterfield County based on their allegation that it failed to properly train and supervise Painter, and based on their allegation that it was aware of and thus condoned Painter’s pattern of unconstitutional behavior.

To successfully plead Monell liability based on a failure to train theory, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights by the defendant’s subordinates; (2) inadequate training that reflects a deliberate indifference to or “reckless disregard for the constitutional rights of persons within police force jurisdiction” and (3) a causal nexus between the allegedly inadequate training policy and the constitutionally violative conduct.

The amended complaint does not reference Chesterfield County’s police training program, much less allege a particular deficiency in such training that gave rise to the shooting of Mr. Byers. Nevertheless, plaintiffs baldly contend that training deficiencies are “obviously” represented by Painter’s conduct. Plaintiffs’ argument is unavailing and cannot overcome the amended complaint’s silence with respect to pleading deficient training. Accordingly, plaintiffs have failed to state a § 1983 Monell claim against the County pursuant to a failure to train theory.

Plaintiffs also endeavor to assert a failure to supervise theory of Monell liability, but this avenue is equally unavailing. It is well established in the Monell sphere that supervisory liability may only lie against natural persons—not entities such as Chesterfield County. The court accordingly concludes that plaintiffs do not state a claim for Monell liability by way of this avenue, either.

The court also finds that the amended complaint does not allege facts to support a condonation theory of Monell liability against the County. Plaintiffs’ allegations to support their condonation theory amount to the following: at least two years before the shooting of Mr. Byers, Painter was sued civilly for another instance of on-the-job excessive force, and the allegations in that case point to additional prior instances of excessive force and/or other unconstitutional behavior. Unfortunately, this does not rise to the level of a “persistent and widespread . . . practice[]” that is “so permanent and well settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of law.”

To hold the County liable solely for the actions of a single individual—even if that individual acted unlawfully multiple times previously—absent a broader showing of policy, custom or culture, does not satisfy the custom or practice standard.

Count Five

The County asserts that it is absolutely immune from liability with respect to Count Five. Plaintiffs concede as much. Little more need be said.

Chesterfield County’s motion to dismiss granted.

Byers v. City of Richmond, Case No. 3:23-cv-801, June 17, 2026. EDVA at Richmond (Young). VLW 026-3-264. 15 pp.

Full-Text Opinion
VLW 026-3-264