Search & Seizure – Warrant allowed search of vehicle within curtilage

Where a man moved to suppress evidence found in a vehicle, his motion was denied. The search warrant allowed law enforcement to search vehicles on the property, and the vehicle at issue here was within the curtilage of the home.

Background                              

Rasheed Azali Mells appeals the circuit court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search of a vehicle and coercive statements made by him and his daughter by law enforcement officials.

Fourth Amendment

Mells argues that the search of the vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment because the target of the warrant was Dwayne Washington and his property, and the Hyundai was at the end of the driveway, “not anywhere near the house.” This court disagrees.

Washington’s home was particularly described in the search warrant, so a search of its curtilage was also authorized. The Hyundai was clearly within the curtilage of Washington’s home because it sat in the gravel parking lot that was a part of Washington’s driveway, in the yard of the home, a mere 35-second walk to the front door.

Given the Hyundai’s presence in the curtilage of a particularly described dwelling and the warrant’s express authorization to search any vehicle on the property, this court finds no error in the circuit court’s denial of Mells’s motion to suppress on the basis of the Fourth Amendment.

Fifth Amendment

Mells next argues that he was improperly questioned by law enforcement when he was handcuffed by police with zip ties and surrounded by officers while the property was searched. Mells asserted that he was asked incriminating questions while he was not free to leave, without the constitutional protections of Miranda.

The trial court held that Mells was only temporarily detained and was not in custody, as defined under the Miranda standard, because “a warrant to search . . . carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted.” However, because he was handcuffed using zip ties and surrounded by a dozen law enforcement officials, Mells was in custody. Clearly, his freedom of movement was restrained. A reasonable person would not have thought they were free to leave.

This court must next ask whether he was interrogated. This court finds that he was. Deputy Wells, asking who owned the black Hyundai and the gun, did constitute an interrogation because (1) it was reasonably likely to elicit incriminating information because (2) police had found contraband before they asked Mells the questions. As such, because Mells was under custodial interrogation without the benefit of his Miranda rights, if Mells had made any statements regarding possession of a firearm, they would have been suppressed.

However, Mells did not answer the questions that Wells asked. Mells offered no other incriminating information before he was Mirandized. And Mells’s acknowledgment that he had driven the car was irrelevant after his later, explicit confession that the drugs and firearms were his. Therefore, this court cannot say the trial court erred in denying Mells’s motion to suppress.

Fourteenth Amendment

“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment forbids the use of involuntary confessions.” Here, Mells has not met his burden of establishing coercion. Detective McCall stated that, if nobody claimed ownership of the firearm and drugs found inside the Hyundai, both Mells and Mells’s adult daughter, Angela Carr, could be jointly charged with their possession. However law enforcement had probable cause to arrest both Mells and Carr at that point in the encounter. Mells and Carr both admitted to driving the vehicle and, at different points, claimed ownership of the vehicle.

Affirmed.

Mells v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0279-25-2, April 21, 2026. CAV (unpublished opinion) (Causey). From the Circuit Court of Fluvanna County (Barredo). (Bryan J. Jones; Bryan J. Jones, LLC, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief. Justin B. Hill, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. VLW 026-7-156. 12 pp.

Full-Text Opinion

VLW 026-7-156
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