Company escapes liability for allegedly stolen goods

Where a federal statute generally preempts state law causes of action for goods lost or damaged in transit, a homeowner alleging her household goods were lost or stolen during a move could not escape application of the statute by alleging theft or other criminal conduct.

Background

Cathy Marie Brentzel sued Fairfax Transfer and Storage, or FTS, alleging two counts related to the loss of household goods transported from a Virginia residence to a Washington, D.C. residence, and a third count for alleged theft of money and a ring from the D.C. residence The district court granted FTS’s motion to dismiss the complaint.

Bills of lading

Brentzel contends first that the district court’s review of the bills of lading was improper as the bills were not essential or integral to her claims. Because the statute on which her claim is based required a receipt or bill of lading to be issued and explicitly recognized that the document could limit liability in certain instances, the bills of lading or other receipts (or lack thereof) would be necessary to determine the scope of liability and the details of the agreement between the parties. While it is true that Brentzel could have instituted her claim even if no bill of lading was issued, Brentzel makes no argument, either below or on appeal, that FTS failed to issue a bill of lading. Accordingly, the district court correctly found that the bills of lading were integral to Brentzel’s claims.

On appeal, Brentzel surmises that the back of the bills of lading attached to the motion to dismiss may not have been on the back of the documents signed by a member of her household staff, David Lamonde. However, below, Brentzel did not dispute that the bills of lading proffered by FTS with its motion to dismiss were complete and were presented to and signed by Lamonde.

Moreover, Brentzel avers that, when she filed the complaint, she possessed copies of the bills of lading that did not include the back of the FTS form, where the time limitations were listed. Thus, Brentzel would have been able to raise her current authenticity claim in district court. As such, given that the bills of lading were integral to Brentzel’s claims and that there was no timely objection to their authenticity, the district court properly considered the bills during the motion to dismiss.

Authority

Brentzel next asserts that the district court erred in determining that the complaint admitted (or inferred) that Lamonde had actual and/or apparent authority to sign the bills of lading. While Brentzel alleged in her complaint that the agency was “strictly limited,” she did not aver whether there was an employment/agency contract (whether oral or written), whether she had specific discussions with Lamonde about signing moving-related documents or what sort of discretion Lamonde was permitted in order to execute the move.

Accepting Brentzel’s interpretation of her complaint, she alleged an unworkable agreement with Lamonde, whereby she gave him authority to commence, oversee, and execute the move but forbade him from signing the necessary documentation. Such an interpretation is implausible and does not prevent dismissal of the motion.

In addition, even assuming that the agency relationship was structured in this implausible manner, the complaint is silent as to how, when or where FTS was made aware of these allegedly strict limitations. Accordingly, because the complaint’s allegations that were contrary to the district court’s ruling were not entitled to a presumption of truth, the contours of the agency relationship did not require any factual findings.

Brentzel next contends that Lamonde’s deviations (or Lamonde’s acquiescence to FTS’s deviations) from the agreed-upon moving arrangements placed FTS on notice that it should inquire further prior to permitting Lamonde to sign the bills of lading. Brentzel provides no facts from which to infer that FTS should not have relied on Lamonde’s apparent authority.

Preemption

Brentzel argues that FTS’s actions were so extreme that they constituted an abandonment of the “contract of carriage” and were criminal in nature. Brentzel contends that the extreme nature of FTS’s alleged actions removed the claim from Carmack Amendment preemption.

Brentzel provides no support for an exception to preemption for state law claims alleging theft or other criminal conduct resulting in damage or destruction to property during shipping. To the contrary, the Third Circuit has specifically found that even state law claims based on “intentional conduct or conduct in the nature of theft” are preempted. Thus, the district court correctly found that Brentzel’s state law claim for damage to and theft of her property during shipping was preempted by the Carmack Amendment.

Affirmed.

Brentzel v. Fairfax Transfer and Storage Inc., Case No. 21-1025, Dec. 29, 2021. 4th Cir. (per curiam), from EDVA at Alexandria (Ellis). James R. Tate for Appellant. Robert R. Worst for Appellee. VLW 021-2-353. 15 pp.