Tort – Court refuses to reverse defamation verdict

Where defendants filed a Rule 59(e) motion after a jury found them liable for defamation, but their motion did not establish any intervening change in controlling law, relied on evidence adduced during the trial and legal theories available prior to judgment and did not demonstrate a clear error of law or manifest injustice that undermines the integrity of the verdict, it was denied.

Background

This case arose from Pamela Hartnett’s allegations that between July 20 and July 25, 2019, she suffered assault and battery, defamation, trespass, malicious prosecution and other offenses at the hands of defendants. Defendants brought counterclaims of malicious prosecution. Following the jury trial, defendants have filed a Rule 59 motion.

Arguments

Defendants contend that, because the jury found they were not liable for assault, battery or malicious prosecution, defendants’ statements labeling plaintiff a liar are either true or constitutionally protected opinions based on disclosed facts. Consequently, defendants argue, the statements are not actionable under Virginia law, and the court should reverse the jury’s defamation verdict as logically inconsistent with its other verdicts.

Plaintiff responds that defendants’ Rule 59(e) motion fails at the threshold because it is untimely in substance and identifies no intervening change in controlling law, new evidence or clear error/manifest injustice. She contends that defendants’ inconsistency argument does not establish that the defamation verdict is legally irreconcilable with the jury’s finding on the other counts. She further argues the motion impermissibly re-packages arguments that were, or could have been, made earlier and revisits factual and legal issues the jury has already decided

Analysis

The court denies defendants’ motion because it fails to establish any of the three possible conditions needed to plead a Rule 59(e) motion successfully. First, defendants do not establish any intervening change in controlling law that would warrant relief under Rule 59(e).

Second, defendants fail to identify any newly discovered evidence that would warrant relief under Rule 59(e). The court agrees with plaintiff that the entirety of defendants’ argument relies on evidence adduced during the trial and legal theories available prior to judgment. Third, defendants do not demonstrate a clear error of law or manifest injustice that undermines the integrity of the verdict.

Moreover the record does not support defendants’ conclusion that their statements are protected opinion based on fully disclosed, non-defamatory facts. Defendants published a series of posts that obfuscated the distinction between protected opinion and actionable assertions of objective fact regarding plaintiff. Defendants’ statements assumed a pretense of factual authority by drawing parallels to a notorious convicted murderer.

Defendants also contend that because the jury rejected plaintiff’s assault, battery  and malicious prosecution claims, it necessarily found that she “lied” about those events, rendering the defamation verdict inconsistent and indefensible. The court does not adopt that inference. The elements and burdens for those torts differ from those for defamation.

Defendants’ Rule 59(e) motion denied.

Hartnett v. Hardenbergh, Case No. 3:23-cv-17, Feb. 24, 2026. EDVA at Richmond (Hudson). VLW 026-3-087. 14 pp.

Full-Text Opinion

VLW 026-3-087
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