Employee’s racial bias claim can go forward

Where the former employee of an educational program for at-risk adolescents alleged that he was treated differently than white employees, and included specific factual allegations of the different treatment, that was sufficient to state a claim for race discrimination.

Charles Holloway sued his former employer, the Maryland Military Department, and related entities Freestate Challenge Academy and the State of Maryland, alleging that they discriminated against him on the basis of race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court dismissed Holloway’s complaint for failure to state a claim.

Regarding unlawful termination, the district court concluded that Holloway had “failed to plead a prima facie case of discrimination” because his complaint did not plead facts showing that his work was satisfactory to his employer or that any proffered comparators were similarly situated to Holloway and treated more favorably.

The court dismissed the hostile-work-environment claim because the allegations were not “severe or pervasive” enough to state a plausible claim. As for retaliation, the district court concluded that Holloway failed to allege a causal link between his EEO complaints and his termination, given that he was terminated “well over six months after his first EEO complaint and nearly three months after his last EEO complaint.”

It has long been the rule that “an employment discrimination plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination” under the evidentiary framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), to withstand a motion to dismiss. The district court therefore erred in requiring Holloway to plead facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.

To state a claim for unlawful termination, a Title VII plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to raise a plausible inference that his employer discharged him because of his race. In his complaint, Holloway alleged that defendants terminated him for the stated reasons of budget mismanagement and low enrollment but that those reasons were a pretext for racial discrimination.

Holloway alleged three important facts in support: (1) John Nickerson, who was white, was the person actually responsible for budget oversight but did not receive any adverse performance evaluation or disciplinary sanction for the alleged budget mismanagement; (2) Holloway’s predecessor, Charles Rose, who was white, was not disciplined for multiple years of low enrollment and (3) defendants contravened their own human resources policy by not giving Holloway an opportunity to enter into a performance improvement plan before terminating him.

Holloway also alleged that Nicholas Pindale, who possessed the authority to fire employees, refused to communicate directly with Holloway as he did with white directors but instead required Holloway to communicate with Princess Neal Washington, who is black. These facts are sufficient to raise the inference of a Title VII violation “above a speculative level.”

Turning next to Holloway’s claim of retaliation, the district court held that Holloway failed to plead facts supporting a causal connection between his EEO complaints and his termination. Holloway’s complaint alleges that he submitted three EEO complaints, the last of which he filed almost three months before he was terminated. But in some cases, intervening events can bridge what would otherwise be a prohibitively long temporal gap.

Here, Holloway has alleged that, during their early morning meeting in June, Jeffrey Teller “exclaimed” that he was aware of Holloway’s EEO complaint against Pindale and that Teller “would be involved.” This intervening comment by Holloway’s supervisor, taken as true, tempers the temporal gap between Holloway’s last EEO complaint and his termination. Considering the timing, Teller’s intervening statement and the previously identified allegations of pretext together, Holloway has alleged facts supporting a plausible inference that he was terminated “because” of his protected activity.

Turning last to Holloway’s claim that he was subjected to an abusive or hostile work environment based on his race or protected activity, Holloway’s complaint falls considerably short of alleging an abusive working environment. Evaluation and criticism of one’s work performance, while perhaps unpleasant, is not abusive. Nor can failure to praise support a hostile work environment claim. And the court rejects Holloway’s contention that one episode of yelling and pounding the table, even considered with his other allegations, is sufficiently severe or pervasive to establish an abusive environment.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.

Holloway v. State of Maryland, No. 20-1958.  April 25, 2022.  4th Cir. (Rushing), from USDC at Baltimore, Maryland (Bennett). Jeremy David Greenberg for appellant. Lisa O’Mara Arnquist for appellee. VLW 022-2-107. 12 pp.