Employee’s pregnancy retaliation claim to proceed to trial

A former supervisor at Volvo’s Dublin assembly plant saw his employment retaliation claim survive a partial motion to dismiss filed by his former employer.

The former employee, Forest Lawton, alleged he was placed on an improvement plan and subsequently terminated partially as retaliation for reporting an alleged failure to provide pregnancy-related accommodations for a fellow team member.

Volvo motioned to dismiss the count that alleged the automaker violated the
Virginia Human Rights Act by failing to provide pregnancy accommodations to Lawton’s team member.

U.S. District Judge Thomas T. Cullen of the Western District of Virginia denied the partial motion to dismiss.

Cullen wrote that Lawton’s failure to cite Va. Code § 2.2-3905 in his amended complaint — an omission Volvo argued “cannot be ignored” — did not ultimately doom his motion.

“As a threshold matter, Lawton’s failure to cite to Virginia Code § 2.2-3905 in his amended complaint is not fatal to his claim,” Cullen wrote. “Lawton styles Count X as a claim for ‘retaliation in violation of the VHRA,’ … which is a core component of a larger statutory scheme.”

Cullen’s May 13 opinion is Lawton v. Volvo Group North America LLC (VLW 026-3-211).

Attorneys for both parties in the case did not respond to requests for comment by press time.

Background

Lawton was employed at Volvo’s New River Valley assembly plant for 20 years. That employment continued after 2019, when he had a brain tumor removed that had caused significant hearing loss, requiring Lawton to wear hearing aids.

In September 2023, Lawton received training from Volvo’s legal department on new legal developments. After this training, Lawton approached the training leader and stated that he believed his direct supervisor was “targeting one of his team members based on pregnancy.”

Stemming from the training, Lawton believed Volvo needed to provide legally required pregnancy accommodations to the team member, who had regular duties including bending and squatting “approximately 30 times per day” to install air lines.

Lawton alleged his supervisor instructed him to cease a pregnancy-related accommodation of providing a chair to the team member at the workstation. Believing this request broke the law, Lawton reported it to human resources. According to the opinion, the pregnant co-worker never received proper accommodations and went on maternity leave earlier than planned.

Independent of the pregnancy accommodation issue, Lawton worked in the chassis line — the loudest area in the plant. As such, he could not use hearing protection and still hear adequately due to his hearing loss. Lawton’s January 2024 request to be moved to a quieter area of the plant was denied, and Lawton was told to go on disability.

Lawton refused and was placed on a plan of improvement, or PIP, 10 days later. On April 3, 2024, Lawton’s employment was terminated due to a “work force reduction.”

Lawton filed suit, claiming Volvo placed him on the PIP and ultimately terminated him in retaliation for reporting the failure to provide pregnancy-related accommodations for his coworker and for requesting accommodations for his own hearing disability. Charges were filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Virginia Office of Civil Rights.

A complaint was filed in Pulaski County Circuit Court in January 2025. An amended complaint was filed later that year, and Volvo filed a notice of removal to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia in January 2026.

In sum, Lawton brought 10 causes of action against Volvo — seven pertaining to his disability and three to opposition to denial of pregnancy-related accommodations. Volvo sought to dismiss only the final count: alleged retaliation in violation of the VHRA.

Case proceeds

In his amended complaint, Lawton cited Va. Code § 2.2-3909 to support his claims of retaliation in violation of the VHRA. The statute states in relevant part that employers cannot take “adverse action against an employee who requests or uses a reasonable hardship.”

Under that language, Volvo argued,
Lawton lacked standing because it suggests that no person besides the pregnant or new nursing mother can assert rights under the statute.

Lawton also asserted in a response that Va. Code § 2.2-3905 bars discrimination against an employee due to opposition activity.

Volvo replied, arguing that Lawton “is attempting to ‘back door’ his way into standing” by referencing the additional code section after filing his amended complaint — which Volvo alleged is “impermissibl[e].”

Cullen disagreed.

“Although he did not explicitly cite to § 2.2-3905 in his amended complaint, he specifically alleged opposition activity under the VHRA, which is a core component of a larger statutory scheme,” Cullen wrote. “Lawton is therefore not attempting to alter his claim by discussing a directly applicable VHRA provision in his brief that is not explicitly cited in the amended complaint.”

The judge added that Lawton “also has the better reading of Virginia Code § 2.2-3905(B)(7).

“Although Volvo is correct that, unlike the [Pregnant Workers Fairness Act],
Virginia’s analogous provision does not explicitly protect opposition activity like Lawton’s, the PWFA is a standalone act while Virginia Code § 2.2-3909 is a part of a larger statutory scheme — the VHRA,” Cullen wrote.

Cullen also turned to the plain language of Va. Code § 2.2-3905(B)(7), which provides in part that it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee because of opposition to “any practice made an unlawful discriminatory practice by this chapter.”

With that in mind, Cullen wrote that the “plain language … protects opposition to any practice deemed unlawful under any provision in the VHRA.”

The judge wrote that Lawton’s action is protected and that he has standing under the code.

“Adopting Volvo’s interpretation, which focuses solely on the language in Virginia Code § 2.2-3909, would require the court to interpret the statutory language in isolation, rather than as a part of the broader statutory scheme that comprises the VHRA,” Cullen wrote. “The court declines to do so here.” — U.S. District Judge Thomas T. Cullen, Western District of Virginia

The court left unaddressed an argument Volvo brought up for the first time in a reply brief — that Lawton failed to allege a causal connection between his opposition activity and his termination “because the temporal gap is too attenuated.”

Because Volvo made this claim for the first time in the reply brief, Cullen wrote that the court “will therefore decline to address this argument.”

As such, Volvo’s partial motion to dismiss was denied, and Lawton’s VHRA claim is able to proceed.

Lawton v. Volvo Group North America LLC

ISSUE           Can a former employee’s claim that his employer violated the VHRA when failing to provide pregnancy-related accommodations to a co-worker proceed to trial?

Answer      Yes (Western District of Virginia)

Attorneys  Monica L. Mroz, Monica Mroz Law, Roanoke (for plaintiff); D. Paul Holdsworth, Jackson Lewis, Richmond (for defendant)

• Lawton v. Volvo Group North America LLC