Virginia Lawyers Weekly//March 23, 2026//
Virginia Lawyers Weekly//March 23, 2026//
Where a woman sued an agency of the Korean government that was not engaging in exempt commercial activity, the agency was immune from suit.
Hyuna Lee sued Korea Innovation Center, or KIC, Korea-U.S. Science Cooperation Center, or KUSCO, National Research Foundation of Korea, or NRF, and Sihoon Ryu, asserting 16 claims. Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss.
NRF argues that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over it because it is immune from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Because NRF is an agency or instrumentality of the Korean government that was not engaging in exempt commercial activity, the court agrees. Accordingly, the claims against NRF will be dismissed, and NRF will be removed as a defendant in this action.
Because plaintiff has alleged that she was paid $30,000 per year less than her predecessor for the same role, she has sufficiently pleaded a prima facie case, and the claim will be permitted to go forward on this disparate treatment theory. Turning to her alleged discharge, plaintiff fails to assert sufficient facts to properly allege that her discharge was connected to her gender, rather than some other more plausible factor (such as retaliation).
Finally, the other various incidents alleged by plaintiff are the kinds of workplace incidents that courts have held do not constitute adverse employment actions because they do not affect the terms and conditions of employment. And, to the extent plaintiff relies on the male senior manager and trainee as comparators to establish that this treatment was gender-based, she has not pled sufficient facts to allow the court to determine whether these coworkers were similarly situated. Thus, plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim will proceed only with respect to her pay disparity claim.
Plaintiff engaged in a protected activity when she lodged a complaint with KUSCO on April 5, 2024, about Sihoon’s “abusive, harassing, defamatory, discriminatory and retaliatory conduct” and discussed such complaints with Sihoon on April 15, 2024. Plaintiff alleges that, right after she met with Sihoon a second time on April 29, 2024, Sihoon told plaintiff that he would extend her trial period, which prevented her from receiving full benefits.
And plaintiff alleges that, around this time period, Sihoon told at least one KIC employee that he would fire plaintiff after her program ended in July. On Aug. 27, 2024, plaintiff was fired. These allegations are sufficient to state a retaliation claim.
Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to connect any of the conduct of which she complains to her gender. Moreover, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the alleged harassment from which she suffered was sufficiently severe or pervasive.
As to her retaliatory hostile work environment claim, many of her allegations are too conclusory for the court to rely upon, and plaintiff fails to allege when the more specific allegations occurred such that the court cannot assess whether they were sufficiently pervasive. And, as with her gender-based hostile work environment claim, the court does not find that these allegations are sufficiently severe to state a claim. These claims will be dismissed.
The essence of plaintiff’s claim is that her predecessor was a man that was paid $100,000 per year, while she was paid $70,000 per year for the same role. Accordingly, plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a prima facie case, and this claim will not be dismissed.
The Virginia Equal Pay Act provides that it “shall not apply to employers covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 as amended.” Defendants argue that because plaintiff alleges that defendants violated the FLSA, her VEPA claim must fail.
However, courts have held that,
“[a]lthough [plaintiff] may be unable to prevail on both theories, at this stage, [plaintiff] is entitled to allege alternative facts and theories which support different and contradictory claims for relief.” Accordingly, plaintiff’s VEPA claim will not be dismissed on this basis.
Sihoon is not plausibly alleged to be plaintiff’s employer, but is instead referenced merely as her supervisor. Accordingly, this claim will be dismissed as to Sihoon.
Plaintiff alleges that Sihoon “publicly criticized,” “scolded,” “humiliated,” and “publicly rebuked” plaintiff. However,
“[i]nsensitive and demeaning conduct does not equate to outrageous behavior.” Accordingly, plaintiff’s IIED claim will be dismissed. And because the vicarious liability claim is for plaintiff’s IIED claim, that claim is also dismissed.
Plaintiff asserts that her Bowman claim is based on the public policy embodied in the Virginia Whistleblower Protection Act. That statute creates its own private right of action. “Numerous Virginia courts have found that ‘statutes containing their own remedy cannot also support a Bowman claim.’” This claim is dismissed.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss granted in part, denied in part.
Lee v. Korea Innovation Center, Case No. 1:25-cv-635, March 11, 2026. EDVA at Alexandria (Alston). VLW 026-3-115. 32 pp.
VLW 026-3-115
Virginia Lawyers Weekly