Administrative – Defendant’s challenge to victim impact statement fails

Where a man who pleaded guilty to multiple counts, including attempted second-degree murder, challenged the trial court’s decision to admit two sentences in the impact statement submitted by the sister of the victim, his challenge was rejected.

Background

Theodore L. Hughes Jr. pleaded guilty to attempted second-degree murder, maliciously discharging a firearm within an occupied building, felony reckless handling of a firearm resulting in serious bodily injury, use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, and unlawful shooting in the commission of a felony. The parties entered a plea agreement that capped Hughes’s active sentence of incarceration at eight years. The trial court then sentenced Hughes to a total sentence of 33 years of incarceration, with 25 years suspended, for a total active sentence of incarceration of eight years.

Analysis

Hughes argues, “The trial court erred in admitting portions of a victim-impact statement submitted by the sister of the victim in violation of Virginia Code § 19.2-299.1 and supporting case law.” Hughes specifically challenges the trial court’s decision to admit two sentences in the victim impact statement.

As required by Code § 19.2-299.1, Hayes’s statement identified the victim, explained some of the medical and psychological consequences the victim had suffered and explained the psychological damage to the victim’s children and to her as their mother. The first sentence challenged by Hughes explains that R.F.’s children had “been traumatized and couldn’t sleep properly due to how abusive Theodore [Hughes] is.”

The trial court found that this sentence was admissible because it explained some of the harm suffered by R.F. in her role as the mother of her traumatized children. The second challenged sentence explained that Hughes had “threatened to take [R.F.’s] life plenty of times before but this time he actually put forth action.” As the trial court explained, the second challenged sentence “talks about the night in question,” and it also addresses the severity and seriousness of R.F.’s injuries at the hands of

Hughes.

Because trial courts “are vested with broad discretion in admitting evidence, and can be expected to exercise that discretion to exclude evidence that does not aid the court in the sentencing phase,” this court simply cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it ruled that the two challenged sentences were admissible—especially since those sentences appear to meet the requirements of Code § 19.2-299.1

Even if Hughes were correct that the two challenged sentences were outside of the scope of Code § 19.2-299.1, a trial court may still properly consider relevant evidence in making a sentencing decision. Here, the trial court carefully parsed the victim impact statement and excluded from consideration those portions of the statement that the trial court determined were irrelevant.

Although reasonable minds may disagree as to the significance of some of the language from the statement, this court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trial court when, as in this case, the appealing party has failed to show that the prejudicial effect of the admitted sentences outweighs the probative value of those sentences.

Affirmed.

Hughes Jr. v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0352-25-2, July 14, 2026. CAV (unpublished opinion) (per curiam). From the Circuit Court of Sussex County (Brittle Jr.). (Mary K. Martin, on brief), for appellant. (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Timothy J. Huffstutter, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. VLW 026-7-294. 8 pp.

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