Employment – Correctional officer’s suit is dismissed

Where a correctional officer failed to plead facts making her discrimination, retaliation and harassment claims plausible, her suit was dismissed.

Background

Nancy Crockett has served as a corrections officer in the Virginia Department of Corrections, or VDOC, for over four years. Beginning in September 2022, she was assigned to work every other week at a short-staffed facility in Augusta County. One night, several months after starting her Augusta position, Crockett was directed to spend nine hours in a room being trained by a particular officer.

That night, the officer was irate and aggressive. He repeatedly threatened to kill others at the facility, including Crockett. Crockett reported the behavior to her Augusta supervisors and other VDOC management. Crockett alleges that she was then subjected to discrimination, retaliation and harassment based on her sex and disabilities. VDOC and the Commonwealth of Virginia have moved to dismiss the second amended complaint, or SAC.

Rehabilitation Act

Crockett alleges that defendants are liable for discrimination and retaliation in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. She also adds a Section 504 “failure to accommodate” claim.

First, any potential “adverse employment actions” that predate defendants’ knowledge of Crockett’s disabilities cannot support a claim that defendants took such action solely because of her disabilities. Crockett also does not clarify which actions of “harassment” she is alleging constitute “adverse employment actions” that defendants took because of her disability.

Second even if the court considers the SAC to include a hostile work environment claim under § 504, it will nevertheless dismiss this claim. Crockett does not adequately allege facts showing that any of the harassment alleged in the complaint was carried out because of her disabilities. And Crockett’s allegations, accepted as true, are not sufficiently severe or pervasive.

Third, because it is unclear whether her disability was even discussed with management, none of these interactions can constitute protected activity for purposes of her retaliation claim. However, requesting disability accommodation is a protected activity under the Rehabilitation Act. Nevertheless, Crockett does not allege sufficient facts to support a finding that she faced harassment or other adverse action because she made accommodation requests. Further she does not allege that the perpetrators of the harassment knew about her protected activity (i.e., her accommodation requests).

Finally, regarding the failure to accommodate claim, defendants argue that the SAC does not make any specific allegations about the defendants’ response to the requests for uniforms, no tight spaces and glasses—including “whether Defendants denied these requests” at all, or whether the denials were unreasonable. The court agrees. The Rehabilitation Act claims are thus dismissed.

Exhaustion

Defendants argue the SAC’s new allegations pertaining to incidents in 2024 and 2025 are unrelated to the original EEOC charge. Neither party has presented Crockett’s EEOC charge or described its contents in detail. Because the court cannot determine whether the new claims are reasonably related at this time, it will not consider new allegations of events occurring after the EEOC charge was filed—Jan. 10, 2024—when evaluating Crockett’s Title VII claims.

Title VII discrimination

Crockett does not plausibly allege that she was treated differently than a similarly situated employee because of her gender. The SAC broadly compares Crockett to other officers and “individuals who received roving contracts,” but does not specify the gender of these other individuals or other characteristics to show they are similarly situated.

When Crockett does compare herself to male colleagues, she relies on broad, conclusory allegations. In the absence of a meaningful comparator, Crockett must provide other factual allegations supporting a plausible inference of unlawful discrimination. She does not provide such allegations in the SAC.

Crockett does, however, allege several instances of harassment that have clear gender-based connotations. These comments suffice to raise a general inference of sex discrimination, as they are gender-related. But Crockett does not include allegations suggesting that either of these incidents is an adverse employment action that “affect[s] the terms and conditions of her employment.”

Title VII retaliation

Crockett alleges that she reported to Hernandez “that she believed she was being retaliated against due to her legitimate reaction to Officer Watkins’ threats of violence, which as stated, Warden Newcomer apparently thought was caused by [] Crockett being female.” But even if Crockett did report this to Hernandez as sex discrimination or retaliation, she still does not explain how Hernandez’s knowledge of this complaint led to any subsequent retaliation by the defendants.

Crockett reasserts the EEOC charge filing as her second form of protected activity. But the court does not at this time consider allegations of events occurring after Jan. 10, 2024.

Defendants’ second motion to dismiss granted.

Crockett v. Commonwealth of Virginia, Case No. 5:24-cv-00084, April 23, 2026. WDVA at Harrisonburg (Yoon). VLW 026-3-186. 47 pp.

Full-Text Opinion

VLW 026-3-186
Virginia Lawyers Weekly